The Economics of River Flood Management: A Challenge for the Federal Organization? by Lünenbürger, Benjamin
The Economics of River Flood
Management: A Challenge for
the Federal Organization?
Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Würde eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.)
an der Fakultät für Wirtschafts - und Sozialwissenschaften
der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
vorgelegt von
Benjamin Lünenbürger
im November 2006

Acknowledgment
This dissertation has greatly beneﬁted from the support, encouragement, and critical
comments of others. It is my pleasure to thank them.
My advisers, Prof. Hans Gersbach and Prof. Reimund Schwarze supported me
throughout the last years. Without their helpful comments, questions and their en-
couragement this dissertation would not have been completed in the present form. A
special recognition is due to Prof. Schwarze, who took it upon himself to advise me all
the way from Berlin.
My work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Their ﬁnancial
support made the graduate program Environmental and Resource Economics possi-
ble. This program took place in collaboration of the University of Heidelberg and the
University of Mannheim. It created a supportive and stimulating academic and social
environment for the work on this dissertation. Thanks to the program directors, Prof.
Klaus Conrad and Prof. Hans Gersbach, and to the coordinators, Dr. Olaf Hölzer, Dr.
Martin Quaas, and Dr. Lars Siemers.
Thanks is also due to my colleagues at the graduate program and the Alfred Weber
Institut, particularly Christian Almer, Prof. Stefan Baumgärtner, Dr. Christian Becker,
Svenja Espenhorst, Christoph Heinzel, Dr. Friderike Hofmeister, Eva Kiesele, Felix
Mühe, Grischa Perino, Dr. Markus Schaller, Maik Schneider, Michael Schreibweis, Dr.
Christian Traeger, Dr. Sheila Wertz-Kannouniko, and Dr. Ralph Winkler.
The dissertation beneﬁted from helpful comments from seminar participants in Hei-
delberg, Rostock, Berlin and Leipzig. For proof-reading my thanks go to Dr. Friderike
Hofmeister, Grischa Perino, Ellen Roberts, and Maik Schneider.
My thanks go to my wife Ellen Roberts, who gave be moral support in all these
years. This cannot be valued too much. Without her support and her belief in me this
dissertation would not have been possible. Finally, my thanks and gratitude go to my
new born daughter, Sophia, for her long-awaited arrival, which she delayed just long
enough to allow the completion of this dissertation.
i
ii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Empirical motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Theoretical motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 The economic problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 The modeling approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Outline of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Introduction to river ﬂood management 9
2.1 Physical causes of river ﬂoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 River ﬂood damage and ﬂood exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Flood defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Flood mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2 Flood adaption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.3 The spatial aspect of ﬂood defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Stylized facts of ﬂood management: an economic perspective . . . . . . . 21
2.4.1 Public goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.2 Unidirectional spatial spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.3 Spatially restricted beneﬁts of local public goods . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.4 Risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 River ﬂood management in Germany 27
3.1 The legal foundation of ﬂood management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Spatial spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.1 The size of spatial spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.2 Spatial spillovers and the federal organization of ﬂood manage-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.3 Summary on spatial spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Flood-prone areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.1 Land use in ﬂood-prone areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Private responses to ﬂooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.3 Flood-prone areas and the federal organization of ﬂood manage-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Future developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 In search of an eﬃcient organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4 Local public goods and ﬁscal federalism 59
4.1 The early literature on ﬁscal federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Unidirectional spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
iii
Contents
4.3 The political-economy of local public goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Migration in a federal state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5 The economic problem of ﬂood defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5 The political-economy of local public goods 77
5.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Public good provision under diﬀerent federal organizations . . . . . . . . 82
5.2.1 The socially optimal outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2.2 Asymmetric spillovers and homogeneous regions . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2.3 Heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions, no spillovers . . . . . . . . 91
5.2.4 Unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous regions . . . . . . . . 93
5.3 Extensions: central standards and partial centralization . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6 Migration and myopic voting 111
6.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2 Social optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2.1 Two regions with unidirectional spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2.2 An illustrative example of the social optimum . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.3 Sequence of the game and the federal organization . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.4 Unidirectional spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.4.1 Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.4.2 Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4.3 Decentralization or centralization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.5 Flood-prone areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7 Migration and non-myopic voting 149
7.1 Unidirectional spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.1.1 Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.1.2 Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.1.3 Decentralization or centralization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.2 Flood-prone areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.3 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.4 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
8 Conclusions 177
8.1 Summary of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.2 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.3 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
iv
List of Figures
2.1 Flood-prone areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Flood damage estimate for the United States (for hydrological years) and
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Cascade of ﬂood risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Flood damage estimate per capita and per million dollars of wealth for
the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Flood protection measures in a river basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Problems of ﬁt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Stylized illustration of the diﬀerent ﬂood-prone areas . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Migration equilibria in a two region local economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1 Federal organizations with asymmetrical spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Critical unidirectional spillover with a downstream majority . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Majority decision depending on the high-beneﬁt share . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 Federal organizations with unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous
beneﬁts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.5 Unidirectional spillovers, heterogeneous beneﬁts and uniformity restrictions100
5.6 Centralized public good provision with and without uniformity restrictions101
5.7 Federal organizations with partial centralized voting and unidirectional
spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.1 |H¯5| of the social optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.2 Social optimal equilibrium allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.3 Indirect utility from decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.4 Indirect utility from centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.5 Comparison of public good provision with myopic voting . . . . . . . . . 134
6.6 Comparison of the population distribution with myopic voting . . . . . . 134
6.7 Comparison of utility with myopic voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.8 Utility depending on spillovers and public good beneﬁts with myopic voting136
6.9 Utility depending on land outside the ﬂood plain with myopic voting . . 140
6.10 Socially optimal consumption of the private goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.11 Decentralized equilibrium allocation with myopic voting . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.12 Centralized equilibrium allocation with myopic voting and an upstream
majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.13 Centralized equilibrium allocation with myopic voting and a downstream
majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
v
List of Figures
7.1 Comparison of public good provision with non-myopic voting . . . . . . . 165
7.2 Locational eﬃciency with non-myopic voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.3 Comparison of population distribution with non-myopic voting . . . . . . 166
7.4 Comparison of utility with non-myopic voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.5 Utility diﬀerence between decentralization and centralization with non-
myopic voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.6 Flood-prone areas and the migration equilibrium with non-myopic voting 170
7.7 Decentralized equilibrium allocation with non-myopic voting . . . . . . . 173
7.8 Second-order condition for g1 for decentralized non-myopic voting . . . . 174
7.9 Existence of a decentralized migration equilibrium with non-myopic voting174
7.10 Centralized equilibrium allocation with non-myopic voting . . . . . . . . 175
7.11 Utility and population size depending on land outside the ﬂood plain for
non-myopic voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Spatial ﬂood protection eﬀects of ﬂood mitigation measures . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Taxanomy of ﬂood management measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 Recent large ﬂood events in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Competences in ﬂood management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vii

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Empirical motivation
River ﬂoods can be very damaging. Recent large scale ﬂood events, such as the 2002
Elbe ﬂood in Middle and Central Europe, illustrate the vulnerability of societies to ﬂood
hazards. Even though such extreme events are rare, there is a long history of damaging
ﬂoods all around the world. For the last 25 years the average ﬂood damage per year is
estimated to be about 3.3 and 4 billion US dollars for Europe and the United States,
respectively (see section 2.2). Discussions on an upward trend in ﬂood damages coincide
with the observation of increased human encroachment of ﬂood-prone areas near rivers.
Such land-use changes increase the value at risk to ﬂooding. The accumulation of wealth
in sensitive areas is an ongoing process in Germany. In the nineteen nineties 0.56% of
areas near rivers were transformed into human settlements and transport infrastructure,
the respective share for the whole of Germany is only 0.48%. These ﬁgures suggest
that a saturation point of urbanization in ﬂood-sensitive areas has not yet been reached,
which is surprising since the share of human settlements and transport infrastructure is
traditionally high in these areas. Currently 16.5% of areas near rivers are taken up by
human settlements and infrastructure, compared to 7.7% for the whole of Germany (see
section 3.3.1).
Flood risk is increasingly seen in the context of climate change. However, for past
ﬂood events it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a climate change imprint in damage data. This is
not surprising, since damaging ﬂoods are typically rare events and non-climate related
factors have also changed signiﬁcantly in recent decades. However, conﬁdence has grown
that climate change will lead to more extreme weather events in the future, which is most
likely to increase ﬂood risk and increase the importance of river ﬂood management (IPCC
2001b).
A wide range of human responses to ﬂood risk are possible. It is the aim of ﬂood
management to ﬁnd the most eﬃcient combination of the diﬀerent possible measures.
This goal is ambitious since the diﬀerent responses have quite diﬀerent characteristics
and involve diﬀerent economic issues. Some measures are locally so restricted that they
are private goods; an example is ﬂood proof building. Other measures, such as levees, are
beneﬁcial for a whole community and are therefore public goods. Public ﬂood defense
can have purely local eﬀects, making it to an issue of local public good provision, but it
can also have inter-regional spillovers that aﬀect communities downstream. Since water
1
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ﬂows from upstream locations to downstream locations, these spillovers are typically
unidirectional. This raises the question of how spillovers can be internalized in the
decision process on public goods. Depending on the ﬂood defense measure, unidirectional
spillovers can be positive (ﬂood basins) or negative (levees that cut oﬀ natural ﬂood
basins). The topography of watersheds usually allows the distinction between ﬂood-
prone areas and areas without ﬂood risk which leads to an uneven distribution of the
beneﬁts from ﬂood defense: Citizens located near rivers beneﬁt, whereas citizens further
away from a river have no direct advantage from ﬂood defense. This induces spatially
heterogeneous preferences for public ﬂood defense.
There is a close interrelation between public and private decisions in ﬂood manage-
ment. Private locational choices of individuals interact with public ﬂood defense. A
high ﬂood protection level can trigger locational choices of individuals and lead to hu-
man encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas in natural ﬂood basins.
Floods are uncertain events. Thus, responses to ﬂoods can be approached as a form
of risk management. While some responses aim to reduce the probability of a damaging
ﬂood (measures in the watershed that mitigate ﬂood risk), others try to reduce the
damaging impact of ﬂoods (ﬂood adaption through appropriate land use). Since chances
of an extreme ﬂood associated with catastrophic damages in any given year are low, there
may be a misperception of ﬂood risk that leads to inadequate mitigation or adaption
eﬀorts.
To focus on key problems of ﬂood management in Germany, its institutional orga-
nization is analyzed. Such an analysis can serve as the basis for a formal approach
that captures some key problems of ﬂood management in general. A few stylized facts
characterize the current situation of ﬂood management in Germany:
. Public ﬂood defense is provided by all federal levels in Germany. The commu-
nal level is responsible for ﬂood defense at small water bodies and for land-use
planning. The Bundesländer 1 provide ﬂood defense along the major rivers. The
federal government introduced central ﬂood protection standards for the whole of
Germany. In addition it gave substantial ad hoc disaster relief to aﬀected citizens
after major ﬂood events in the past.
. Improvements in ﬂood protection are often only possible through measures with
inter-jurisdictional spillovers. In the current debate on improved ﬂood protection,
some measures can only be undertaken at upstream locations. Examples are po-
tential ﬂood basins along the Upper Rhine for a better protection of cities, such
as Cologne, on the lower Rhine.
. It is the exception and not the rule that public ﬂood defense is provided by a
jurisdiction that is tailored to ﬂood-prone areas. Usually a jurisdiction also includes
citizens in no risk zones. It is also common that a jurisdiction stretches over several
watersheds.
. There is an increasing awareness that high ﬂood damage in recent years correlates
1German states are called Bundesländer.
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with an accumulation of wealth in ﬂood-prone areas. However, so far this accu-
mulation of wealth is largely not seen as a response to the improved public ﬂood
defense of recent decades.
These stylized facts can all be interpreted as challenges for the federal organization
of public ﬂood defense. Firstly, unidirectional spillovers challenge a decentralized provi-
sion of ﬂood protection, because the interests of downstream riparians are neglected by
upstream jurisdictions. Secondly, jurisdictions with both risk and no risk areas might
be challenged to eﬃciently provide ﬂood defense, since one group of citizens wants ﬂood
protection and another group has no interest in it. Thirdly, the federal organization can
be challenged by inter- and intra-jurisdictional migration ﬂows that respond to the level
of public ﬂood defense. Public good provision that is eﬃcient for a given population
distribution might not be eﬃcient for a jurisdiction of smaller or larger population size.
1.2 Theoretical motivation
The literature on ﬁscal federalism can serve as a starting point for a study on public ﬂood
defense and its challenges to the federal organization. This literature looks at the vertical
distribution of public responsibilities with the aim to provide suggestions how to achieve
an eﬃcient provision with public goods. It is well established in the literature that
ﬁrst-best solutions are often hard to achieve, even if one assumes a social planner who
cares about the utility of all citizens within a jurisdiction (Oates 1999, List and Mason
2001). This draws attention to comparisons of second-best approaches. In his inﬂuential
contribution Fiscal Federalism Oates (1972) postulates in his decentralization theorem
that the lowest governmental level that internalizes spillovers shall provide the public
good. Also, with inter-regional spillovers, the decentralized supply can be superior to
the centralized supply because of the possibility to diﬀerentiate public goods according
to local preferences. This argument relies on the assumption that a centralized provision
of public goods is restricted to a uniform supply within the whole jurisdiction. With this
assumption, centralization is only superior to decentralization if spillovers are suﬃciently
large.
Recent contributions challenge this view and emphasize a slightly diﬀerent trade-oﬀ
between decentralized and centralized supply of public goods. Besley and Coate (2003)
ﬁnd the uniformity restriction not very plausible, because a central government could
theoretically choose a diﬀerentiated supply pattern of public goods. Focusing on the
decision making process and not on the ﬁction of a social planner, Besley and Coate
see the disadvantage of centralization in ineﬃcient voting decisions. Voters from one
region care about public goods in other regions only if they receive spillovers. Public
good supply in a central jurisdiction is not required to be uniform but must be approved
by a majority of voters. This may result in strong regional diﬀerences of public goods
if spillovers are weak. For stronger spillovers these diﬀerences can be expected to de-
crease. Thus, also in political-economy approaches, spillovers are the critical parameter
determining whether decentralization or centralization is superior. A basic assumption
of political-economy approaches on ﬁscal federalism is a common budget that ﬁnances
3
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(local) public goods. This ﬁnancing rule creates common pool incentives that drive the
ineﬃciencies in central jurisdictions. DelRossi and Inman (1999) and Knight (2004) ﬁnd
evidence for the empirical relevance of common pool incentives for federal water and for
transportation projects in the United States. Both cases provide evidence that central
legislators try to target spending to politically favored states.
Despite the recognition that unidirectional spillovers, which are present in many wa-
ter issues, are a particular challenge for the federal organization (see for example Oates
(2002)), political-economy approaches largely neglect this important special case of pub-
lic good provision.
There is a distinct spatial pattern of ﬂood defense, since beneﬁts are restricted to
ﬂood-prone areas. The spatial distribution of public beneﬁts is the starting point for
the literature on the formation of nations (Alesina and Spolaore 2003), where the size
of a state inﬂuences the cost of preference heterogeneity and the advantage of cost-
sharing of public goods. Another approach, of Frey (1997), recognizes that public goods
have diﬀerent spatial characteristics and suggests that a ﬂexible system of overlapping
jurisdictions can eﬃciently provide diﬀerent bundles of public goods within a nation.
The issue of ﬂood defense certainly does not raise such principle issues as the formation
of nations, but is does raise the issue of whether jurisdictions shall be tailored to ﬂood-
prone areas. This can be done through single issue authorities, which complement an
existing federal structure. Such considerations seem important in a political-economy
context, where the beneﬁts from public goods drive voting preferences. However, the
current literature says little on single issue authorities so that this is another starting
point for the formal analysis of ﬂood defense.
There is an extensive literature on local public goods and migration that was in-
spired by Tiebout (1956). Some authors even see the possibility of locational choices as
the crucial feature of local public good economies (Stiglitz 1977). Early contributions
investigate purely local public goods, but more recent contributions also incorporated
inter-regional spillovers. Wellisch (1993) ﬁnds that a decentralized supply of public goods
with spillovers can be eﬃcient if transfers are possible. Other, very general approaches
search for migration equilibria with voting on public goods and inter-regional spillovers
(Konishi 1996). However, these ambitious approaches generally assume a given federal
structure and do not address the issue of whether public goods shall be provided by de-
centralized or centralized decision making. As Nechyba (1997, 278) remarks, the study
on intergovernmental relations in the spirit of Oates has been largely separated from the
literature on local public goods and migration that was inspired by Tiebout. Since it is
well established in the literature that there is a close interrelation between public goods
and locational choices, it is promising to apply this insight to the case of public ﬂood
defense in a federal state.
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1.3 The economic problem
The empirical and theoretical motivation leads to the following economic questions that
shall be answered in the dissertation:
. Shall decentralized or centralized jurisdictions provide local public goods that have
unidirectional spillovers?
. Can single issue authorities, which separate people with unequal public good ben-
eﬁts, improve eﬃciency in public good provision?
. What is the linkage between unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts
in the choice of the best federal setting?
. Taking migration into account, what is the best federal organization, and how does
the answer to this question depend on the voting behavior of citizens?
In answering these questions the following analysis relies on some important premises.
First, public ﬂood defense is interpreted as the result of voting decisions. Second, free
migration is seen as a fundamental force that is of relevance in ﬂood management. Third,
it is recognized that other economic issues (such as uncertainty) are also of importance in
ﬂood management, however, it is assumed that these factors do not completely invalidate
the present analysis.
1.4 The modeling approach
Unidirectional spillovers and spatially heterogeneous beneﬁts of public goods challenge
the federal organization of ﬂood defense. Following the lead of recent political-economy
contributions to ﬁscal federalism, both aspects are investigated in a two region model
with majority voting. The two regions can be interpreted as an upstream and a down-
stream region. Within each region there is a group of citizens who beneﬁt from public
goods and another group without beneﬁts.
Four diﬀerent decision-making structures are compared: classical decentralization or
centralization (based on jurisdictions containing voters both with and without bene-
ﬁts of the public goods) and decentralized or centralized single issue authorities (whose
jurisdictions, by deﬁnition, contain only voters with high beneﬁts). Decentralized juris-
dictions separate upstream and downstream voters, whereas a centralized jurisdiction
comprises both groups.
Based on a comparison of aggregated public good surplus, it turns out that cen-
tralized jurisdictions lead to a very low public good surplus and that either classical
decentralization or decentralized single issue authorities achieve the best results under
most conditions. The centralized provision of public goods is ﬂawed because there is
either an extreme over- or an extreme under-provision of the downstream public good.
This can, however, be mitigated if there is a common standard for ﬂood protection or if
only the upstream provision of the public good is centralized. Whether or not these two
5
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solutions are beneﬁcial depends on the magnitude of spillovers and also on the voting
majorities in the two regions.
Expanding the model to consider migration leads to a more complex setting. With
voting and locational decisions to be made, the analysis is structured as a two stage
game. At the ﬁrst stage of the game there is voting with a given population distribution,
and at the second stage citizens decide on their location. Following a wide strand of
the literature, see for example Wildasin (1987), free and costless migration is assumed
as well as homogeneous preferences within the population. Therefore the migration
equilibrium is characterized by the same utility level of the whole population. The
provision with public goods depends crucially on the voting behavior. One possibility is
that voters are myopic, neglecting potential migration at the second stage. Alternatively
non-myopic voters could anticipate migration ﬂows in response to a given level of public
good provision. The analysis focuses on a two region setting, with homogeneous beneﬁts
from public goods within each region. To compare diﬀerent federal settings, a functional
form of the model is speciﬁed.
The result of the model depends crucially on the voting behavior. With myopic
voting, centralization suﬀers from the dominance of the majority, which results in a
large population size of the majority region in the migration equilibrium. The impact of
spillovers on the population distribution depends on the sign of the spillovers as well as
on political-economy conditions. With decentralization, spillovers have a positive impact
on the downstream population size. The comparison of both federal settings is in favor
of decentralization unless spillovers are very large.
Non-myopic voting leads to very diﬀerent results, since voters are aware that the ﬁnal
equilibrium utility level is the same for the whole population. Diﬀerences between the
federal organizations now primarily reﬂect the diﬀerent ﬁnancing schemes of decentral-
ized and centralized supply of public goods. Under certain conditions, centralization
can achieve the socially eﬃcient allocation, whereas this is not generally the result un-
der decentralization. However, for both federal settings and suﬃciently strong spillovers,
the downstream populations increases when spillovers become more extreme (positive or
negative). Thus, negative and positive spillovers favor a large downstream population.
1.5 Outline of the dissertation
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces river ﬂooding and
human responses to that hazard. It structures the discussion of ﬂood management
with respect to the dimensions 1) private or public action, 2) the scope of inter-regional
spillovers, and 3) the three basic responses of risk management. Focusing on public ﬂood
defense and spatial spillovers, chapter 3 analyzes ﬂood management in Germany, which
leads to the working hypothesis that ﬂood management is a challenge for the federal
organization. This is followed by an overview on the economic literature on ﬁscal feder-
alism and unidirectional spillovers (chapter 4). On the basis of the literature review and
the discussion of ﬂood management in Germany, the economic problem is formulated.
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1.5 Outline of the dissertation
Chapter 5 presents the basic model of local public good provision in a federal state. The
following chapters are extensions to the basic model by introducing the possibility of free
migration. Chapter 6 assumes non-myopic voting, where voters do not anticipate how
public good provision inﬂuences locational choices. While chapter 7 analyzes the same
issues with the assumption that voters are non-myopic and therefore consider potential
migration in response to public good provision. The last chapter summarizes the results
and discusses their policy implication with respect to ﬂood management.
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Chapter 2
Introduction to river ﬂood management
2.1 Physical causes of river ﬂoods
Two aspects characterize ﬂoods: inundation and damage. The ﬁrst aspect is emphasized
by Smith and Ward (1998, 8). In their book on `Floods' they draw on Ward's deﬁnition:
A ﬂood is a body of water which rises to overﬂow land which is not normally submerged.
In the same book a more restrictive deﬁnition of river ﬂoods is given by Chow (1956),
A ﬂood is a relatively high ﬂow which overtaxes the natural channel provided for the
runoﬀ. Pielke and Downton (2000) also consider the second aspect of ﬂoods. They
point to diﬀerent perspectives on ﬂoods of scientists and policy makers. In addition to
the above deﬁned hydrological ﬂoods there can be damaging ﬂoods, which are, ﬂoods
that result in damage to human life or property (Pielke and Downton 2000, 3625-3626).
In what follows, damaging river ﬂoods will be at the center of attention and coastal
ﬂoods will be neglected. Therefore river ﬂoods and ﬂoods will be used as synonyms.
Key features of a hydrological ﬂood event are the peak water level and peak dis-
charge, with the latter being the volume of water passing a gage in a certain time. The
duration of ﬂoods diﬀers as well as the time until peak conditions and the total volume
of ﬂoodwater. The area of inundation of the peak water level of a ﬂood is called the
ﬂood outline. The larger the ﬂood, the greater the ﬂood outline. Usually there is also
a distinct seasonal pattern of ﬂoods, since the conditions that cause ﬂoods in winter
months usually diﬀer from those in the summer (Smith and Ward 1998, 16-19).
An important statistical measure of hydrological ﬂood events is their frequency. Small
ﬂoods with fairly low peak water levels occur relatively often, whereas large ﬂoods are
unusual events. Thus, the return periods of small ﬂoods are shorter than of large ﬂoods.
The peak discharge of a ﬂood, Q, can be classiﬁed according to the return period. A
ﬂood occurring once in ﬁve years is a Q5-ﬂood and a 100-year-ﬂood is a Q100-ﬂood. Since
any ﬂood can occur any time, chances for a Q5-ﬂood to occur in a given year are 20%
and for a Q100-ﬂood, 1%.
Hydrological ﬂood frequencies play a crucial role in the design of ﬂood control mea-
sures. Systems built for a Q5-ﬂood give no protection against large ﬂoods with long
return periods. And even high ﬂood protection levels do not guarantee absolute safety.
Certain areas may be attractive to human encroachment because they are protected up
to a Q100-ﬂood, however they remain vulnerable if they are in the ﬂood outline of an
extreme ﬂood event with return periods of more than 100 years. A map with diﬀerent
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Source: Smith (2001, 276)
Figure 2.1: Flood-prone areas
ﬂood risk zones illustrates that the ﬂood outline of a rare ﬂood event is larger than that
of ﬂoods happening more frequently (see ﬁgure 2.1).
Most river ﬂoods are directly or indirectly caused by climatological events, particularly
excessive rainfall. In regions with cold winters and accumulating snowfall, snowmelt
and ice jams can also cause ﬂoods. Alternatively, dam failures can also cause ﬂoods or
increase their severity (Smith and Ward 1998, 10-11).
Because ﬂoods result from the accumulation of upstream runoﬀ, the understanding of
ﬂood events must be based on an understanding of the whole watershed. Characteristics
of the river basin, the drainage network, and the stream channel can act as ﬂood inten-
sifying factors. For a given precipitation event these factors determine the magnitude
of a ﬂood. The size of a river basin, its shape, slope, and altitude are stable factors
inﬂuencing a ﬂood. The eﬀects of climate, soil type, vegetation cover and anthropogenic
inﬂuences in a river basin are variable factors aﬀecting a ﬂood event (Smith and Ward
1998, 10-14).
The topology of the river basin can lead to diﬀerent typical ﬂood events. In areas
with mountains, locally heavy precipitation, often favored by orographic eﬀects1, can
lead to destructive ﬂoods with very high velocities. The consequences of such precipi-
tation events are worse if combined with snowmelt in spring. Hilly regions with narrow
valleys are particularly vulnerable to locally extreme precipitation, because the size of
the watershed tends to be small. Flash ﬂoods in mountains occur with short notice after
heavy local precipitation. Floods in the lowlands are characterized by low velocity and
large areas with inundation. Such ﬂoods in low lying ﬂood plains are fed by a large
watershed so that precipitation can be far away from the ﬂood event, giving more time
for ﬂood warnings compared to ﬂash ﬂoods in the mountains (WBGU (1999, 99-101)
and Patt (2001, 7-8)).
1Orographic precipitation is precipitation generated by a forced upward movement of air upon en-
countering a highland.
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2.2 River ﬂood damage and ﬂood exposure
Flood events can have enormous destructive power, leading to high damage in areas with
human encroachment. Extreme ﬂoods with long return periods can be catastrophic,
claiming thousands of lives, while aﬀecting even more lives negatively and leading to
high economic losses.
Before turning to the damaging impact of ﬂoods it is worth noting that ﬂoods can also
bring numerous beneﬁts to ecosystems and people. Agriculture in ﬂood plains beneﬁts
from ﬂood-borne silt. One example is the River Nile, one of the most fertile farming
regions in the world. Floods can bring many other advantages, which are often linked
to common property resources (Smith and Ward 1998, 35-38). Nevertheless, damaging
ﬂoods are among the most destructive natural hazards in the world. In the period from
1980 to 2000 ﬂoods caused more than 170 000 deaths, whereas earthquakes and tropical
cyclones (including hurricanes and typhoons) are associated with approximately 160 000
and 215 000 deaths, respectively (UNDP 2004, 34-42).
Assessment of economic ﬂood loss is more diﬃcult than of ﬂood fatalities. The de-
structive power of a ﬂood can cause both direct and indirect economic losses. While
direct damage is the immediate consequence of water and its solids in suspension, indi-
rect losses occur through the interruption of economic activities (Smith and Ward 1998,
34). Pielke et al. (2002, 4) specify,
Direct costs are closely connected to a ﬂood event and the resulting physical damage.
In addition to immediate losses and repair costs they include short-term costs stemming
directly from the ﬂood event, such as ﬂood ﬁghting, temporary housing, and adminis-
trative assistance. By contrast, indirect costs are incurred in an extended time period
following a ﬂood. They include loss of business and personal income (including perma-
nent loss of employment), reduction in property values, increased insurance costs, loss
of tax revenue, psychological trauma, and disturbance to ecosystems.
Direct and indirect economic losses are sometimes considered as tangible losses which
can be expressed in monetary values. In addition, ﬂoods can also lead to intangible
losses, such as loss of life, where monetary assessment is not possible (Smith and Ward
1998, 34-57). One can note that in contrast to this classiﬁcation there are numerous
approaches in cost-beneﬁt analyses to assess the values attached to a human live in
monetary terms.
Economic losses from ﬂoods has increased signiﬁcantly in recent decades. An accurate
assessment of losses is, however, diﬃcult. Even though the quality of damage data for
the United States is better than for most other countries of the world, Pielke et al. (2002,
4) emphasize that their revised data can be best described as a damage estimate as
opposed to precise loss data. In the United States, the monetary value of damage is
estimated and compiled soon after a ﬂood. Flood damage estimates only comprise direct
physical damage, as supposed to all direct costs of ﬂoods. There is no veriﬁcation with
actual costs of repair and replacement at a later stage.
Total ﬂood damage (in inﬂation-adjusted US dollars) for the United States increased
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signiﬁcantly from 1934 to 2000 (ﬁgure 2.2), although a large variation of yearly ﬂood
damage is apparent. There is also an upward trend of ﬂood damage in Europe. Yearly
ﬂood damage is often dominated by single, high impact event, as demonstrated by the
large August ﬂood in 2002 in Central Europe. The damage of this ﬂood is estimated
to be 21.1 billion euros (Munich Re 2003, DKKV 2003). Average yearly damage for the
years 1980 to 2004 was 3.3 billion US dollars. The comparable number for the United
States for the years 1983 to 2000 is 4 billion US dollars. It is important to note that there
is no common standard for data collection in Europe and the United States. Even within
Europe there is no common standard, therefore the numbers presented are only rough
estimates. Flood damages are concentrated to ﬂood-prone areas along rivers. About 7%
of the United States lies in the ﬂood outline of a Q100 ﬂood (including coastal zones).
However, ﬂood risk is also present elsewhere since 31% of insurance claims were made
outside the Q100-ﬂood outline (Kusler and Larson 1993).
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Figure 7-1.  Estimated annual flood damage in the United States, 1934–1999: 
         (a) Total flood damage. 
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Sources: United States, Pielke et al. (2002, 55-59). Data refer to hydrological years. Europe, Munich
Re (2004, 27). The numbers for Europe of the presented ﬁgure were conﬁrmed upon e-mail request by
Munich Re (23.5.2005). Data are deﬂated to 1995 US dollars according to the implicit price deﬂator
for GDP as published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005)
Figure 2.2: Flood damage estimate for the United States (for hydrological years) and
Europe
What are the driving forces of rising ﬂood damage? The literature discusses a number
of reasons. Climate changefrequently cited in the media in cases of large, weather-
related catastrophesis one of them. Other potential causes are changes in land use
and landscape, changes in waterbody systems or increasing human settlements (WBGU
1999, 101). The interplay of the various ﬂood-inducing factors can be seen as a cascade
of ﬂood risk, as illustrated in ﬁgure 2.3. Flood risk is a joint product of the four
global changes in the top line of the ﬁgure and the resulting consequences on extreme
weather events, soil and vegetation conditions, riverbeds and ﬂood plains, and human
settlements on ﬂood-prone areas. The frequency of extreme water levels and the ﬂood
impact constitute the actual ﬂood risk of a society.
Regarding the current understanding of the quantitative relevance of ﬂood-inducing
factors, Pielke and Downton (2000) note that the state of knowledge is such that the
relative contribution of each factor is poorly understood. There are, however, studies
on single aspects of the ﬂood risk cascade which demonstrate the practical relevance of
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Source: (WBGU 1999 p.102)
Figure 2.3: Cascade of ﬂood risk
some factors.
Climate change might induce an upward trend in river ﬂood events because higher
temperatures increase the water holding capacity of the atmosphere. This would inten-
sify the hydrological cycle, making extreme weather conditions, such as extreme pre-
cipitation, more likely (WBGU 1999, 108-109). Floods resulting from extreme weather
conditions might increase because the distribution function of ﬂood events might change
such that the mean value of ﬂoods (e.g. peak discharge) increases. Alternatively, or in
addition, climate change might also lead to an increased variance of ﬂood events. Both
changes would make extreme ﬂood events more likely (IPCC 2001a, 423).
In their report on the current understanding of climate change, the Intergovernmental
Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) noted that the analysis of and conﬁdence in extreme
events within climate models is still emerging (IPCC 2001b, 54). Accurate predictions
are not possible because ﬂoods are caused by short-duration, high-intensity, localized
heavy rainfall events, which cannot be simulated suﬃciently well by climate models.
However, simulations by climate models suggest that extreme precipitation event will
happen more frequently over many areas in the world (IPCC 2001b, 71). Parts of the
insurance industry believe that more frequent extreme precipitation will translate into
more extreme ﬂoods; a 100-year-ﬂood, with a return period of 100 years, might become
a ﬂood with a return period of ten years (Munich Re 2003).
Empirical investigations of past ﬂood events present some evidence for increased fre-
quency of extreme ﬂoods, other studies do not conﬁrm this result. Kundzewicz and
Schnellhuber (2004) point to methodological diﬃculties in detecting a climate change
signature in ﬂood events. Finding such a signature in river ﬂow data is already a com-
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plex task since human inﬂuences are typically strong (river regulation, deforestation,
urbanization, dams, and reservoirs), in addition, good quality data on historical ﬂood
events are rare, especially since extreme ﬂoods areby deﬁnitionrare events and data
need to cover a long time period to allow a meaningful analysis.
Milly et al. (2002) investigate ﬂood events exceeding a Q100 discharge in 23 large river
basins around the world (bigger than 200 000 km2) and ﬁnd evidence for an increased
frequency of ﬂood events in the twentieth century. Muddelsee et al. (2003), on the other
hand, ﬁnd no evidence of increases in the number of summer or winter ﬂoods for the
rivers Oder and Elbe over the last 150 years.
Even more problematic than detecting a climate change eﬀect on ﬂood events, is
elucidating the impact of climate change on economic ﬂood damage. There are very
few studies that attempt to do this. One challenge of such studies is the separation
of changes in hydrological extremes from societal factors that could lead to increased
ﬂood damage in the absence of climate change. Pielke and Downton (2000) investigate
diﬀerent measures of ﬂood damage. In addition to total ﬂood damage per year, they
also look at ﬂood damage per capita and at ﬂood damage per unit of wealth and ask,
if there is an upward trend that correlates with increasing precipitation or with a time
trend. The precipitation measure is selected from ten diﬀerent hydrological measures
of heavy precipitation events. A time trend in a ﬂood damage measure could capture
improvements in ﬂood policy that reduce the exposure of society to ﬂooding.
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Figure 7-1, continued.   (b) Flood damage per capita. 
 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1, continued.   (c) Flood damage per million dollars of tangible wealth. 
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Figure 7-1, continued.   (b) Flood damage per capita. 
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Figure 7-1, continued.   (c) Flood damage per million dollars of tangible wealth. 
Source: Pielke et al. (2002, 55-59). Data refer to hydrological years. Until 1997, Pielke et al. (2002)
use the same data as Pielke and Downton (2000).
Figure 2.4: Flood damage estimate per capita and per million dollars of wealth for the
United States
The model that tries to explain ﬂood damage p r apit ﬁnds a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of precipitation but no linear trend. Figure 2.4 (left part) shows an increasing trend of
damage per capita. This trend is not as clear as in total damages per year (see the left
part of ﬁgure 2.2), since the population in the United States grew at a rate of 1.26% per
year (for the time from 1934 to 1998). This model suggests that there might be a climate
change impact on economic ﬂood damage, since the increase of per capita damage can
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be explained by higher precipitation. In an alternative model speciﬁcation, Pielke and
Downton (2000) can explain the decreasing ﬂood damage per unit of wealth (see ﬁgure
2.4, right part) by precipitation and a time trend that may capture a decreasing vulner-
ability of society towards ﬂooding. A decline in ﬂood vulnerability could be interpreted
as a success of ﬂood policies.
Critically one has to ask, if Pielke and Downton explain the right variables. For
ﬂood management it is of interest to know the development of per capita damages and
damages per unit of wealth in ﬂood-prone areas. However, due to shortcomings in their
data, Pielke and Downton assume that the population and wealth growth in the United
States are the same in and outside ﬂood-prone areas. If, for example, the population
growth in ﬂood-prone areas is above average, per capita damages would be lower; for
suﬃciently large population growth in ﬂood-prone areas, per capita damages might even
fall.
It is sometimes argued that climate change mitigation is necessary to avoid higher
ﬂood risk. Pielke and Downton (2000) see this argument as one sided and emphasize that
the greatest potential for reducing ﬂood damage is to focus on ﬂood plain management.
Nevertheless they see important other reasons to mitigate climate change.
In the political debate it is a widespread phenomenon that natural disasters are
associated with climate change. However, it is noteworthy that no increase in weather
extremes and related losses is found in the United States for hurricanes, hail, tornadoes,
wind storms, and severe thunderstorms. In fact for most of these extremes a signiﬁcant
downward trend was observable between 1950 and 1997. It is only for heavy rain that
an signiﬁcant increase in extreme events and losses is observable (Changnon 2003).2
Cartwright (2005) and also Pielke et al. themselves point at two shortcomings of the
ﬂood damage analysis. First, the data do not allow a sectoral disaggregation of ﬂood
damage. The comparison of two selected ﬂood events for Minnesota (1993 and 1997)
illustrates that the 1993 ﬂood caused high damage in the agricultural sector whereas
inundation aﬀected mainly urban areas in 1997. Second, ﬂood damage estimates do not
allow regional comparisons of economic or land-use trends between areas in and outside
of ﬂood plains, because there is no single standard for delineating ﬂood plains. Therefore
the analysis of Pielke et al. hinges on the assumption that global trends in the United
States and trends within ﬂood plains are the same.
Changes in land-use patterns can be considered as a global phenomenon. The re-
sulting (direct) impact of land-use change on river ﬂoods is, however, conﬁned to the
respective river basin. Deforestation is a land-use change, which substantially reduces
the inﬁltration capacity of the soil, leading to reduced natural retention of water. In
small basins this can aggravate ﬂood peaks; examples of a more than fourfold increase
have been monitored. For large basins the ﬂood intensifying eﬀect of deforestation is
less direct. For the Ganges-Brahmaputra river system no eﬀects of deforestation in the
Himalayas could be found despite hydrological records of almost 100 years (Smith 2001,
2Note that this ﬁndings refer to a time period that does not cover recent years and the high-damage
hurricanes such as `Katrina' in 2005.
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270). Similarly, a report on Forest and ﬂooding in Asia (CIFOR and FAO 2005) found
only minor relevance of deforestation for large scale ﬂooding. This results also holds
for Germany, where the vegetation is considered to have a minor impact on large scale
ﬂooding (LAWA 2000).
For a variety of reasons, substantial changes in water body systems took place in
recent decades and centuries. Levees and dams were build to allow agricultural use of
ﬂood-prone areas, channel alignment eased navigation of ships on rivers, and the drainage
of wetlands reduced the danger of infectious diseases. These human made changes of
the water body substantially reduced the ﬂood plain of many rivers and increased the
velocity of the ﬂood peak ﬂowing downstream (Schmidt (2000, 15-16, 25-30) Heiland
(2002, 18-20)).
The increase of human settlements in ﬂood-prone areas is considered to be one impor-
tant development leading to increased ﬂood damage (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
2003). As mentioned above for the United States, rising ﬂood damage can partly be at-
tributed to a growing population. However, the speciﬁc impact of a growing population
in ﬂood-prone areas could not be analyzed due to missing data. This problems applies
not only to the United States, but also to other countries. The insurance industry sees
an increasing population density and the accumulation of economic values in exposed
areas as the main reasons for rising damage of weather-related catastrophes (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (2003, 90), Munich Re (2002, 16) and Swiss Re (2003, 13)).
2.3 Flood defense
Despite huge progress in ﬂood defense in modern times there is widespread agreement
that ﬂood protection measures cannot guaranty absolute safety (see for example LAWA
(1995), Smith and Ward (1998), and WBGU (1999)). This view is, in part, the conse-
quence of high damage after recent large ﬂood events. Numerous responses to ﬂooding
are possible and this section of the chapter will describe the basic characteristics of the
most important ﬂood defense measures. Crude estimates of beneﬁt-cost ratios of ﬂood
defense in the United States concluded that every dollar invested in ﬂood defense pre-
vented more than six dollars of damage (Comiskey 2005). The approach used in the
estimate, however, does not take into account that ﬂood defense measures are often also
the driving force of wealth accumulation in (formerly) ﬂood-prone areas. Therefore,
prevented losses might be over-estimated.
Flood risk has a feature in common with many other human-made or naturals risks:
High damage events are rare, whereas low damage events happen frequently. Societies
tend to be much better equipped to cope with frequent events than with extreme events.
There are many technical and non-technical measures that protect a society from fre-
quent ﬂoods. In the case of a rare event, these measures might not protect anymore,
oreven worsemight aggravate the ﬂood, yielding a catastrophe with high damage
and many fatalities (WBGU 1999, 112). It is this feature of risk that constitutes a
major challenge in the design of ﬂood defense measures.
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There are two basic responses to ﬂoods. One response is to reduce the frequency (or
the probability) of a damaging ﬂood event, this will be considered as ﬂood mitigation.
Another response is the adaption to ﬂoods in order to reduce economic damage in case
of ﬂooding. The probability and the loss determine the expected damage of a ﬂood.
2.3.1 Flood mitigation
A basic insight of hydraulic engineering is that there is a close linkage between the
discharge capacity of a channel and its ﬂow resistance, its slope, and its proﬁle. Some
conditions favor water retention and others hamper it. Water retention reduces the
peak discharge downstream in the drainage system and extends the time lag to peak
conditions after a precipitation event. Increasing the discharge capacity by decreasing
the ﬂow resistance of a given channel, reduces the water level of a given discharge and
decreases water retention at the location where the measure is undertaken. In contrast,
a reduced discharge capacity increases both the water level and the water retention
(Brombach et al. 2001, 231-232). Whether or not one wishes to increase or decrease
water retention in a speciﬁc portion of the drainage network depends on both the ﬂood
vulnerability of the area and that of the downstream locations.
Natural retention can occur in the catchment area or in the drainage network itself.
Forest leads to a high water storage capacity of the soil and therefore favors retention.
In contrast, sealed surfaces in urban areas and surfaces under intensive agricultural use,
lead to a quicker runoﬀ. Natural drainage systems with meadows have a greater storage
capacity for water than developed waters. Nowadays increased retention in the drainage
system itself can often only be achieved by removing existing levees and allowing natural
woodland and meadows in the ﬂood plain again (LAWA 1995).
Technical ﬂood protection measures can increase or decrease water retention. De-
tention basins with retarding dams or storage dams increase water retention. It is the
particular aim of detention basins to reduce the peak discharge for downstream locations.
Detention basins with retarding dams are self regulating systems whose reservoirs ﬁll as
the ﬂood exceeds a threshold level. After the ﬂood peak is passed the reservoir empties
on its own. Detention basins with storage dams can be actively regulated, which al-
lows a more accurate control of the downstream ﬂood peak. The location of a detention
basin is important. The ﬂood protection eﬀect decreases as the distance to the detention
basin grows (Smith and Ward 1998, 214-217). Detention basins are of limited use if the
forecasting period is too short to allow an eﬀective ﬂood control of distant downstream
locations. This problem prevails for potential detention basins on the Upper Rhine with
respect to ﬂood control for the city of Cologne on the Lower Rhine (LAWA 1995).
Some manipulations of the proﬁle of the channel decrease water retention. Widen-
ing the proﬁle of a channel, removing trees and brushes or other local obstacles, and
increasing the slope of a channel all reduce its ﬂow resistance, leading to reduced water
levels. These measures are very eﬀective in proximity to urban areas to reduce the risk
of ﬂooding (Smith and Ward 1998, 236-239).
17
Chapter 2 Introduction to river ﬂood management
Levees are constructed parallel to a river. The ﬂood plain behind the levee is protected
from ﬂoods with return periods up to the design ﬂood. The height and the distance to
the natural channel are important features determining the protection level of a levee.
For ﬂoods bigger than the design ﬂood, there is no protection behind the levee, and even
for a lower ﬂood there is no guarantee of total protection, because of potential levee
failure. However, ﬂood plains protected by levees tend to attract human encroachment.
Therefore extreme ﬂoods often cause much more damage in levee protected areas than
on areas without a levee. This is sometimes referred to as the levee eﬀect. Another
consequence of levees is an increase in the ﬂow velocity of a river, potentially causing
higher ﬂooding downstream. This eﬀect is particularly strong in the case of double
embanking near the natural channel, so that the whole ﬂood plain is protected (Smith
and Ward (1998, 210-213), Tobin (1995, 361)).
2.3.2 Flood adaption
Flood adaption can take place in various ways: land-use decisions and ﬂood-proof build-
ing inﬂuence the damage potential of a ﬂood. Since the general ﬂood risk is often known
and since there is usually some warning time in case of ﬂooding, behavioral responses
before inundation are also often possible. Additionally, insurance of unavoidable ﬂood
losses can be seen as a ﬂood adaption strategy (LAWA 1995).
Land-use changes where mentioned earlier as an important factor leading to increas-
ing ﬂood damage. These changes are often irreversible. New settlements are the typical
example of land-use changes that increase the damage potential. In Germany new set-
tlements are still planned in ﬂood plains (Hofmeister 2006, 192). This not only increases
the ﬂood damage potential but can also prevent the establishment of new detention
basins. Lacking information on the course of the natural ﬂood outline often triggers
inadequate land-use decisions. Accurate maps of the ﬂood outline can inform the public
and create awareness of ﬂood risks.
The vulnerability of buildings to ﬂooding can be substantially reduced by adapted
construction. Homeowners can undertake many measures to reduce vulnerability. Sen-
sitive elements of buildings are the basement, furnaces, oil tanks, and electric wiring.
Flood forecasting is essential because it gives communities time to initiate emergency
measures. Due to improved models, it has been possible to greatly extend warning
times. This beneﬁts downstream locations in large river basins, whereas streams and
rivers with small watersheds react fast to precipitation, precluding long warning times.
Floods are uncertain events. Therefore the insurance of ﬂood losses is a potential way
to improve the situation of ﬂood victims.
2.3.3 The spatial aspect of ﬂood defense
Each ﬂood defense measure described in the previous sections has its own spatial char-
acteristic. Each river basin is clearly deﬁned in space and shares some common features.
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Hilly or mountainous regions tend to mark the border of a watershed. Water in the
upper reaches of a river-system comes from large and small valleys, passes the middle
reaches of a river and ﬂows through the lower part of the river into the ocean (Heiland
2002, 29). One can ask what part of the watershed is suitable for what ﬂood defense
measure. A second question concerns the scope of the measure, is it local or does is also
aﬀect locations further downstream?
A Conservation of retention areas 
• protection of flood plains in the natural flood outline 
• protection of detention basins 
B Enlargement of retention areas 
• creation of new detention basins 
• removal of levees and if necessary buildings 
• deepening of detention basins 
C Surface retention 
• rainwater management 
• control of  surface sealing 
• land use and adapted agricultural techniques  
• adapted forest management  
• renaturation of drainage system and  
adjoining meadows 
D Minimization of flood damage potential  
• regional development 
• precautionary building 
• public awareness of flood risk 
• civil protection 
E Technical flood protection 
• levees 
• walls 
• detention basins 
• dams 
Source: Modiﬁed after Heiland (2002, 29)
Figure 2.5: Flood protection measures in a river basin
The ﬁrst aspect is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.5, where the typical location of diﬀerent ﬂood
defense measures within a river basin are shown. The conservation of areas near rivers
preserve the possibility of water retention in the natural ﬂood outline (type A measures).
In order to reclaim the natural ﬂood outline for ﬂooding, levees need to be removed and
land use has to be adapted to ﬂooding (type B measures). Retention on the surface can
be done most eﬀectively near the upper reaches (type C measures). To minimize the
ﬂood damage potential, it is mainly the lower part of a river in the ﬂat land where ﬂood
adaption measures can be undertaken (type D measures). Technical ﬂood protection
measures can be undertaken all along the river and its tributaries (type E measures).
The second aspect is the spatial range of a ﬂood defense measure. Beneﬁts from some
measures are very local and others are regional. Upstream measures can inﬂuence the
downstream ﬂood protection level. These spillovers can be positive as well as negative.
Aside from some ﬂood defense measuressuch as damswhich have also localized eﬀects
on upstream locations, spatial eﬀects of ﬂood defense are unidirectional spillovers. This
characteristic is a general feature of water problems, becauseas Hung and Shaw (2005,
85) notewater [...] always ﬂow[s] to the lowest level unidirectionally. The unilateral
character of spillovers and the resulting fundamental asymmetry between upstream and
downstream riparians is also recognized in the political discourse (MKRO 2000, 515).
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The extend of non-local eﬀects of a ﬂood defense measure depends crucially on the
conditions of the particular river basin. However, some rough estimates are given in
table 2.1.
The effect of flood mitigation on flood peaks of large 
floods through local effect 
long range effect 
for downstream 
locations 
adapted agricultural techniques  + 0 
vegetation, removal of surface 
sealing 0 0 
river restoration + 0 
natural retention  
removal of levees + + 
levees and local flood protection  + 0 / - 
widening of channel + 0 
technical flood 
protection 
detention basins (regulated and 
self-regulated) + + 
 Source: Modiﬁed after LAWA (2000) and IKSR (1999)
Table 2.1: Spatial ﬂood protection eﬀects of ﬂood mitigation measures
Most measures listed in table 2.1 have positive local ﬂood protection eﬀects for large
ﬂoods. The removal of surface sealing and the control of vegetation in the whole water-
shed have ﬂood protection eﬀects primarily for small ﬂoods, but not for extreme ﬂoods.
Only with extreme assumptions with regard to (de-) forestation or surface sealing do
these measures have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬂood protection level (IKSR 1999, Heiland
2002). Levees and other local ﬂood protection measures increase the ﬂood protection
level, but unlike other measures the actual ﬂood peak is not reduced but increased.
However, as long as the ﬂood does not exceed the design ﬂood this leads to a better
ﬂood protection level. Local ﬂood protection eﬀects are possible through the widening
of the ﬂood channel (LAWA 2000, IKSR 1999).
Long range eﬀects are not present for most ﬂood defense measures. Only increased
retention due to the removal of levees and creation of detention basins are able to improve
ﬂood protection downstream. Higher levees and other technical measures of local ﬂood
protection can aggravate the ﬂood susceptibility downstream (LAWA 2000, IKSR 1999).
Water retention depends on the condition and height of levees. In case of extreme
ﬂoods that exceed the design ﬂood, the protected areas behind levees will function as a
retention area. Also if a ﬂood does not overﬂow a levee, it is often technically feasible to
use areas behind levees as emergency retention basins to protect high-risk areas further
downstream. However, it depends crucially on the institutional framework of ﬂood
management if this form of ﬂood defense will be used. Savanije (1995, 436) calls for a
shift from pure ﬂood protection to ﬂood management:
Flood management means that we take into account that extreme ﬂoods, inundations
and dike failure can occur, and that we have a plan that will be followed in case of these
eventualities.
Some countries follow this approach and have adapted strategies with diﬀerentiated
protection levels. In Switzerland the protection level depends on the form of land use.
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Housing zones and important infrastructures are protected by a high and agricultural
areas with a lower protection level (IKSR 1997, 52-53).
Flood adaption reduces damage in case of ﬂooding. These measures have primarily
local eﬀects. Only with respect to ﬂood forecasting riparians further downstream beneﬁt
from a ﬂood forecast upstream.
2.4 Stylized facts of ﬂood management: an economic
perspective
So far this introductory chapter has revealed a number of features of river ﬂoods that
are of interest for an economic analysis. It is the task of ﬂood management to con-
sider all possible human responses to ﬂood risk. Optimal ﬂood management requires
that marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts of each measure are equalized. Focusing on
the main characteristics of river ﬂoods, the following aspects capture the task of ﬂood
management.
2.4.1 Public goods
Many ﬂood defense measures are public goods. Public goods are usually deﬁned as
goods whose use by one agent does not preclude the use by other agents. In addition to
non-rivalry, a second feature of public goods is sometimes seen in the non-excludability
from consumption (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, 359).
Flood defense can be a public good, because the beneﬁts one person enjoys do not
reduce the consumption level of other people. Although many important ﬂood defense
measures are public, private responses are also possible. A rough classiﬁcation with
respect to private and public is given in table 2.2. Natural and technical ﬂood defense
measures are, in most cases, public goods. Most ﬂood defense measures, especially
retention areas, need space and depend on some form of spatial planning that distributes
diﬀerent forms of land uses in space. Therefore spatial planning is a public task. In
response to public spatial planning, private as well as some public actors make their
locational decisions. Private persons might buy land and construct houses; public actors
build infrastructure for transport or other uses. Since it is not always easy to distinguish
between private or public responsibility in land-use decisions, Changnon (1996, 313)
emphasizes that individuals and not the government must assume responsibility for
their locational decisions. Adapted building construction beneﬁts the owners of houses
and is therefore a private good. Exceptions are ﬂood-proof oil tanks that prevent oil
contamination also of the neighboring properties. Public building codes can support
ﬂood adapted constructions. Flood losses can be compensated by public disaster aid.
An alternative response is the private insurance of potential ﬂood losses.
The theoretical condition for eﬃcient provision of public goods draws on Samuelson
(1954, 1955) and requires, for a quasi-linear setting, that the sum of consumer's marginal
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 public good character spatial spillovers risk management 
natural flood defense public some measures have spillover mitigation 
technical flood defense public some measures have spillover mitigation 
spatial planning: distributing 
land uses in space  public 
some measures 
have spillover 
mitigation and 
adaption 
locational decisions primary private no spillovers adaption 
adapted building primary private no spillovers adaption 
civil protection  public  some measures have spillover 
adaption and 
mitigation 
flood loss public disaster aid or private insurance no spillovers insurance 
Table 2.2: Taxanomy of ﬂood management measures
beneﬁt from the public good is equal to the marginal costs of the public good. Eﬃcient
provision of public goods is not easy to achieve. Oates (1972, 31-35) develops the ideal
of a perfect correspondence where jurisdictions providing a public good should include
all individuals who consume the good. This ideal is not reached either if jurisdictions
are too small or if jurisdictions are too large.
First, if jurisdictions are too small, free-riding problems arise when individuals out-
side the jurisdiction beneﬁt from the public good because of spillovers. With positive
transfrontier spillovers, free-riding can lead to an under-provision of the public good, be-
cause individuals outside the jurisdiction cannot be taxed. In case of negative spillovers,
free riding can lead to an over-provision of the public good. The subsequent section will
deepen the aspect of spatial unidirectional spillovers, which are present in ﬂood defense.
Second, if jurisdictions are too large, common-pool incentive may lead to ineﬃcient
public good supply. This argument is based on political-economy considerations. In
ﬂood defense, jurisdictions may be too large because they also comprise areas outside
the ﬂood plain. A further discussion of this issue is given below.
Both, spatial spillovers as well as ﬂood-prone areas, raise the question of the appro-
priate federal organization of ﬂood management.
2.4.2 Unidirectional spatial spillovers
Flood defense can induce spatial spillovers. As analyzed above (see section 2.3.3) these
spillovers are unidirectional. The spillovers can be positive as well as negative. Spillovers
can lead to externalities. In economics, externalities are usually deﬁned as direct eﬀects
of an economic agent on the well-being of other economic agents, such as consumers or
the production possibilities of ﬁrms (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, 352). The eﬀect is direct
in contrast to indirect eﬀects mediated through market prices. Therefore externalities
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are not only a technological phenomenon, but also the result of existing and missing
markets.
As discussed earlier and indicated in table 2.2, not all ﬂood management measures
involve spatial eﬀects. Flood adaption through adapted building and adequate land
use, or ﬁnancial relief such as disaster aid and insurance of ﬂood losses do not aﬀect
the well-being of downstream riparians. Some but not all measures of ﬂood mitigation
inﬂuence the downstream ﬂood protection level. As introduced above these measures
are retention basins and levees.
Muraro (1974) discusses the economic problem of negative unidirectional externalities
for the case of transfrontier pollution. The condition for optimal pollution abatement
requires that marginal abatement costs equal the sum of marginal damage of the country
under consideration and all downstream countries. Due to the lack of a central authority
in the case of international transfrontier pollution, the key question discussed in Muraro
is how to implement the optimal solution.
Because many measures of ﬂood management are public goods and because some of
these measures potentially cause spatial externalities, the federal organization of ﬂood
management becomes an issue. It is well known that many problems of river management
arise because issues stretch across jurisdictional borders. Small jurisdictions may neglect
spillovers and undertake too little or too much eﬀort by neglecting eﬀects on downstream
riparians. On the other hand, big jurisdictions may neglect local diﬀerences.
2.4.3 Spatially restricted beneﬁts of local public goods
Some public goods are national public goods, since all members of a nation beneﬁt from
the public good. Consumption of other public goods is conﬁned to a geographical subset
of an economy (Oates 1972, 34). If the subgroup is small in comparison to the whole
economy, potentially corresponding to the communal level of the economy, the public
good can be described as a local public good. Also for local public goods the Samuelson
rule must hold for eﬃcient provision.
Public ﬂood defense has the characteristics of local public goods, because utility is
conﬁned to people in hazard-prone areas. People outside the ﬂood plain do not beneﬁt
from ﬂood defense. A political-economy perspective suggests a problem originating from
such heterogeneous beneﬁts. If decisions on public ﬂood defense are made by majority
voting, welfare enhancing projects might not be adopted if the majority does not beneﬁt.
Alternatively, projects adopted by the majority can be ineﬃcient if the minority does
not beneﬁt (Niskanen 1998). Therefore voting decisions on public ﬂood defense can lead
to an under- or an over-provision of public goods.
In a federal state ineﬃcient public good provision can arise if public decisions are
made locally and ﬁnancing is done by a central authority. Common-pool incentives can
then lead to the over-provision of public goods. Alternatively, common-pool incentives
arise if the special-interest groups inﬂuence the central government to their advantage
(Persson and Tabellini 2000, 163-164).
23
Chapter 2 Introduction to river ﬂood management
Since beneﬁts from ﬂood defense are geographically conﬁned to ﬂood-prone areas, too
large jurisdictions may lead to ineﬃcient public good provision because of common-pool
incentives. This can be seen as a problem of the size of the jurisdiction.
2.4.4 Risk management
Floods are uncertain events, therefore one can see ﬂood management from the per-
spective of risk management. Diﬀerent aspects of risk management have been treated
extensively in the literature. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) discuss market insurance, self-
insurance and self-protection as the basic measures of a comprehensive risk management.
Risk is a phenomenon where possible states of the world as well as the probabilities of
these states are known. Obviously not all uncertain events share this feature. Market
insurance is the contractual arrangement that uncertain losses get compensated in re-
turn to a premium. This is a possible private response to ﬂood risk that does not cause
spillovers. Self-protection reduces the probabilities of bad states of the world that lead
to losses. Above, this was referred to as risk mitigation. Flood mitigation measures are
public goods and some of these measures cause spillovers. Self-insurance reduces the size
of potential losses and is an adaption to the risk. This is a possible response to ﬂood
risk, which has partly public and partly private good characteristics. For most ﬂood
adaption measures there are no spillovers to downstream locations.
If there are only two states of the world (a bad state, `damage', and a good state,
`no damage') the motivation for one of the three responses to risk is as follows: First,
market insurance can improve expected utility by shifting income (or wealth) from the
good to the bad state of the world. For risk-averse individuals and an actuarially fair
insurance premium, a shift of income increases marginal utility in the bad state more
than it decreases marginal utility in the good state. Second, self-insurance reduces the
loss in the bad state of the world, but it also means less income in all states of the
world, because self-insurance is not costless. Incentives for self-insurance depend on the
probability of a loss. Therefore it can be expected that self-insurance is lower for rare
losses than for more frequent losses, because the cost of self-insurance is not inﬂuenced by
the probability of the states of the world. Third, self-protection reduces the probability
of a loss at the expense of less income in both states of the world. If the reduction of
the damage probability is large enough a citizen will invest in measures that make the
good state more likely.
If more than one response of risk management is possible the analysis gets more
complicated. If risk mitigation (self-protection) and risk adaption (self-insurance) are
both available they discourage each other. The same applies for risk adaption and market
insurance. It is, however, unclear how risk mitigation reacts if market insurance is also
available. Potentially incentives for risk mitigation could increase as well as decrease.
The following analysis of the federal organization of ﬂood management will not fo-
cus on a risk management perspective. Therefore a more detailed introduction to risk
management is not given here. Extensions to Ehrlich and Becker are given in Briys and
Schlesinger (1990). Public self-insurance and self-protection as a part of risk management
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is discussed by Lewis and Nickerson (1989) and Quiggin (1992). It shall be suﬃcient to
point out (see table 2.2) that public ﬂood defense tends to be a form of self-protection,
whereas private ﬂood adapting activities tend to be a form of self-insurance. Therefore
one can think of public ﬂood defense as activities that reduce the probability of a ﬂood
and private ﬂood adaption as decisions that determine the ﬂood loss potential.
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Chapter 3
An institutional analysis of river ﬂood
management in Germany
Einer der gravierendsten Schwachpunkte ist die unklare
Zuständigkeit bei der Katastrophenvorsorge im politischen
Rauma
Die Vorsitzende des Deutschen Komitees für Katastrophenvorsorge (DKKV),
Bundesministerin a.D. Dr. Irmgard Schwaetzer beim Gefahrentag 2004 in
Mainz am 13.10.2004; http://www.dkkv.org
aOne of the most severe shortcomings is that there are unsettled responsi-
bilities for catastrophe prevention in the political sphere.
In the last decades, large ﬂoods frequently caused substantial economic damage in
Germany. Due to missing data, it is diﬃcult to give a comprehensive overview of the
exposure of people and economic values to ﬂood risk and of ﬂood damage. However,
some data may illustrate diﬀerent aspects of the problem.
Damage from the large Elbe ﬂood in August 2002 amounted to 9.2 billion euros in
Germany (Munich Re 2003, 30). It was much higher than that of any earlier ﬂood event
in Germany (see table 3.1). The August ﬂood caused damage of 6.2 billion euros in
Saxony, which was the Bundesland1 aﬀected most severely by the ﬂood. 36% of this
was damage to residential buildings, 23% damage to commercial constructions and 36%
damage to governmental infrastructure (Leitstelle Wiederaufbau 2003, 2). Numbers
for the whole of Germany are less precise, since unspeciﬁed losses amount to nearly
18% of the damage. The shares of residential buildings, commercial constructions, and
of governmental infrastructure are estimated to be 23%, 19%, and 37%, respectively
(Munich Re 2003, 27).
Despite large ﬂood damages in the past decades, it is noteworthy that extreme ﬂoods
in the last century tended to occur less frequently than extreme ﬂoods in earlier centuries.
Even though measured data are only available since the middle of the 19th century,
reports and historical ﬂood marks indicate the large magnitude of former ﬂoods. River
management and improved ﬂood protection are potential reasons for reduced ﬂood risk.
In addition, power plants with their cooling systems, increase the water temperature
and decrease the risk of ice jam related ﬂoods (Schmidt 2000, 282-258).
1The German provinces are referred to as Bundesländer. There are 16 Bundesländer (the plural of
one Bundesland) in Germany.
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Month/Year Area
economic losses 
[nominal values in million euros]
insured losses
[nominal values in million euros]
3/1981 Germany 46 -
1981 South Germany 40 5
1983 Rhine 27 2
1984 Rhine 72 3
1988 Danube 27 4
8/1991 Danube 50 4
12/1993 Rhine 540 162
1994 Elbe 162 54
1/1995 Rhine 288 117
7/1997 Oder 324 32
1/1998 Germany 135 5
1999 Rhine 72 5
5/1999 Danube 375 63
8/2002 Elbe 9200 1740
Source: Schwarze and Wagner (2006, 225).
Table 3.1: Recent large ﬂood events in Germany
Climate change and its potential impact on ﬂood management will most likely in-
crease the risk of ﬂooding and make issues of ﬂood management even more important
in the future than they are already today. Beyond ﬂood adaption through better ﬂood
protection, an increased ﬂood risk may also require relocation to reduce risk exposure
(IPCC 2001a, 674).
Recent high ﬂood damages raise the question if ﬂood defense can be improved. This
question will guide the following chapters, having in mind that ﬂood defense is expensive.
As there is no comprehensive overview of expenses for ﬂood defense in Germany, some
examples will have to suﬃce to illustrate the cost of ﬂood defense measures. 42% of
the levees along the Elbe in Germany are in poor condition. Costs of reconstruction are
estimated to be more than 450 million euros (IKSE 2001, 71). On the Rhine the ﬂood
action plan (see section 3.2.2) for the years 1998 to 2020 lists costs of 8.8 billion ECU2
for ﬂood defense measures (IKSR 1998).
Nowadays there are three basic strategies that are of importance for ﬂood defense
in Germany. These strategies are a combination of ﬂood mitigating and ﬂood adapting
measures (LAWA 1995):
- Natural retention encourages the natural functions of water retention, mitigating
the ﬂood risk.
- At vulnerable locations technical ﬂood defense measures are able to meet more am-
bitious protection targets than possible with natural retention. This also reduces
ﬂood risk.
2The `ECU' is the precursor of the European currency `euro'.
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- Further precautionary actions ensure that people adapt themselves to the remain-
ing ﬂood risk.
3.1 The legal foundation of ﬂood management
Responsibility for ﬂood defense measures in Germany is divided among diﬀerent public
actors at the federal, state (Bundesland3, and communal level, as well as among commer-
cial and non-commercial private actors. Various legal acts regulate ﬂood-related issues
such as land use, building standards, levees, channel maintenance or civil protection.
This dispersed responsibility results in a complicated organization of ﬂood management.
Traditionally ﬂood mitigation and adaption was the task of the German states and
the communal level. However, the recent Flood Protection Act4 strengthened the federal
level and introduced a common standard in ﬂood protection. In addition ﬂood manage-
ment is increasingly seen as a task of the whole river basin. The river basin approach
is fundamental in the Water Framework Directive of the European Union, adopted in
2000. Table 3.2 gives a crude overview of the federal organization of the diﬀerent ﬂood
management measures.
 actor  
task federal level (Bund) state level (Bundesländer) communal level 
retention areas • protection of flood 
basins of Q100-floods 
and designation of all 
flood-prone areas on 
maps according to the 
federal water act 
(WHG) 
• designation and protection of Q100-
flood basins according to the federal 
and state water acts (WHG and 
others) 
• consideration of flood-prone areas in 
regional planning  according to the 
federal regional planning act (ROG) 
 
technical flood 
protection 
• maintenance of federal 
waterways according to 
the federal water act 
(WHG) 
• maintenance of first-order water 
bodies  
• construction of levees and dams 
according to the federal water act 
(WHG), DIN-standard  
• maintenance of  second-order 
water bodies according to 
state water acts 
• obligation of discharge 
control according to state 
water acts 
regional and urban 
land-use planning  
• principles and goals of 
regional planning 
according to the federal 
regional planning act 
(ROG) 
• regional plans (state regional 
planning acts) 
• urban land-use planning: 
zoning restrictions according 
to the federal building code 
(BauGB) 
precautionary 
building 
 • building codes  
civil protection  • civil protection acts   
insurance and 
public disaster aid 
• flood insurance: commercial voluntary flood insurance with differentiated risk zones 
• disaster aid in case of large floods: no legal provision, ad hoc disaster aid at all federal levels 
 
Table 3.2: Competences in ﬂood management
The Federal Water Act (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz, WHG) is the legal basis for water
3which is the singular of the German states, the Bundesländer
4The Flood Protection Act brought a number of changes to existing legal acts (Artikelgesetz), refer-
ences will be given with respect to the actual legal acts.
29
Chapter 3 River ﬂood management in Germany
management. The Water Framework Directive (WFD) of the European Union with
its river basin management approach is now implemented in the Federal Water Act.
It is the objective of river basin management to improve the ecological and chemical
status of surface water and avoid any detrimental eﬀects (WHG  25a). Exceptions to
this objectives are allowed for artiﬁcial and heavily modiﬁed surface water bodies. In
this case a good ecological potential and good chemical status shall be achieved and
detrimental eﬀects shall be avoided. Flood protection measureswhose replacement by
alternative measures would cause disproportional eﬀortcan qualify water as heavily
modiﬁed surface water bodies (WHG  25b).
The federal Flood Protection Act, which was adopted in 2005, introduced major
changes to ﬂood plain protection under the Federal Water Act. The Flood Protection
Act also aﬀected the Federal Building Code (BauGB), the Federal Regional Planning
Act (ROG), and other legal acts.
The Federal Water Act is the framework for ﬂood mitigation through water retention
areas as well as for technical ﬂood protection measures. Areas in the ﬂood outline can
be protected as ﬂood basins (WHG  31b.1, 31b.2) or as ﬂood-prone areas (WHG 
31c). Flood basins are areas between surface waters and dykes or high banks as well as
other areas that are ﬂooded or that ﬂood water ﬂows through or that are used for ﬂood
water relief or retention. (WHG  31b.1). WHG  31b.2 asks the Bundesländer to
designate ﬂood basins located in the Q100-ﬂood-outline and to adopt provisions for ﬂood
protection. It was the original aim of the Flood Protection Act to prohibit the declaration
of new housing zones in urban land-use planning, but due to political diﬃculties new
housing zones are now permitted under rather restrictive conditions in ﬂood basins(WHG
 31b.4). The new Flood Protection Act simpliﬁed the designation of ﬂood basins.
Designated ﬂood basins used to be bound to stricter requirements than the location in
the Q100-ﬂood-outline.
Flood-prone areas according to WHG  31c are ﬂooded in case of failure of ﬂood
protections measures such as levees, or they are areas in the ﬂood outline that are not
vulnerable to ﬂoods with return periods of less than a 100 years. The Bundesländer
are required to map these areas and to take measures to avoid and abate potential
impairments from ﬂoods. Flood protection plans shall achieve a protection level for
ﬂoods with return periods of up to 100 years (WHG  31d). Levees are a very common
protection measure for ﬂood-prone areas. Their construction is regulated by the norm
DIN 197125 that not only gives guidelines on various technical issues but also on the
height of the levee and the resulting ﬂood protection level. According to the DIN-norm
the ﬂood protection level shall be determined under consideration of technical, ecological,
economic as well as urban planning aspects.
The Federal Water Act contains provisions on the upkeep and development of water
bodies. The upkeep of water bodies comprises the maintenance of proper conditions for
water drainage (WHG  28.1). The Bundesländer and their state water acts classify
rivers as ﬁrst-order water bodies or second-order water bodies. Some states also diﬀer-
entiate higher order water bodies. The Bundesländer hold responsibility for ﬁrst-order
5DIN norms are deﬁned by the German Institute for Standardization.
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water bodies, whereas smaller, second or third-order water bodies are managed at the
communal level. In some states single issue authorities hold responsibility for speciﬁc
water related tasks, such as the maintenance of levees. Federal waterways are main-
tained according to the federal waterway act (Bundewasserstraßengesetz, WaStrG) by
federal authorities. Since many large rivers are federal waterways it is important to note
that responsibility for the waterways ends at the milestones on the banks. Areas that
become inundated by ﬂooding fall under the responsibility of the Bundesländer or the
communal level (Heiland 2002, 240).
In urban areas with second-order water bodies the communal level is obliged to adjust
water discharge with appropriate measures to prevent detrimental eﬀects on riparians
and ecosystems. This obligation of the state water acts serves the general public and
not the interests of individuals (Fröhlich 2001, 523).
Water development measures may only be undertaken if they are in compliance with
the objectives of river basin management plans. Water development has to maintain
natural retention areas and avoid interferences with the natural run-oﬀ. The construction
of dikes and dams is considered as a water development measure. If no agreement can be
reached on water development measures extending over more than a single Bundesland
the federal level can be asked to negotiate between the Bundesländer (WHG  31.1-2,
31.5-6). The requirement of agreement and the possibility of mediation of the federal
level is reiterated by WHG  32. The Bundesländer are asked to undertake measures to
maintain and reclaim natural retention areas, to allow ﬂooding and discharge of these
areas according to an optimized ﬂood discharge concept for the whole water basin, and
to restore meadows. Flood protection plans are required to guaranty protection from
ﬂoods with return periods up to 100 years; they shall be developed until the year 2009.
It is the task of any kind of regional planning to regulate and distribute diﬀerent land
uses in space and to balance the diverse interests that are aﬀected. Flood protection
is just one interest, competing with many others at diﬀerent levels of planning (Lüers
1999). Urban and regional land-use decisions have to consider the basic principles and
goals of the federal Regional Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz, ROG). With respect
to ﬂood protection on rivers, a guiding principle of regional planning asks for protecting
or restoring meadows, retention areas and areas that are in danger of being ﬂooded
(ROG 2.2(8)). This principle is speciﬁed by regional plans and is complemented by
the sectoral planning approach of the federal and state water acts, with their binding
regulations of ﬂood basins and other issues related to the water drainage system.
Regional plans (for each state) and sub-regional plans are based on state regional
planning acts. There is a growing awareness in the state ministries for regional planning
that transfrontier cooperation is needed to strengthen ﬂood protection and to prevent
the development of new residential areas in ﬂood-prone areas (Fröhlich 2001, 506-507).
Urban land-use planning at the communal level sets the legally binding framework
for governmental authorities as well as for aﬀected citizens. It is based on the Federal
Building Code (Baugesetzbuch, BauGB) and is obliged to ﬁt to the demands and aims of
the regional planning act, regional plans, and sectoral planning. Urban land-use planning
deﬁnes areas for housing and other purposes and can mark areas that are reserved for
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water drainage and ﬂood protection measures, such as levees, dams, drainage channels
and ﬂood basins (BauGB  5.2(7), 5.4). The recent Flood Protection Act explicitly
introduced ﬂood protection as one of the principle requirements of the Federal Building
Code (BauGB  1.6(12)). However, there is no general priority for ﬂood protection since
attention must also be paid to various other issues such as health, safety, and other
socio-economic considerations. Discretion regarding ﬂood protection in urban land-use
decisions is limited when new housing zones are established, in contrast, discretion is
large with respect to general preventive measures of ﬂood protection (Fröhlich (2001,
509-512) and Lüers (1999)).
Building codes of the German states set standards with respect to speciﬁc buildings;
they complement the spatial approach of urban land-use planning. One aim of building
codes is hazard control, therefore building licenses can require precautionary measures
such as safeguarding oil tanks (Fröhlich 2001, 514).
Civil protection in case of natural catastrophes is part of the responsibility of the
Bundesländer. They adopted civil protection acts. In case of a catastrophe the federal
level can help the Bundesländer with its civil defense resources. Federal authorities for
civil protection take action if local resources are not large enough. Superordinate author-
ities can overtake responsibility in case of very large events. Civil protection authorities
rely on resources from ﬁre departments, rescue services, the German Federal Agency for
Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk, THW), and non-governmental organizations
(DKKV 2003, 100-106).
3.2 Spatial spillovers
Spatial spillovers and heterogeneity of land through ﬂood-prone areas were introduced
in section 2.4 as key issues for economic eﬃciency in ﬂood management. Having given
overview of damaging ﬂoods and the organization of ﬂood defense measures in Germany,
this section returns to spatial spillovers to provide an in depth description of how they are
considered in ﬂood management. Flood-prone areas will be discussed in the subsequent
section (see 3.3).
Eﬃcient ﬂood management requires the internalization of spatial externalities. As
mentioned above, ﬂood protection measures can exhibit unidirectional upstream-downstream
spillovers. A detention basin in the upper reaches of a watershed can improve ﬂood pro-
tection for downstream riparians. Levees or river channeling can have the opposite eﬀect
and aggravate the ﬂood risk downstream.
3.2.1 The size of spatial spillovers
As it is discussed later on (see chapter 5), the magnitude of spillovers is crucial to
evaluate what kind of federal organization is most eﬃcient in providing ﬂood defense.
Large spillovers favor a centralized provision of ﬂood protection whereas projects with
small spillovers are better served by a decentralized provision.
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Quantitative assessments of the spatial eﬀects of ﬂood defense must be based on
a comprehensive understanding of hydrological and hydraulic conditions of the water-
shed. Recent advances in computer modeling signiﬁcantly improved the understanding
of ﬂooding events. The eﬀects of river development measures undertaken in the past can
now be quantiﬁed for some rivers. Models capable of consistently simulating past ﬂood
events are becoming the basis for evaluating beneﬁts of potential future ﬂood protection
measures. The following section outlines the importance of spatial spillover eﬀects for
large river basins in Germany.6
The Rhine is not only the largest river in Germany, it is is also one of the best studied
watersheds in the country. Large scale water development was undertaken in the Rhine
watershed during the last 200 years. In the nineteenth century, rectiﬁcation of the Upper
Rhine took place between Basel and Mannheim. The plan was inspired by the wish to
stabilize the riverbed to prevent changes in the river course. The rectiﬁcation helped to
ﬁx the borders between the state of Baden and France and also lowered the groundwater
level, with positive eﬀects on agricultural use in the ﬂood plain (Disse and Engel 2001).
Additional measures were undertaken from 1928 to 1977 between Basel and Maxau
to improve shipping by means of channels and weirs and to allow the construction of
power plants. As a consequence of these measures the ﬂood protection level increased
to ﬂood-return periods of 1000 years. However, the same measures decreased the ﬂood
protection downstream the weir Iﬀezheim (near Maxau) from a protection level of 200
years return period to that of a 50 to 60 year return period. At the same time the
velocity of the ﬂood peak ﬂowing downstream increased, leading to a higher probability
that ﬂood peaks of tributaries of the Upper Rhine coincide with the main ﬂood peak.
Water development was also undertaken along the Lower Rhine, today only 15% of the
natural ﬂood outline remains available for ﬂooding (IKSR 1997, Lammersen et al. 2002).
Heavy ﬂooding in 1992 and 1995 boosted awareness of ﬂood risk in the Rhine area and
the consequences of earlier water development measures. The Guidelines for Forward-
Looking Flood Protection reﬂect the current understanding of ﬂood management in
Germany. They were adopted in 1995 by the Länder working group on water 7 and
conﬁrmed in 2003 (LAWA 2004). A quantitative assessment of the recommendations,
using hydrological models, deepened understanding of the eﬃciency of ﬂood protection
measures and of the magnitude of spatial eﬀects. Simulations with such models were
done extensively for the Rhine and the results are believed to carry over to other river
basins in Germany (LAWA 2000).
The transformation of old ﬂood basins into retention basins with storage dams is
most eﬃcient for ﬂood protection further downstream. Regulated storage dams enhance
ﬂood protection signiﬁcantly in comparison to the recovery of old ﬂood basins as self
6Note that not all ﬂood problems involve spatial eﬀects, as 50% of ﬂood damage in Southwest Germany
is caused by ﬂash ﬂoods. These ﬂoods are caused by localized, high intensity rainfalls of short
duration. In contrast, ﬂoods at large rivers are the consequence of long lasting rainfalls of smaller
intensity over large areas (Bronstert 1995).
7This group, the Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser, is made up of representatives from each Bundes-
land
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regulated systems. A three- to fourfold increase in eﬃciency was found for retention
basins along the Upper Rhine between Worms and Bingen. Flood protection measures
display positive downstream eﬀects only if they located at a part of the river that is
also aﬀected by the ﬂood. Measures aiming to improve water retention in the whole
watershed by the means of adapted agricultural techniques and forest management, and
by control of surface sealing may be favorable for many ecological systems; the ﬂood
protection eﬀect for large ﬂoods at large rivers is, however, not signiﬁcant. Local, low-
scale, technical ﬂood protection measures have, on average, no eﬀect on downstream
riparians. A simple aggregation of upstream ﬂood protection eﬀects is not possible
(LAWA 2000).
After pointing out the low eﬃciency of natural retention, it has to be added that
these ﬂood protection measures also serve other means and cannot solely be judged
with respect to their ﬂood protection eﬀect. Cost beneﬁt studies found high beneﬁts
from the removal of levees along the Elbe. The willingness to pay for the creation of
a wetland near the Elbe was high enough to yield positive cost-beneﬁt ratios under a
set of scenarios. The ratios ranged between 2.5 and 4.2. Due to the small size of the
wetland, potential beneﬁts from better ﬂood protection where not taken into account in
this study (Dehnhardt and Meyerhoﬀ 2002, Meyerhoﬀ 2002).
A theoretical option for ﬂood protection along the Rhine would be the regulation
of the Lake of Constance. However, under realistic conditions lower ﬂood peak levels
on the Lower Rhine (Cologne, Düsseldorf) cannot be reached by this measure. This
is mainly because the distance is so large that regulation would have to start before
the ﬂood-generating rainfall. Currently there are no models available that would allow
such long warning times, nor can they be expected to be available in the future. In the
1970s there was a discussion if regulation of the Lake of Constance could improve ﬂood
protection along the Upper Rhine. Strong local resistance against these plans arose
among the riparians of the Lake of Constance. The Swiss canton Thurgau even held a
referendum demanding the government of the Canton to oppose such regulation. The
German Bundesland Baden-Wurttemberg also opposed regulation because it would not
be in accordance with environmental objectives in the region of the Lake of Constance
(IKSR 1997, 15-17).
Far reaching ﬂood-protection eﬀects (potential externalities) are also present along
the Elbe. The Elbe basin has a high density of reservoirs and storage lakes, higher than
in any other large river basin in Europe. A lot of these reservoirs have storage capacities
for ﬂood water. Many reservoirs were constructed between 1950 and 1980, increasing
ﬂood water storage capacity from 74 to almost 500 million m3, of which roughly half is
located in Germany and the other half in the Czech Republic. Large reservoirs in the
Czech Republic have signiﬁcant ﬂood-reducing eﬀects, reaching far into the Middle Elbe
in Germany. Simulation analysis found a ﬂood peak reduction of 30 cm in Dresden as
well as ﬂood reducing eﬀects in Magdeburg, which is even further downstream. On the
Saale, one of the large tributaries of the Elbe, a peak reduction of up top 50 cm was
found for Halle from reservoirs 190 km upstream. But these results need further analysis
to provide reliable benchmarks that give a picture of the extent of spatial spillovers
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(IKSE 2001, 28-35).8 Non-stationary data, caused by human impacts and long term
climatological variability, constitute the major problem in ﬂood data analysis.
Detrimental eﬀects from ﬂood protection on downstream riparians due to the up-
stream construction of levees and the resulting destruction of natural ﬂood basins are
also present along the Elbe. Nowadays most areas along the Elbe are protected by lev-
ees. In the area of Lutherstadt Wittenberg the Q100-ﬂood peak rose approximately 10
cm and further downstream in the area of Wittenberge it rose 50 cm (IKSE 2001, 16).
Eﬃcient ﬂood protection measures do not always have to be undertaken upstream. In
urban areas local ﬂood defense is crucial. In Dresdenthe city most aﬀected by the 2002
ﬂoodthere are two ﬂood channels constructed to release the main Elbe channel if water
rises above a certain level. A water level reduction of up to 30 cm can thereby be achieved
in the city of Dresden (IKSE 2001, 35). In 2002 the water level in Dresden was the highest
ever measured; with 940 cm the gage was considerably higher than the highest gage of
877 cm, measured in 1845. However, in contrast to early speculations, the ﬂood was not
a millennium ﬂood. After a number of calculations of the peak discharge, the return
period of the ﬂood is now estimated to range between 150 and 200 years. Reasons
for extreme water levels were obstacles in one of the ﬂood channels (Ostraﬂutrinne)
and natural aggradations near to the Elbe bridges in the city. Responsibility for these
problems is shared between the city of Dresden, which maintains the ﬂood channels and
the federal ministry of environment, which supported natural conditions on the federal
water way Elbe and prevailed against the federal ministry of transport (DKKV 2003,
31).
One can conclude that spatial spillovers play an important role in current ﬂood man-
agement. Nowadays ﬂood defense measures discussed for the future mainly exhibit
positive spillovers. Retention basins and river restoration are two important examples.
However, in the past large scale water development in combination with new or higher
levees caused predominantly negative spillovers.
3.2.2 Spatial spillovers and the federal organization of ﬂood
management
Federal, state, or communal responsibility?
Spatial spillovers lead to the question: What is the appropriate federal organization?
It is the aim of the federal organization to promote eﬃcient provision of public goods.
As noted in section 2.4.1, eﬃciency requires that beneﬁts and costs of public goods are
equalized at the margin. For local public goods, the eﬃciency condition can be fulﬁlled
within a local jurisdiction. Local governments can consider the utility of all its citizen
and provide an eﬃcient quantity of the public good. The economic literature stresses
that local governments are able to take into account local preferences, which promotes
8Helms et al. (2002) work in this direction and emphasize that up to now no (international) agreement
could be reached on the ﬂood statistics of the Elbe.
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eﬃcient public good allocation (Oates 1972).
However, decentralized decisions can be ineﬃcient if spillovers also aﬀect citizens be-
yond the borders of the respective jurisdiction. Local governments neglect those exter-
nalities, since it is generally assumed that the interests of citizens outside the jurisdiction
are not considered. Centralization is the traditional answer to this problem, because a
central government of a large jurisdiction can consider beneﬁts of all aﬀected individuals.
The classical literature on ﬁscal federalism argues that this advantage of centralization
is not costless, since local diﬀerences in tastes cannot be taken into account in large
jurisdictions. Oates (1972), for example, speciﬁes that centralization requires ineﬃcient
uniformity in public good provision.
After giving an overview on the legal basis of ﬂood management and after looking
at the spatial eﬀects of ﬂood defense measures, the question arises if the federal organi-
zation of ﬂood management is eﬃcient in taking into account spatial spillovers. Flood
management is a complex task. The introductory chapter (see table 2.2) distinguished
between ﬂood mitigation, which can have spillovers, and ﬂood adaption, which predom-
inantly has no spillovers. Here the responsibilities for ﬂood mitigation in the federal
system will be analyzed ﬁrst, followed by a brief description of ﬂood adaption measures.
Flood mitigation can be achieved by natural or technical ﬂood defense. Some of these
measures exhibit upstream-downstream eﬀects that range further than the local level of
the federal system and also further than a Bundesland and may, in some cases, even
aﬀect other countries. The Federal Water Act is only a framework legislation of water
policy and leaves it to the Bundesländer to decide on speciﬁc policies. The Bundesländer
diﬀerentiate in their water acts between large, ﬁrst-order water bodies and smaller,
second and third-order water bodies. Therefore ﬂood protection for large water bodies
falls under the responsibility of the Bundesländer, while that for small water bodies
falls under the responsibility of the communal level. This division allows a separation of
responsibilities in approximation with the size of the spatial interdependencies of streams
and rivers.
As mentioned above, ﬂood protection eﬀects on large rivers often extend further
than one Bundesland. The two large rivers Rhine and Elbe ﬂow through ﬁve and seven
Bundesländer and their watersheds extend over eight and ten Bundesländer, respectively.
In addition, both rivers cross international borders. Large-scale water development
measures undertaken in the past decades, and in some cases even centuries, led to
increased ﬂood risk on some downstream locations (such as Cologne). The economic
approach on federalism suggests that those spillovers were not taken into account by
upstream decision making bodies.
Nowadays, after a number of ﬂoods with high economic losses, priorities in ﬂood
protection have changed. There is a growing awareness of the spatial eﬀects of ﬂood
protection measures. Levees are now seen in a much more critical light than in the
past and ﬂood retention basins, with positive downstream eﬀects, are considered to be
very eﬀective. Recent changes, through the Flood Protection Act have strengthened
the central (federal) level in ﬂood management. The German government argued that a
common federal standard in ﬂood protection is necessary to reach a fair balance of inter-
36
3.2 Spatial spillovers
ests between upstream and downstream riparians (Deutscher Bundestag 2004). There is
now (1) a common minimum standard in the ﬂood protection level that shall be reached
(ﬂood protection up to Q100-ﬂoods) and (2) a common standard in the declaration of
ﬂood plains (Q100-ﬂood outline).
From an economic perspective, it is well known that common standards do not nec-
essarily fully internalize externalities. Whereas complete internalization of externalities
leads to eﬃciency, common standards usually involve ineﬃciencies (Baumol and Oates
1988). Therefore it worth asking to what extent common standards lead to an internal-
ization of spillovers.
To (1): A common ﬂood protection level can be reached by two diﬀerent ﬂood de-
fense measures: Increased water retention measures or higher levees. In principle the
two measures can be combined. Today, however, the ﬂood plains of most large rivers
are already protected by levees, which reduces ﬂexibility in these combination of both
measures. Human encroachment in ﬂood plains often leaves little room for larger reten-
tion areas. A large scale removal of levees to give more room to the rivers is often not
possible. The remaining option are higher levees.
As described before, higher levees have, in most cases, a negative impact on down-
stream ﬂood protection. If higher levees were the only option for better ﬂood protection,
a higher ﬂood protection level upstream would also require higher levees downstream
to maintain the original ﬂood protection level. If a common minimum standard aims
to increase the ﬂood protection level, downstream levees need an additional increase.
A uniform, minimum ﬂood protection standard upstream and downstream in the pres-
ence of negative spillovers can have counterproductive eﬀects and aggravate, rather than
improve, eﬃciency in ﬂood defense.
In contrast to levees, water retention measures can have signiﬁcant positive spillovers,
particularly when regulated retention basins are used. Retention basins can be con-
structed behind existing levees in the natural ﬂood outline. This possibility prevails in
many situations, even if the general population density in the natural ﬂood plain is high.
The key challenge for the establishment of new retention areas is to ﬁnd appropriate lo-
cations and ﬁnancing for these projects.
Traditionally, ﬁnancing of ﬂood defense is done by the federal level that is responsible
for planning and conducting these measures. The Bundesländer ﬁnance ﬂood protection
on ﬁrst-order rivers and on federal waterways. Flood protection along second and higher
order water bodies is ﬁnanced on the communal level. In practice, however, assistance
from the Bundesländer is available as co-ﬁnancing for ﬂood protection projects. In
addition, most water acts of the Bundesländer allow the communal level to share costs
among riparians who beneﬁt from a speciﬁc ﬂood protection measure. Funding from the
federal level is also available under the joint task Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und des
Küstenschutzes (improvement of agricultural structure and coastal protection, GAK),
which provides co-ﬁnancing of up to 70% of costs. Further co-ﬁnancing opportunities
are also given from the European Union; an example is the completed INTERREG II
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C program9 (Heiland 2002, 240-251). As mentioned already earlier, it is not possible to
give a comprehensive overview of the ﬁnancing of ﬂood protection measures undertaken
in Germany in recent years.
The new ﬂood protection plans (WHG  31d) strengthen the need for cooperation
within water basins. However, the Flood Protection Act does not introduce transfer
mechanisms to ﬁnance new retention areas. One has to conclude, therefore, that a
common minimum standard in the ﬂood protection level does little to internalize positive
spillovers from retention basins. The problem of how to establish new retention basins
is not solved by a common ﬂood protection level alone.
One can note that the situation would be diﬀerent if the ﬂood plains were still in
their natural conditions today. Under such conditions levees are probably a very eﬃ-
cient means of ﬂood defense. A common standard of ﬂood protection would then help to
achieve ﬂood protection without comprising the ﬂood safety further downstream. How-
ever, this is not the starting point today, since the ﬂood plains of all major rivers in
Germany are already protected by levees.
To (2): The second common standard is the declaration of the Q100-ﬂood outline
as legally protected ﬂood basins. Areas behind levees in the natural ﬂood plain do
not fall under this provision. Many settlements were constructed in the Q100-ﬂood
outline in the past, which built up pressure to protect these areas with new levees. The
legal protection of the ﬂood plain might help to stop this cycles, which favored negative
spillovers. However, the new Flood Protection Act still allows exceptions for new housing
zones in the high risk Q100-ﬂood outline.
Like the common ﬂood protection standard, the legal protection of the Q100-ﬂood
outline does not foster the establishment of retention basins for downstream ﬂood pro-
tection. Potential locations for these basins are in many cases behind existing levees and
thus do not fall under the provisions of the new Flood Protection Act.
This assessment of standards is tentative as long as there is no closer description and
analysis of decentralized and centralized decision making. Such an analysis is provided
in chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Flood adaption aims to reduce the damaging impact of ﬂoods and has, in most cases,
no spillover eﬀects (see the summarizing table 2.2). From an economic perspective,
public ﬂood adapting activities are best provided by decentralized jurisdictions.
Flood adaption is possible by land-use decisions, precautionary building, and civil
9The INTERREG II C program of the European Union (1997-1999) was a transnational co-operation
on regional and spatial planning that also funded ﬂood mitigation projects. The INTERREG pro-
gram on Rhine-Meuse Activities (IRMA) was funded with more than 130 million ECU. Since member
states had to co-ﬁnance the projects the total costs amounted to approximately 430 euro. Interest-
ingly, more than 70% of EU funding went to the Netherlands, which certainly can be considered
as a downstream riparian of the Rhine. This is in contrast to the requirements of the ﬂood action
plan for the whole Rhine (see the following section on cooperation), where the suggested measures
in the Netherlands amount to not more than 20% of the total costs along the Rhine (Heiland 2002,
248-251).
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protection. Even though the federal government and the Bundesländer have some in-
ﬂuence on land-use decisions, it is the communal level, with its land-use planning, that
has most inﬂuence on the ﬂood loss potential. This division of responsibilities seems
justiﬁed with respect to spillovers, since, in most cases, the loss potential has no impact
on ﬂood risk further downstream.
Building codes and civil protection fall under the responsibility of the Bundesländer.
Spatial eﬀects of most of these ﬂood adapting measures are not present for downstream
riparians. One important exception is the ﬂood proof installation of oil tanks, since
oil contamination through upstream leakages signiﬁcantly increases the ﬂood damage
to a house. After the 2002 Elbe ﬂood, 44% of the damaged houses were aﬀected by
oil contamination, whereas only 13% of households had unprotected oil tanks (DKKV
2003, 50).
Substantial wealth accumulation in the protected parts of the ﬂood plains raises the
question: Is the communal level able to promote eﬃcient locational decisions of individ-
uals. Since this important concern is not primarily based on inadequate considerations
of spillovers, it will be discussed in section 3.3, which concentrates on the particularities
of ﬂood-prone areas.
Civil protection could potentially cause spillover eﬀects. During the Elbe ﬂood in
2002 more than 131 levees were breeched in Saxonia alone (DKKV 2003, 81, 103).
It is recognized that failure of levees or low levees reduced ﬂood peaks downstream
during major ﬂood events in the past years. However, publications outlining the general
principals of future ﬂood protection in Germany (LAWA 2000, IKSR 1999) do not discuss
these ﬂood protection measures, neglecting the fact that higher levees built according
to modern technical standards reduce these accidental ﬂood protection eﬀects.
The current understanding of civil protection in the case of ﬂooding does not promote
the idea that areas behind levees can be intentionally ﬂooded to protect other, more
valuable areas further downstream. For example, no guidelines were given with respect to
this issue in the recent recommendations of the Länder working group on water (LAWA
2004). This issue has gained importance since the new Flood Protection Act introduced
a common ﬂood protection level for all ﬂood plains and substantial rebuilding of levees
is currently being undertaken nowadays along many rivers to reach this goal.
Cooperation
The hierarchically organized federal structure of governmental authorities in charge of
ﬂood defense is complemented by numerous approaches to cooperation within river
basins. Cooperation is seen here as the collaboration of jurisdictions beyond the hi-
erarchical structure of the formalized federal system. Cooperation increased parallel to
a growing understanding of the inter-regional eﬀects of ﬂood protection and river de-
velopment. Cooperation at the international level increased as did cooperation within
countries. The Rhine is an early example of this development.
Due to a changed ﬂood risk, France and Germany agreed, in 1982, to implement
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retention measures along the Upper Rhine between Basel and Worms. The agreement
was a response to the substantial river development along the Upper Rhine, which
was completed in 1977. It was the objective of the agreement to implement retention
measures in the volume of 290 million m3. By 1997 a volume of 80 million m3 retention
capacity was available. Simulation analyses show that these measures were able to
improve ﬂood protection downstream (along the Lower Rhine), but were not able to
reach the ﬂood protection level of 1955. For the Upper Rhine, whose protection is the
main objective of the agreed protection measures, the ﬂood protection level increased
from a 50  60 year to a 80  100 year protection level (Lammersen et al. 2002, IKSR
1997).
Financing of the retention measures of the international agreement is shared between
the federal government of Germany (40%), and the Bundesländer Rhineland-Palatinate
(40%) and Hesse (20%). The cost-sharing agreement of the ﬂood defense measures
is unique for the Rhine watershed and evolved from the particular historical situation
between France and Germany after World War I (Heiland 2002, 255-257).
A further step was taken in 1998 when an action plan of ﬂoods was adopted under
the umbrella of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (IKSR).
The IKSR works on the basis of an international agreement of the riparian states of the
Rhine (Übereinkommen zum Schutz des Rheins) with the aims to promote sustainable
development of the ecosystem Rhine ( 3.1) and to undertake a holistic approach to ﬂood
protection under considerations of ecological needs ( 3.4). The aggregated eﬀects of a
bundle of measures on the Upper Rhine are quantiﬁed as an 80 cm reduction of the ﬂood
peak at the Upper Rhine and 45 cm reduction at Cologne for an extreme ﬂood with a
Q200-discharge. Additional measures at the end of the Upper Rhine and along the Lower
Rhine would be able to achieve a further reduction of 50 cm for Cologne. A reduction
of the peak water level from 13 m to 12 m in Cologne reduces a ﬂood from a Q1000- to
a Q280-ﬂood (IKSR 1999, 7-8). Costs of the action plan exceed 12 billion euro for the
years 1998 to 2020 (IKSR 1998). They are ﬁnanced by the country (and Bundesland)
responsible for implementing the ﬂood defense measure (Heiland 2002, 181).
Implementation of the action plan is making progress. Important objectives for the
year 2000 could be reached; examples are the reduction of the ﬂood peak and longer ﬂood
warning times. However, a reduction of the ﬂood loss potential in ﬂood-prone areas could
not be reached (see the following section 3.3). In order to reach the future goals of the
action plan, increased eﬀort is needed in the future (IKSR 2001b, 27). Heiland (2002,
177-181) points to fundamental diﬃculties in implementing the action plan of ﬂoods.
Unlike water quality problems, which were the starting point of cooperation within
the IKSR, ﬂood defense is not solely part of water management, but also requires the
integration of spatial planning. Whereas costs of measures to improve water quality were
shared among upstream and downstream riparians, no such cost sharing agreement could
be reached for the ﬂood action plan. Costs are carried by the party who is undertaking
the action, regardless of who reaps the beneﬁts.
One extreme example is the Bundesland Hesse that refused to establish regulated
retention basins, even though it can be expected that they lead to a substantial reduction
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of ﬂood risk on the Middle and the Lower Rhine. North-Rhine Westphalia even oﬀered
funding for these measures, but Hesse refused because of local resistance. Instead,
Hesse chose to build higher levees as a response to increased ﬂood risk after the water
development on the Upper Rhine (Heiland 2002, 258-261). Local resistance against
retention areas, particularly from the agricultural sector, is a common phenomenon at
many potential ﬂood basins (Holtmeier and Kolf 1999).
After analyzing various other approaches of cooperation in the ﬁeld of water man-
agement and regional planning, Heiland (2002, 270) comes to the conclusion that eco-
nomic linkages between upstream and downstream riparians taking account of cost and
beneﬁts from ﬂood defense measures are presently non-existent in Germany. The only
exceptionwhich has to be seen in a special historical contextare the above-mentioned
ﬂood defense measures along the Upper Rhine that aim to reach the ﬂood protection
level of 1995.
Spillovers and the river basin approach
Unidirectional spillovers are not only present in ﬂood defense but also in many other
water related issues. It is therefore useful to link the discussion of ﬂood management to
the broader policy ﬁeld of water management. In order to take spillovers into account,
the river basin management approach became popular in recent decades. As many river
basins comprise more than one country, river basin management is often a transnational
task.
Common characteristics of river systems that imply the necessity of public action
are (1) economies of scale for large dams (2) upstream-downstream interdependencies
and (3) non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness of almost all water uses. A simple normative
economic analysis would suggest that a central river basin authority would be suitable
to incorporate all relevant externalities (Wandschneider 1984). An ambitious proposal
for such river basin authorities is made by Spulber and Sabbaghi (1998, ch. 10) for the
United States. They suggest that a wide array of water quality and quantity issues should
be addressed by a central authority. This authority should be provided with competence
over quality standards, taxes and user fees. However, after analyzing a number of river
management experiences, Wandschneider (1984, 1066) comes to the conclusion that
no general recommendations for decentralized or centralized river basin management
structures are justiﬁed. Maass (1962, 597) is skeptical of river basin authorities for very
large rivers and asks, what degree of segmentation is desirable? Some authors even see
the promise of decentralization, since decentralization can lead to improved eﬃciency in
water use, greater equity in water allocation and the preservation of ecosystems (Mody
2004, 29)
Analyzing problems of existing river basin authorities, Barrow (1998) ﬁnds that such
authorities often lack the control over the whole basin. They are not able to `tax' certain
activities upstream in order to allow more eﬃcient development in other parts of the
basin. River basin authorities are often too centralized and inﬂexible. They suﬀer from
over ambition and do not work well together with local authorities and non-governmental
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organizations. Barrow suggests that river basin authorities focus on coordination and
oversight: River basins should be managed by more than one authority, to reduce bias
and improve scrutiny of development activities. (Barrow 1998, 180).
Despite the controversy on the best degree of (de-) centralization within river basins,
consensus emerged in recent decades that water resources management [...] should
be carried out at the level of the catchment basin or sub-basin. (United Nations 1992,
Agenda 21  18.9). Water policy of the European Union follows the river basin approach.
Its Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000 asks for river basin management plans
(WFD  13) and programs of measures (WFD  11) to achieve the environmental goals
of the directive. Countries of the European Union shall coordinate activities required
by the directive. Upon request the European Commission will support coordination
activities (WFD  3).
Beside the fact that most river basins in Germany are shared with other countries,
river basins usually comprise several Bundesländer. This constitutes a major challenge
for the implementation of the Water Framework Directive, since numerous problems
of ﬁt arise through externalities between jurisdictions (Moss 2003, 33-36). Figure 3.1
illustrates that jurisdictions in charge of water management can be too small, since they
do not comprise the whole water basin. But they can be also too large when they stretch
over more than one water basin.
The Problem
? Misfit of hydrological 
& political boundaries 
=> transboundary 
externalities
Source: Moss 2003 
Source: Moss (2003, 34)
Figure 3.1: Problems of ﬁt. Hexagons represent jurisdictions. Dotted outline shows the
river basin.
The Water Framework Directive leaves it to the member states to ﬁnd institutional
arrangements to implement the river basin approach. Two options were discussed in
Germany: Either to create new river basin authorities (ländergrenzenüberschreitende
Planungsverbände) with ﬁscal autonomy or to develop coordination groups between
the Bundesländer that share a river basin (Koordinierungsverbund zwischen den Län-
dern). The advantage of river basin authorities was seen in eﬃcient decision making.
However, due to constitutional constraints, closer coordination within existing struc-
tures was chosen and river basin authorities were not established (LAWA without year).
Even though it is recognized that closer coordination is required, there is a tendency to
decrease the administrative capacities of the Bundesländer (SRU 2004, 331-332).
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As mentioned above, the Flood Protection Act follows the river basin approach of the
Water Framework Directive. Therefore institutional arrangements found for the Water
Framework Directive will also be of high relevance for ﬂood management.
3.2.3 Summary on spatial spillovers
One key requirement of eﬃciency in ﬂood management is the internalization of spatial
spillovers. The institutional analysis of ﬂood management in Germany leads to the
following conclusions.
. Spatial spillovers play an important role in ﬂood management. However, a lot
of ﬂood defense measures have no spatial spillovers and are primarily local public
goods or in some cases also private goods. Flood adaption activities, in particular,
have no spatial spillovers. Local public ﬂood defense along small rivers and streams
lies primarily in the responsibility of the communal level, which is responsible for
second and higher order water bodies. On ﬁrst-order water bodies and on federal
water ways the Bundesländer are responsible for ﬂood defense, reﬂecting the fact
that spillovers can range further then communal borders.
. Some spillovers extend beyond Bundesländer -borders causing unidirectional exter-
nalities. In the past, large scale water development measures caused positive as well
as negative spillovers. Whereas human-made reservoirs usually decreased ﬂood-
ing further downstream, the construction of levees and the straightening of rivers
increased ﬂood risk downstream. Eﬃcient ﬂood defense measures are presently
(regulated) retention basins. In addition, higher levees are also, in many cases, the
answer to the present ﬂood risk.
. In response to spillovers in ﬂood defense, a number of cooperation approaches
emerged in the past. Cooperation was successful in some cases in improving com-
munication among riparians of a river. However, cooperation was not able to
establish economic linkages between upstream and downstream riparians taking
account of costs and beneﬁts from ﬂood defense.
. The new Flood Protection Act introduced a common standard with respect to the
ﬂood protection level as well as with respect to legally deﬁned ﬂood basins. Flood
protection shall be designed for ﬂoods with a return period up to 100 years. The
second standard speciﬁes that all areas in the ﬂood outline of a Q100-ﬂood are
legally protected ﬂood basins. A common standard does not solve the problem
how to remove levees and/or increase water retention capacities for the beneﬁt
of downstream riparians. The new Flood Protection Act does not introduce any
transfer mechanisms to ﬁnance new ﬂood protection measures. Weaknesses in
existing cooperation approaches are therefore not eased.
. Unidirectional spillovers are a common feature of many water management issues.
The river basin approach is often seen as the institutional answer to water related
problems. However, it was found that this approach does not solve the question
of centralization or decentralization in water management. The Water Framework
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Directive of the European Union follows a river basin approach, but leaves it to
the member states to ﬁnd institutional arrangements how to reach the ambitious
environmental goals of the directive. In Germany, no fundamental reorganization of
water responsibilities will take place in response to the Water Framework directive.
. One reason that a centralized river basin authority might not be the best answer
in ﬂood management is that ﬂood-prone areas are unevenly distributed. Cen-
tralization is often seen as the answer to spillovers. However, larger jurisdictions
usually also incorporate many areas without ﬂood risk and therefore do not solve
the problems of ﬁt. Large jurisdictions increase heterogeneity of beneﬁts within
the jurisdiction. It will be the focus of the following section to discuss how the
interests of ﬂood-prone areas are reﬂected in the federal system. Since only few
areas of the country are actually exposed to river ﬂood risk, the problem might be
that jurisdictions are rather too large than too small as suggested by the external-
ity problem. This issue is emphasized by Pielke (1999, 432) who states that Calls
for changes in federal ﬂood policy are seemingly paradoxical because they identify
a need to be simultaneously more comprehensive and more localized [...].10
3.3 Flood-prone areas
River ﬂood risk is not evenly distributed in Germany. It is restricted to ﬂood-prone
areas near rivers. Therefore ﬂood management has a distinct spatial aspect. Most areas
of Germany are not exposed to ﬂood risk, but a substantial part is. Flood protection
and other measures of ﬂood management beneﬁt individuals who reside in ﬂood-prone
areas. Beneﬁciaries of ﬂood protection are not concentrated in any speciﬁc region, but
are found in the whole of Germany, since numerous large rivers and a tight drainage
system is typical for Middle Europe.
Land use in ﬂood-prone areas has an important inﬂuence on the ﬂood loss potential.
Whereas the property value of a square meter under agricultural use or forestry is not
more than nine euros in Germany, human settlements and transport areas have property
values between 144 and 345 euros. Property values translate into ﬂood damage values
of not more than one euro for agricultural areas and forestry. For human settlements
and transport areas, damage functions are needed to estimate ﬂood damage. In housing
areas ﬂood losses can exceed 50 euros per square meter (IKSR 2001a). Since diﬀerent
alternatives of land use inﬂuence the ﬂood loss potential signiﬁcantly, it will be of interest
in this section to investigate whether or not the ﬂood risk is taken into account in land-
use decisions in ﬂood-prone areas.
The discussion of land use in ﬂood-prone areas also seems worthwhile, because rising
ﬂood damage is often attributed to increases in wealth in hazard-prone areas (see section
2.2). The Raumordnungsbericht (regional planning report) for Germany (BBR 2000,
163-164) states that there is little awareness of ﬂood risk behind levees. Flood defense
often does not take into account changes in population density in ﬂood-prone areas.
10The quote also refers to the ﬁndings of Kusler and Larson (1993).
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Land use in ﬂood-prone areas is certainly also the result of public decisions. However,
as table 2.2 summarized, there are also a number of private decisions that inﬂuence the
value at risk in ﬂood-prone areas.
The discussion of ﬂood-prone areas will ﬁrst focus on land-use trends in ﬂood-prone
areas (section 3.3.1). Section 3.3.2 then describes private responses to ﬂood risk, which
ﬁnally leads to the role of the public sector for land use in ﬂood-prone areas (section
3.3.3). Since beneﬁts from ﬂood defense are geographically conﬁned to ﬂood-prone areas,
the question arises: How does the federal organization of ﬂood management responds to
this spatial heterogeneity?
3.3.1 Land use in ﬂood-prone areas
Approximately 15% of the buildings in Germany are located in the Q200 ﬂood outline, and
3% of the buildings are exposed to ﬂoods with return periods of 50 years or shorter (GDV
2004). In the densely populated ﬂood outline of the Rhine, 10.7 million people live in the
ﬂood outline of an extreme ﬂood, that is 18% of the total population of the watershed.
Most people that are exposed to ﬂood risk along the Rhine (8.6 million people) live
in the Nethertlands. The German share of the watershed constitutes 54% of the land
area and 64% of to the population. Accumulated potential ﬂood losses for the entire
ﬂood outline of the Rhine from the Lake of Constance to the border to the Netherlands
are estimated to amount to 33 billion euros (IKSR 2001a, Koordinierungskomitee Rhein
2005).11
In the whole of Germany, some long-term land-use trends can be observed in ﬂood
plains: since 1900 human settlements and transport areas increased fourfold. The land
use share was 3% in 1900 and is 12% today. After 1950 the share of human settlements
and transport areas doubled. To this day this trend continues. There are no precise
numbers on how land-use is developing in German ﬂood plains. 16% of the ﬂood plain of
the Rhine between the Lake of Constance and the border to the Netherlands is occupied
by human settlements and transport areas (IKSR 2001a, LAWA 1995). This number
is representative for all ﬂood-prone areas in Germany. 16.5% of areas not more than
three kilometers away from large rivers are used for human settlements and transport
infrastructure. The share of the total area of Germany used for human settlements
and transport areas is about 7.7%. If areas near rivers (within three kilometers) serve
as a proxy for the ﬂood outline, one can observe a special dynamic of urbanization in
ﬂood-prone areas.
In the nineteen nineties 0.56% of ﬂood-prone areas were transformed into human
settlements and transport areas. For the whole of Germany the respective number was
0.48%. The diﬀerence might not seem large, but it demonstrates that, despite a high
degree of urbanization in ﬂood-prone areas (16.5% compared to 7.7%), a saturation
point has not yet been reached.12 At the same time as human settlements and transport
11The ﬂood outline of this part of the Rhine includes areas in Germany, France and Switzerland.
12The numbers reported here rely on CORINE (2004) and the analyzes of the CORINE database by
my former colleague Friderike Hofmeister. See also Hofmeister (2006, ch. 11.2). Unfortunately the
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infrastructure was increasing, ﬂood protection constructions were built along the rivers.
Nowadays 80% of the natural ﬂood outline of the two main rivers Rhine and Elbe is
protected by levees or other ﬂood protection measures (LAWA 1995).
Even though the following discussion of land use will focus on the accumulation of
wealth through human settlements and transport areas in ﬂood-prone areas, other land-
use forms in ﬂood plains are also of high value for society. Flood plains help to maintain
high water quality and sustain groundwater supplies. Productive wetlands are found
in ﬂood plains, home of many endangered species. In addition, ﬂood plains are often
beautiful landscapes oﬀering recreational opportunities (Kusler and Larson 1993).
Exposure to ﬂood risk is in many cases not public information. Even though water
authorities keep records of ﬂood events and know the areas ﬂooded by a design ﬂood
(usually a Q100-ﬂood) and also of other return periods, the public often has no access to
this data. It is only recently that public information became available for some rivers.
In 2001 the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine published the
Rhine Atlas, which contains information on ﬂood-risk areas of the Rhine between the
Lake of Constance and the Rhine delta in the Netherlands. Flood-risk zones also include
areas that are protected by levees. Flood-prone areas of tributaries of the Rhine are not
included in the atlas.
The Flood Protection Act will improve transparency with respect to ﬂood-prone areas.
The Bundesländer are required to publish this information. The new law not only
requires the publication of legal ﬂood basins (according to WHG  31b), but also the
release of maps showing ﬂood-prone areas that are protected by levees or that are only
threatened by extreme ﬂoods (WHG  31c). Flood-prone areas have to be marked in
urban land-use plans according to the Federal Building Code (BauGB  5.4). These new
requirements aim to improve ﬂood awareness on the communal level. In the past ﬂood-
risk awareness was sometimes low or even entirely absent. An example is the recently
established industrial area An der Flutrinne (by the ﬂood channel) in Dresden. Even
after the ﬂood in 2002, an extension of the industrial area was approved by the city of
Dresden (DKKV 2003, 41-44).
3.3.2 Private responses to ﬂooding
There are several possible private responses to ﬂood risk. The available information
and the institutional framework inﬂuence individuals to undertake measures to reduce
potential ﬂood damage. Flood risk may inﬂuence locational choices and adapted building
or promote the insurance of ﬂood losses.
Locational choices are a very important private decisions that determine the ﬂood
loss potential. As the preceding numbers showed, there is a changing land-use pattern
CORINE database does no allow a precise deﬁnition of ﬂood-prone areas. Instead, areas not further
away than three kilometers from large rivers serve as a proxy. The deﬁnition of large rivers is also
somewhat random, since some parts of rivers are recognized as ﬂowing waterbodies in the CORINE
database and other parts are not. Large rivers tend to be classiﬁed as waterbodies and small rivers
are not diﬀerentiated from their surrounding.
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in ﬂood-prone areas in recent decades. An increasing urbanization of ﬂood-prone areas
is accompanied by a very low willingness to move out of ﬂood-prone areas after ﬂood
events. Less than 5% of households that suﬀered damage from the Elbe ﬂood in 2002
considered moving out of ﬂood-prone areas (DKKV 2003, 52-53).
There is a higher willingness to undertake measures that reduce the vulnerability of
ﬂood-exposed buildings. This willingness usually increases after ﬂood events. Building
licenses can require basic ﬂood protection measures for new houses, but for existing
buildings most measures are voluntary (DKKV (2003, 46-53) and Lüers (1999)).
Another private response to ﬂood risk is the insurance against ﬂood losses. Since not
all ﬂood-prone areas are equally exposed, ﬂood-risk zones are essential for the insurance
industry in establishing risk-diﬀerentiated premiums. In 2001 a zoning system for ﬂood-
ing, backwater in rivers, and torrential rain (Zonierungssystem für Überschwemmung,
Rückstau und Starkregen, ZÜRS) was introduced. It was developed by the German In-
surance Association (GDV). The information on risk zones of ZÜRS is not public but
only accessible to insurance companies. In 2004 ZÜRS was extended to four risk zones
comprising now the high risk zone IV (return periods of shorter than 10 years), zone III
(return periods longer than 10 years and shorter than 50 years), zone II (return periods
longer than 50 years and shorter than 200 years) and zone I with low ﬂood risk (return
periods longer than 200 years). Diﬀerentiation between risk zones I and II was intro-
duced after the Elbe ﬂood in 2002, when failure of levees increased damage signiﬁcantly.
Risk zone II now also comprises ﬂood-prone areas behind levees. A natural hazard in-
surance is possible in zones I, II, and III for a risk-diﬀerentiated premium, whereas no
insurance is available in the high risk zone IV (GDV 2004, DKKV 2003). However, in
zones II and III insurance companies might also decide, on a case-by-case basis, that
insurance is not possible, so that the share of uninsurable areas in Germany (which had
been 10%) is expected to increase signiﬁcantly (Schwarze and Wagner 2003).
Individuals can insure their property against natural hazards; this insurance includes
ﬂood damage. Since the insurance is voluntary, market penetration is low. Household in-
surance has two separate branches. At the time of the Elbe ﬂood in 2002, approximately
10% of household contents insurance (Hausratversicherung) comprised natural hazards,
whereas only 4% of the residential buildings themselves were insured (Wohngebäudever-
sicherung) (DKKV 2003, 62). Up to the year 2005, insurance of residential buildings
increased to approximately 5.5%, whereas household contents insurance remained con-
stant (GDV 2005). There are signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences in market penetration of
natural hazard insurance. The Bundesland Baden-Wurttemberg had a compulsory insur-
ance oﬀered by a regional monopoly insurance until the year 1992. Due to requirements
of the European Union, natural hazard insurance became voluntary and market penetra-
tion declined to 80  90%. For historical reasons, household contents insurance is above
average in Eastern Germany (DKKV 2003, 62). Insured ﬂood losses for large ﬂoods in
Germany were given in table 3.1.
Public disaster aid might be a reason for low market penetration of private insurance
of ﬂood losses. Public compensation of ﬂood losses has been signiﬁcant in some past
ﬂood events. A systematic analysis of public ﬂood aid is not available in the literature.
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The Elbe ﬂood illustrates, however, that most ﬂood damage was compensated by the
government. Economic losses were estimated to be 9.2 billion euros, of which 1.8 billion
were covered by the insurance industry. Disaster aid accumulated to 9.2 billion euros,
raising questions as to the actual contribution of public aid to cover total economic
losses (Munich Re 2003). Independent from questions of data consistency, public disas-
ter aid usually does not only cover economic losses, but rather the ﬁnancial needs for
reconstruction. This is in accordance with the estimation method that is usually based
on reconstruction costs and not on a rigorous economic cost assessment. The federal
government spent 5 billion euros on disaster aid and reconstruction, the Bundesländer
and the communal level together spent 3.6 billion euros, and the European Union 0.6
billion euros (only for Germany) (Munich Re 2003, 30). This accumulates to the 9.2
billion euros mentioned above.
Public disaster aid for ﬂood losses is in most cases voluntary. Even though ﬂood
protection is a public task, there is no general liability of the government for ﬂood
damage. Floods are natural disasters and are considered to be an individual and not a
public risk. In some cases shortcomings in ﬂood defense can lead to public compensation
for ﬂood damage. However, legal requirements are usually high since liability depends
on causation and fault (Reinhardt 2004).
Reasons for voluntary public disaster aid are not only seen in altruistic motives, but
also in the political system and in considerations of reelection of politicians (Schwarze
and Wagner 2006). An empirical analysis of this hypothesis by Garrett and Sobel (2003)
ﬁnds that, in the United States, presidential disaster declarations and congressional
inﬂuence on allocation of disaster aid is partly driven by political motives. States that
are politically important have higher shares of disaster declarations, and states that
are represented in the oversight committee of FEMA13the agency actually allocating
disaster aidreceive a disproportionally large amount of disaster aid. Garret and Sobel
ﬁnd that nearly half of disaster aid is driven by political motives and not by altruism.14
In response to high disaster relief after the ﬂood in 2002 and in response to a low
market penetration of private insurance for ﬂood damage, a compulsory natural hazard
insurance was considered by the Bundesländer. There were a number of suggestions
from the scientiﬁc community as well as wide support from politicians. Schwarze and
Wagner (2003) suggested a compulsory natural hazard insurance that is in line with
a competitive market. The basic objective of this model was to reduce the need of
public support and to foster incentives for ﬂood defense. However, due to a number
of diﬃculties, attempts to introduce a compulsory insurance terminated in early 2004.
13FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is responsible for disaster aid after severe ﬂood-
ing, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes and ﬁres.
14Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola (2003) ﬁnd cross-country diﬀerences in public ﬂood aid. Some coun-
tries pay hardly any disaster relief after ﬂoods (e.g. United Kingdom), whereas in other countries
disaster relief is common and also expected by the population, because the state failed to protect
ﬂood victims (e.g. Hungary). Cross-country diﬀerences are also present in ﬂood insurance (Schwarze
and Wagner 2006). Whereas in some European countries there is an almost perfect market pen-
etration of ﬂood (or natural disaster) insurance, in others countrieslike Germanyonly a small
fraction of potential ﬂood losses is insured.
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Also the new Flood Protection Act of 2005 does not include any provision on private
insurance of ﬂood losses (Schwarze and Wagner 2006).
People exposed to ﬂood risk might organize themselves in the political process. Even
though public disaster aid was substantial for past ﬂood events, there are no exam-
ples of lobbying activities for public compensation of ﬂood losses. There are, how-
ever, a number of examples of lobbying activities in favor of better ﬂood defense mea-
sures. The Hochwassernotgemeinschaft Rhein e.V. is a registered private law asso-
ciation (eingetragener Verein) with membership of municipalities, rural districts and
non-governmental organizations in ﬂood-prone areas along the lower section of the Up-
per Rhine, the Middle and the Lower Rhine. As mentioned above, this section of the
Rhine experienced increased ﬂood risk after the completion of river development along
the Upper Rhine in 1977. The association aims to improve ﬂood protection for its mem-
bers. The Hochwassernotgemeinschaft supports the ﬂood protection plan of the IKSR,
it is, however, not authorized to conduct ﬂood defense measures or negotiate further
ﬂood protection plans. Because it oﬀers a platform to exchange experiences in ﬂood
management, the association is considered to be useful by most members (Heiland 2002,
184-185).
3.3.3 Flood-prone areas and the federal organization of ﬂood
management
The discussion of land use in ﬂood-prone areas revealed that private incentives are biased
for several reasons. Risk zone mapping is just evolving, market penetration of private
insurance is low at the same time as substantial public disaster aid is paid. All these
issues are certainly important and inﬂuential for land-use decisions in ﬂood-prone areas.
However, the following analyzes will primarily focus on public ﬂood defense and land
use in ﬂood-prone areas.
The previous chapter characterized ﬂood defense as a local public good whose beneﬁts
are restricted to ﬂood-prone areas. From a political-economy perspective this leads to
the question, if jurisdictions are too large and do not eﬃciently provide ﬂood defense.
Depending on their exposure to ﬂood risk, political powerful groups of the population
may either provide too much or too little ﬂood defense. From this perspective, an uneven
spatial distribution of public good beneﬁts can lead to ineﬃcient public ﬂood defense.
One way to avoid such ineﬃciencies is to tailor jurisdictions to ﬂood-prone areas.
Problems originating from too large or too small jurisdictions can be avoided. Look-
ing at boundaries in existing federal systems, Oates (1999, 1131) remarks that many
jurisdictions are quite poorly designated to deal with the provision of certain important
public goods, notably environmental resources. Rivers, for example, often mark bor-
ders between jurisdictions. An eﬀective management of public goods would avoid such
shared resource use. Oates is convinced that a rational system would be very diﬀerent
than the historically grown federal organizations. He speculates that on a rational map
fairly sizable jurisdictions would extend over watersheds containing smaller jurisdictions
of metropolitan and local areas. However, a complete re-organization of the existing
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federal system according to ﬂood risk zones is unlikely to achieve eﬃciency gains, since
ﬂood defense is only one of many public tasks. Other public goods are likely to have
completely diﬀerent spatial characteristics than ﬂood defense.
An interesting idea for a new federalism was suggested by Frey (1997). He developed
the concept of functional, overlapping, competing, jurisdictions. Such jurisdictions
aim to fulﬁll a speciﬁc task, and jurisdictions for diﬀerent tasks can be geographically
overlapping. Mobility between jurisdiction in the sense of Tiebout (1956) (voting with
the feet) introduces an element of competition in public good provision. Such a new
federalism would force governments to consider the actual preferences of citizens more
closely. Borders of jurisdictions would be based on the actual geographical needs and
would not be merely the result of history or just chance.
Since ﬂood risk is geographically conﬁned to ﬂood-prone areas, it seems worthwhile
to investigate if this spatial peculiarity is reﬂected in the actual federal organization of
ﬂood management. Both ﬂood risk zones and the areas suitable for most ﬂood defense
measures are located in ﬂood-prone areas. An exception is water retention in the whole
watershed (e.g. soil water retention). However, this measure is not very eﬃcient to
protect against extreme ﬂoods (LAWA 2000). Thus, risk zones as well as areas for ﬂood
defense are both located in ﬂood-prone areas, which would make it possible to tailor
jurisdictions to ﬂood-prone areas.
There is another reason to investigate the linkage of ﬂood-prone areas and the federal
organization. As the preceding sections showed, some long term land-use changes can
be observed in ﬂood-prone areas. During the last decades, there was a steady increase
of human encroachment on ﬂood plains. Numerous contributions to the literature argue
that this development is inﬂuenced by public ﬂood defense. Without a special focus on
Germany, Smith (2001, 273-274) describes a circular link between ﬂood control works
and ﬂood plain encroachment. First, better ﬂood defense is more likely to be justiﬁed
on cost-beneﬁt grounds if existing ﬂood plain development is great. Second, better ﬂood
defense makes ﬂood plain invasion more likely. Third, individual locational decisions are
often biased, since the cost of public ﬂood defense measures is often not borne by the
parties directly involved, but by the central government.
A similar view is expressed by Tobin (1995, 365), who describes the levee eﬀect:
Once [... a levee] has been constructed, however, the structure may generate a false
sense of security [... which] can also lead to greater development in the so-called safe
areas, thus adding to the property placed at risk [...] when the levee does fail, the increase
in development can actually raise losses even higher than if no levee system had been
constructed in the ﬁrst place.
The dilemma of improving ﬂood protection without raising human encroachment on
ﬂood plains has been increasingly recognized in recent years. One of the goals of the ﬂood
action plan of the Rhine (adopted in 1998) is a 25% reduction of the damage potential
by 2020. This goal shall be reached through regional and urban planning (IKSR 1998).
In its ﬁrst progress report in 2000, the International Commission for the Protection of
the Rhine (IKSR 2001b, 4, 25-26) found that all member countries legally implemented
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provisions that allow a better protection of ﬂood plains. However, the report ﬁnds that a
reduction of potential damage could not be achieved. Despite the legal progress and the
fact that it is very diﬃcult to quantify (additional) wealth accumulation in ﬂood-prone
areas, the report suspects that an increase and not a decrease took place in recent years.
The inﬂuence of public ﬂood protection on private land-use decisions does not nec-
essarily imply that public ﬂood protection is always ineﬃcient. It stresses, however,
that ineﬃciencies in ﬂood defense may have far reaching consequences with respect to
land-use patterns in ﬂood-prone areas. This brings the federal organization of ﬂood man-
agement into the center of attention. Over- or under-provision of public ﬂood defense
is not only an issue of upstream-downstream spillovers, but also an issue of locational
decisions in ﬂood-prone areas.
Single issue authorities in ﬂood and water management
Single issue authorities responsible for ﬂood defense would be one way to take account of
the spatial characteristics of the ﬂood problem. There are no examples of such jurisdic-
tions that fulﬁll a broad range of ﬂood defense tasks. There are, however, examples of
jurisdictions that focus on a speciﬁc aspect of ﬂood defense. The examples are primarily
related to water management issues.
There are diﬀerent legal acts that allow for single issue authorities. The term single
issue authority is used here as a general term for diﬀerent legal institutions. A single
issue authority is a jurisdiction in addition to the regular hierarchical federal system that
provides a public good with a certain degree of ﬁnancial autonomy. Two possibilities are
of relevance with respect to ﬂood management:
. water and soil associations, according to the Water Association Act,
. special purpose associations.
Water and soil associations are based on the Federal Water Association act (Gesetz
über Wasser- und Bodenverbände, WVG), which gives guidelines for the establishment
of water and soil associations (Wasser- und Bodenverbände). All Bundesländer allow
such associations, which can be responsible for various, primarily water-related issues.
Such issues can also be the maintenance of water courses and dikes. More than half of
the Bundesländer established water and soil associations in charge of watercourse main-
tenance for second and third-order water bodies. Five Bundesländer have associations
in charge of dike maintenance (Monsees 2004; 2005). One example is North-Rhine West-
phalia, where  108.2 of the State Water Act (Landeswassergesetz, LWG) declares that
the party who constructed a levee is responsible for maintenance and reconstruction.
A fundamental characteristic of water and soil associations is that membership is
generally linked to property and not to persons. Private landowners as well as bodies
under public law can be members of an association (WVG  4). Membership is primar-
ily voluntary, but WHG  9 also allows compulsory membership, notably if the purpose
of a water and soil association requires a contiguous territory. A contiguous territory
is essential for the building and maintenance of levees or for water maintenance. The
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establishment of a water and soil association requires a unanimous approval of all partic-
ipant, a majority of votes of (potential) participants, or the decision of a public authority
(WHG  7). The regulation of water drainage and the protection from ﬂoods (WHG 
10) are specially mentioned as objectives for water and soil associations established by
a public authority (Monsees 2004).
Water and soil associations are self-governed jurisdictions. Resolutions are usually
made by majority voting. The number of votes is based on the expected advantage of
a participant; in case of a disadvantage, the weight of the vote is based on the size of
the disadvantage (WVG  13). Financing of the work of water and soil associations is
primarily done by members, but can also be subsidized by the general public, as is often
done in the case of ﬂood-defense measures. Members pay contributions to an association
according to the received beneﬁts (WVG  28). For watercourse maintenance, the size of
the land usually serves as a benchmark for contributions, and in the case of ﬂood-defense
measures, ﬂood-prone areas (polder areas) contribute more than others (Monsees 2004).
Special purpose associations (Zweckverbände) are a form of cooperation on the com-
munal level that can also be interpreted as single issue authorities. In some Bundesländer
some special purpose authorities are responsible for watercourse maintenance (Monsees
2005). They can be established either voluntarily (Freiverband) or by a higher rank-
ing public authority (Pﬂichtverband). Enforced special purpose associations are only
allowed for public goods that legally have to be provided on the communal level (Pﬂich-
taufgaben). North-Rhine Westphalia is the only Bundesland in which a special purpose
association can be enforced for the provision of public goods that the communal level
is not legally required to provide. However, the creation of such an enforced special
purpose association requires a legal act of the parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia
(GkG NW  22). Water development and maintenance and urban land-use planning are
tasks that have to be provided by municipalities and rural districts. It is determined
by law that the communal level has to provide these goods, but not how it has to do
it (Pﬂichtaufgaben ohne Weisung). Members of special purpose associations are usually
municipalities or rural districts, but in some cases also other legal bodies such as private
persons. Special purpose associations have ﬁscal autonomy and their budget is ﬁnanced
according to the beneﬁts of members (Gern 2003, ch. 7 and pp. 595-601).
One example of a single issue authority with far reaching water management com-
petence is the Emschergenossenschaft, which is responsible for the second-order water
body Emscher. The legal authority Emschergenossenschaft was founded by a special law
of North-Rhine Westphalia in 1990 (the Emschergenossenschaftsgesetz, EmscherGG)
but has its roots already at the time of the industrialization of the Ruhr area. The
Emschergenossenschaft is responsible for water supply, sewage treatment and ﬂood pro-
tection in a densely populated watershed with 2.4 million people (2800 per km2). Cities
and other communal jurisdictions as well as local companies are members of the Em-
schergenossenschaft. In 2005 the Emschergenossenschaft adopted a ﬂood action plan
(Emschergenossenschaft 2005) that does not propose fundamental changes in ﬂood de-
fense, since the ﬂood protection level is already above a Q100 design ﬂood in most cases.
There are other institutions that could be interpreted as single issue authorities. How-
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ever, they either have no ﬁnancial autonomy or are of no relevance for ﬂood management.
An overview of the legal aspects of cooperation on the communal level is given by Gern
(2003, ch. 20).
One can summarize that the federal system in Germany allows for single issue au-
thorities in charge of public ﬂood defense measures. In some Bundesländer there are
examples of single issue authorities. It is, however, apparent that these jurisdictions
are established on small rivers and streams. On ﬁrst-order water bodies the Bundeslän-
der are generally responsible for ﬂood defense. They ﬁnance ﬂood-protection measures
through their general budget and not according to beneﬁts.
Regional and urban land-use planning in ﬂood-prone areas
Traditionally, ﬂood defense was seen as a task of water management in Germany. In re-
sponse to large ﬂoods in 1988 in Southern Germany, it was increasingly recognized that
ﬂooding has to be taken into account of in regional and urban land-use planning. This
development led to recommended actions of the Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung
(Ministerial Conference on Regional Planning) of the Bundesländer in 2000. Regional
planning now not only aims to support the sectoral planning approach in water man-
agement, but also to control the ﬂood loss potential in areas that do not belong to the
legal ﬂood basin (Heiland (2002, 32-33) and MKRO (2000)). A stylized illustration of
responsibilities for water management and regional planning is given in ﬁgure 3.2.
Qextrem
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levee
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Source: Modiﬁed version of Heiland (2002, 87) and MKRO (2000, 523)
Figure 3.2: Stylized illustration of the diﬀerent ﬂood-prone areas. The ﬁgures shows a
typical situation where water retention could be improved by the removal of
a levee.
Regional planning can designate areas for ﬂood defense in two categories. The ﬁrst
are priority areas for ﬂood defense (Vorranggebiete) according to ROG  7.4(1). In
these areas the main spatial function is ﬂood defense and all other land uses are of minor
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importance. Such priority areas are protected ﬂood basins according to the water acts,
as well as high risk zones behind levees. The new Flood Protection Act made the water
laws stricter with respect to land-use possibilities in protected ﬂood basins, since new
housing zones are now only allowed as an exception.
The second category is used for areas where ﬂood defense has high importance (Vor-
behaltgebiete) according to ROG  7.4(2). In these areas land-use regulation decisions
need to give ﬂood defense high importance, but can also consider other forms of land
use. Flood-prone areas where inundation is possible only in cases of extreme ﬂooding are
such Vorbehaltgebiete. The regulations of the Regional Planning Act were particularly
important for protected areas behind levees, since the water law, before changes through
the Flood Protection Act, did not contain any provision for these areas (MKRO 2000).
A study on regional planning in Germany ﬁnds varying importance of the diﬀerent
ﬂood-defense measures. Heiland (2002, 90-134) investigated 39 regional plans in Ger-
many, covering the watersheds of the Rhine, Elbe and Danube. He ﬁnds that most
regional plans give clear goals and principles for the protection and extension of reten-
tion areas. In contrast, the reduction or control of the ﬂood damage potential is only
the goal of six regional plans. Only three of these plans entail detailed provisions on
land-use forms and adapted building.
The lack of regulation of the ﬂood damage potential can be seen as a weakness of
regional planning as well as of ﬂood management in general. Heiland (2002, 82) notes
that a diﬀerent argument is possible. A society that recognizes that absolute ﬂood safety
is not possible can leave it to individuals to decide how to respond to the remaining risk.
Strict regional planning of the ﬂood damage potential would then be a form of over-
regulation. Heiland himself does not support this view. However, such a view is in line
with the argument made by Changnon (1996, 313) with respect to ﬂood management
in the United States: He states that individuals and not the government must resume
responsibility for their locational decisions (see also Pielke (1999) and section 2.4.1).
Even if one opposes a strong role of regional planning, it has to be recognized that
the current organization of ﬂood management in Germany is far from being ﬁrst best.
In the past the lack of access to information on ﬂood risk zones and the high public
disaster aid systematically undermined the ability of individuals to make socially optimal
decisions. The risk zoning system, ZÜRS, of the insurance industry, introduced a few
years ago, and publicly accessible ﬂood risk maps, which are promoted through the new
Flood Protection Act, are ﬁrst steps to strengthen private responsibility within ﬂood
management.
3.4 Future developments in ﬂood and water
management
In response to a number of large ﬂood events throughout Europe, the European Union
initiated an action program of ﬂood risk management that led to the proposal of a direc-
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tive On the assessment and management of ﬂoods (Commission 2006). This directive
requires the member states to develop ﬂood risk maps and ﬂood risk management plans
for river basins ( 7, 9). The management plans shall be developed in close coordina-
tion with the river basin management plans of the European Water Framework Directive.
Since the recent Flood Protection Act in Germany adopted stricter ﬂood protection goals
with more ambitious deadlines, the adoption of the current proposal from the European
Union will not bring major additional changes to German ﬂood management.
The most important future issue in water management will be the implementation
of the Water Framework Directive. The legal implementation into national law is now
completed, but this is only the ﬁrst step with many more to follow. An important future
step is the adoption of a program of measures ( 11) and of river management plans (
13) that shall help to reach the ambitious water quality goals of the directive by 2015.
With the decision in favor of close coordination between existing water authorities in
Germany (see section 3.2 on länderübegreifende Planungsverbände) an important insti-
tutional decision has been made already. However, it can be expected that this issue
will stay on the agenda in the future. According to the German Advisory Council on
the Environment, federal competence for legislation as well as implementation needs to
be strengthened to ensure a watershed-oriented implementation of the Water Frame-
work Directive (SRU 2004, 329-335). The advisory council sees serious diﬃculties in the
current approach, since good examples of cooperation are missing and water authorities
from the diﬀerent Bundesländer each have their own way of implementing the framework
directive.
These diﬃculties are also likely to arise with respect to the implementation of the
new Flood Protection Act. This act is also watershed-oriented and requires long term
management plans. In addition, the Flood Protection Act also asks for strong cross-
sectoral cooperation with spatial planning to control the wealth accumulation in ﬂood-
prone areas.
Flood management in Germany is aﬀected by the reform of the federal system that
was adopted on June 30th 2006 by the German parliament. The reform of the federal
system aﬀects a large number of legal acts, among others it also changed basic elements in
environmental law. Instead of its competence for framework legislation, the federal level
has now the right to adopt detailed provisions on many environmental issues (konkurri-
erende Gesetzgebung). Depending on the subject, this right is bound on the condition
that the federal government can fullﬁl a certain task better than the Bundesländer (Er-
forderlichkeitsklausel). However, in addition the reform introduced the possibility that
a Bundesland can deviate from the federal law (Abweichungsbefugnisse). Since there
are very few areas in environmental law that are exempted from the right of deviation,
the reform of the federal system in Germany does not consolidate existing environmen-
tal law in a uniﬁed framework, but rather complicates the responsibilities (SRU 2006,
3-8). This general critic also applies in the ﬁeld of water and ﬂood management. The
reform of the federal system gives the Bundesländer the principle right to deviate from
federal law and it is a open question at this point if the Bundesländer will use this right
in the future. In water management the European Water Framework Directive is still
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binding to the Bundesländer, limiting the possibility of deviation. As long as there is no
European ﬂood directive, the Bundesländer are not restricted from the European level.
As one can only speculate about these future developments, the Flood Protection
Act will be considered as the relevant legal provision in ﬂood management in subsequent
discussions.
3.5 River ﬂood management: In search of an
eﬃcient organization
The forgoing study of the institutional organization of river ﬂood management in Ger-
many leads to a number of conclusions that can serve as the starting point for a formal
economic analysis of some key problems. The study focused on two characteristics of
ﬂood defense. First, some ﬂood defense measures have unidirectional, spatial spillovers.
Second, beneﬁts from ﬂood defense are geographical conﬁned to ﬂood-prone areas.
. A number of responses to ﬂood risk are possible. Measures of ﬂood management
can be the provision of public as well as of private goods. The previous analysis
focused primarily on public ﬂood management. However, it was recognized that
public ﬂood defense has important impacts on private locational decisions and on
the insurance of ﬂood risks.
. Beneﬁts of public ﬂood defense measures have diﬀerent geographical characteris-
tics. Some measures are clearly local public goods and others have inter-regional
spatial eﬀects. Water always ﬂows downwards, this gives the spatial eﬀects of ﬂood
defense a fundamental structure since spillovers are unidirectional. Upstream ri-
parians can inﬂuence downstream locations. Neglecting a few special cases, the
opposite is not possible.
. Due to diﬀerent spatial characteristics of public ﬂood management, the question
of an eﬃcient federal organization arises naturally. Spatial spillovers raise the
question if decentralization or centralization is the more eﬃcient federal organiza-
tion. Responsibilities in ﬂood management are distributed among all federal levels
in Germany. Public goods with large spatial eﬀects tend to be provided by the
Bundesländer whereas purely local public goods are provided on the communal
level.
Since beneﬁts from certain ﬂood defense measures range further than a Bundesland,
there are externalities that were not considered in the past. The strengthening of
the federal level through the Flood Protection Act might reduce externalities, but
it appears unlikely that the new regulations will solve this problem completely.
Given high public disaster aid, one can speculate that the introduced common
standard to legally protect the Q100-ﬂood outline rather aims to control potential
damage than spatial spillovers. However, so far no convincing arguments were
found that the control of wealth accumulation is a public good so that a central
standard is justiﬁed.
56
3.5 In search of an eﬃcient organization
. Economic theory suggests that bargaining between jurisdictions can promote eﬃ-
cient public good provision, even when spillovers between jurisdiction are present.
The analyses of diﬀerent cooperation approaches revealed that transfers between
jurisdictions are not common in ﬂood management. As long as successful bargain-
ing does not take place, the federal structure is crucial for taking spillovers into
account.
. Some ﬂood defense measures are highly political because local resistance is large.
Traditional approaches of ﬁscal federalism assume that decisions within a juris-
diction are made from a welfare perspective. This assumption appears somewhat
unrealistic and a political-economy approach to federalism seems promising for the
analysis of public good provision when interests are diverse because of heteroge-
neous beneﬁts and unidirectional spillovers.
. A political-economy approach, focusing on the distribution of power within a ju-
risdiction, seems promising for the analysis of local public goods with unilateral
spillovers. Investigations of water policy issues come to inconclusive results with
regard to an eﬃcient federal organization. Both centralization as well as decen-
tralization are recommended for river basin management.
. Flood risk is distributed very unevenly in Germany. It is conﬁned to ﬂood-prone
areas. It was therefore analyzed how ﬂood management incorporates this spatial
heterogeneity. Diﬀerent approaches were found on small and large rivers. On
small rivers, heterogeneity can be taken into account by single issue authorities.
In practice such jurisdictions are responsible for water maintenance and sometimes
also for levees. On large rivers (ﬁrst-order water bodies), single issue authorities
are not found, except for very few cases.
. There is an ongoing accumulation of wealth in ﬂood-prone areas. High ﬂood dam-
ages in the past clearly indicate this trend. Large public disaster aid occurred at
the same time as market penetration of natural hazard insurance is low. This all
leads to a situation where awareness of ﬂood risk and incentives to adapt to ﬂood
risks are low. Aside from obvious reasons, it is also the federal organization that
leads to this unsatisfying situation. The federal government and the Bundesländer
play an important role in ﬁnancing disaster aid, whereas it is mainly the communal
level and private decisions that crucially determine the potential damage.
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Chapter 4
Local public goods and ﬁscal federalism:
Related literature and the economic
problem
We should also know over which matters several local tri-
bunals are to have jurisdiction, and which authority should be
centralized
Aristotle, Politics 4.15
The preceding chapters introduced ﬂood management as a problem of public good
provision in a federal system with mobile households. With this focus, it is primarily
the literature on ﬁscal federalism that is relevant for the subsequent analysis. Fiscal
federalism emerges from the theory of public ﬁnance and has its focus on ﬁscal issues
of federal countries. It is [...] drawing on the theory of public goods, taxation and
public debt incidence, public choice theories of the political process and various aspects of
locational theory. (Groenewegen 1987). This chapter gives an overview of the diﬀerent
aspects of ﬁscal federalism and is the starting point for the subsequent formal analysis
of ﬂood defense. The overview starts with the early literature on ﬁscal federalism and
the special problems arising from unidirectional spillovers. This is followed by a survey
on political-economy approaches to local public goods under diﬀerent federal structures.
Then the literature that relates to migration in a federal state is presented. The chapter
closes with the formulation of the economic problems of ﬂood defense that emerge from
the analysis of actual ﬂood management in Germany and the review of the related
economic literature.
4.1 The early literature on ﬁscal federalism
The role of the public sector in the economy is the subject of numerous contributions in
the economic literature. In his inﬂuential contribution, Musgrave (1959) distinguished
between the three basic functions of the public sector that contribute to the overall
welfare of the economy. One function is the eﬃcient allocation of resources, another
an equitable income distribution, and the third the stabilization of the output level of
an economy. With this classiﬁcation it is apparent that public ﬂood defense requires
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primarily an eﬃcient supply of public goods, which is an issue of resource allocation.
Disastrous ﬂoods and mobile households may, however, also raise distributional issues.
Public goods are deﬁned as goods whose use by one agent does not preclude the
use by other agents. In addition to non-rivalry, a second feature of public goods is
sometimes seen in the non-excludability from consumption (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, 359).
Externalities are deﬁned as the direct eﬀects of an agent of an economy on the well-being
of a consumer or the production possibilities of a ﬁrm (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, 352). The
term direct eﬀect stresses that the eﬀect is not mediated by prices or coordination
between diﬀerent jurisdictions. There is a close interrelation between externalities and
public goods. The private provision of public goods causes spillovers so that other
individuals, who do not provide the public good, can enjoy the beneﬁts. In this case
spillovers are externalities. As introduced already in section 2.4, the Pareto-optimal
supply of public goods requires that the aggregated marginal beneﬁts equal the marginal
costs of public goods (Samuelson 1954; 1955).
Since public goods and externalities generally result in ineﬃcient market allocation
(the ﬁrst welfare theorem does not apply (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, ch. 16.C)), it is the
goal of the public sector to ensure an eﬃcient allocation of resources. In a federal state
with a number of regions and diﬀerent levels of government, the question arises (Oates
1972): What assignment of responsibilities promises the greatest success in fulﬁlling
the (three) functions of the public sector? The spatial distribution of beneﬁts can vary
for diﬀerent public goods. Ideally there is a perfect correspondence of a jurisdiction
that provides a public good and the citizens who consume the public good. However,
a perfect correspondence is not always possible, so that jurisdictions can be either too
small (there are individuals outside the jurisdiction who beneﬁt from the public good)
or to too large (a subset of citizens of a jurisdiction have no beneﬁts from the public
good). For a given organization of a federal state the question arises, if the provision of
public goods should be decentralized or centralized. The literature discusses numerous
arguments in favor of each solution. If not stated otherwise the following arguments go
back to Oates (1972, ch. 1 and 2).
- Strong spillovers favor centralization. Benevolent local governments balance mar-
ginal cost of public good supply and marginal beneﬁts to their constituents. Conse-
quently the public good is under-supplied because beneﬁts outside the jurisdiction
are neglected. For nation-wide public goods this implies that a centralized pro-
vision is more eﬃcient than decentralized supply. A decentralized government
contemplating an additional unit of a public good has to carry the full cost, which
it will weigh against the beneﬁts within the jurisdiction.
- Local variations in the tastes of individuals favor decentralized public good provi-
sion, since a central government tendsby the assumption of Oatesto provide
the public good in uniform quantity. Decentralized public good provision allows
diﬀerentiated levels of public good supply that follow local preferences.
- Collective decision making on public goods is costly and connected to ﬁxed costs.
Economizing on the number of governmental levels and the number of jurisdictions
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favors fewer federal levels and fewer jurisdictions if such costs are high.
- Mobility of individuals can be an argument in favor of or against decentraliza-
tion. In a decentralized setting, mobile individuals can choose the community
with the most preferred public good supply. With a uniform centralized supply
such a choice does not exist. In addition, decentralization introduces an element
of competition between jurisdictions that is not present under centralization. This
argument, which inspired a whole strand of literature (see section 4.4), goes back
to Tiebout (1956). However, migration can also cause distortions in a decentral-
ized public sector. One example is congestion, where public good utility depends
on the number of individuals who consume the good. With such impure pub-
lic goods, migration is likely to promote ineﬃcient results, because an immigrant
only considers the average level of congestion of a jurisdiction and not the marginal
congestion he imposes on all other citizens.
- Apart from migration, the literature on inter-jurisdictional competition considers
other mobile economic untis, particularly capital. It is often feared that decentral-
ized taxes and public good provision will be distorted, because local governments
seek to attract mobile capital or try to shift the tax burden outside the jurisdic-
tion. As Oates (1999) points out, it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd theoretical or empirical
evidence for distorted allocations in a decentralized public sector. In contrast, the-
oretical models show that decentralization can be eﬃciency enhancing. However,
since the following chapters adopt a highly stylized model without capital, this
chapter refrains from giving a broader overview of that branch of the literature.
- The afore-mentioned public sector functions, redistribution and stabilization, are
unlikely to be fulﬁlled by local governments. Potential migration poses a serious re-
striction on decentralized redistribution. Low level jurisdictions are like small open
economies. Thus they are neither very eﬀective in ﬁscal nor in monetary policy,
so that stabilization can not be eﬃciently achieved by decentralized jurisdictions.
In his decentralization theorem, Oates (1972, 35) assumes equal costs and no inter-
regional spillovers and concludes that local public goods are best provided by decentral-
ized jurisdictions, since they can consider local preferences. Large, centralized jurisdic-
tions are not superior to smaller, decentralized units, because they areby assumption
bound to provide the public good in uniform quantity. With its strict assumptions, the
decentralization theorem basically compares a ﬁrst-best decentralized with an imperfect
centralized setting. With inter-regional spillovers the assumptions of the decentraliza-
tion theorem are violated and neither decentralized nor centralized supply will reach the
ﬁrst-best outcome. Depending on spillovers, the best federal organization is either de-
centralized jurisdictions that neglect spillovers or a centralized jurisdiction that is bound
to uniform supply. According to Oates, centralization is favorable if inter-jurisdictional
spillovers are strong in comparison to regional diﬀerences in taste.
An environmental economic example that entails the basic trade-oﬀ between decen-
tralized and centralized settings is given by List and Mason (2001), who analyze a trans-
boundary stock pollutant in a two region setting. Even though pollution is in essence
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a global issue, the economic problem is allowed to be very asymmetric since abate-
ment costs and environmental damage are region speciﬁc. List and Mason compare
two second-best settings, where the ﬁrst scenario captures decentralized optimization
of benevolent local governments and the second scenario represents a centralized ap-
proach with a uniform emission standard. Strong asymmetries between regions favor a
decentralized emission control approach. Even if centralized emission control maximizes
aggregated payoﬀs, it does not necessarily imply an improvement for both regions.
Issues of federal structure are not the only potential solution to the problem of in-
ternalizing spillovers. Intergovernmental grants can complement the federal structure
and aim to achieve Pareto-optimal public good provision. Grants can be paid between
jurisdictions on the same hierarchical level, or from a central to a subcentral government.
There are unconditional and conditional grants, where the latter are bound to a special
purpose of spending. A common conditional grant is a matching grant, where the spend-
ing is ﬁnanced by a speciﬁed formula by the grantor and the recipient government. Oates
(1972, ch. 3) argues that a matching grant, and not a conditional lump-sum grant or
an unconditional grant, is best suitable to internalize spillover eﬀects. A comprehensive
analysis of the eﬀects of grants is given by King (1984).
Empirical studies on the federal structure of a country try to explain the the federal
structure either in terms of the degree of centralization or with respect to the conse-
quences of the federal structure on economic growth. In an international, cross-country
comparison, Panizza (1999) ﬁnds that the size and the income of countries have a neg-
ative eﬀect on the degree of centralization in terms of central government revenues or
expenditures. Depending on the elimination of outliers, Panizza also found a negative
eﬀect of ethnic fragmentation and a democracy proxy on the degree of ﬁscal central-
ization. Analyzing growth in industrialized countries, Thießen (2003) ﬁnds support for
the hypothesis that a medium level of ﬁscal decentralization leads to more growth than
either very high or very low degrees of ﬁscal centralization.
4.2 Unidirectional spillover
Unidirectional spillovers, as they are present in ﬂood defense and other water economic
issues, create an asymmetry between upstream and downstream riparians along a river.
Whereas upstream activities aﬀect downstream parties, the opposite does not hold.1 If
the upstream party independently decides on pollution abatement, it equates marginal
1Note that unidirectional spillovers are only one class of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Oates (2001)
points to reciprocal spillovers that also may be present in water economics, when diﬀerent jurisdic-
tions share a lake or bay by occupying parts of the same shoreline. The focus on (unidirectional)
spillovers and issues of ﬁscal federalism in the present context is not intended to imply that water
economics can be reduced to these aspects. Water economics involves resource economics, since wa-
ter is a renewable resource, which is available in diﬀerent quantities and qualities at diﬀerent places
of the world. It is used by diﬀerent major user groups and its use often requires infrastructure
that exhibits economies of scale. Survey articles on water economics are Becker et al. (2000) and
Ziberman and Lipper (1999). An in-depth introduction to water economics is given by Spulber and
Sabbaghi (1998).
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abatement costs and its own marginal pollution damage. Since downstream damage is
not taken into account spillovers are too high. If the downstream party has the right to
an unpolluted river and if it is also able to enforce this right, the upstream party may
be hindered in engaging in beneﬁcial but polluting activities. Muraro (1974) derives the
optimal level of abatement activities in the case of negative, unidirectional externalities
along rivers. In a utilitarian framework, optimal pollution abatement requires that
marginal abatement costs equal the sum of marginal damages in the country under
consideration and all downstream countries. This insight holds for diﬀerent countries
and can be generalized to all riparians along a river. In the case of positive spillovers
from upstream economic activities, optimality requires that the marginal cost of that
activity equal the marginal beneﬁts of all riparians along the river.
The implementation of the optimal solution has proved to be diﬃcult for many
upstream-downstream problems. This seems somewhat surprising since the set up of
the problem seems suited to be solved by bargaining. In his seminal contribution on
The Problem of Social Cost, Coase (1960) analyzes economic activities that involve
harmful eﬀects to others. He argues that the socially optimal outcome can be achieved
independently from the initial distribution of rights. With well deﬁned rights, bargaining
can lead to this optimal outcome. However, high transaction costs or ill-deﬁned property
rights can impair an optimal bargaining outcome.
Muraro (1974) and also Mueller and Oates (1996) argue that often there is no clear
commitment to the distribution of property rights (particularly on the international
level); this leads to ineﬃcient outcomes because the victims of an externality favors to
appeal to standards of social justice instead of settling with the polluter. Diﬃculties in
committing to a distribution of property rights arise because of equity or distributional
implications. Even if the optimal level of spillovers is realized, the question remains how
the beneﬁts and costs are shared. For the case of one upstream and one downstream
region an overview of possible property right distributions and the resulting incidence
of abatement costs and environmental damage is given by Smets (1974). Three basic
principle are:
- With the victim pays principle, all pollution rights are given to the upstream region.
The optimal solution can be reached if the downstream region pays for upstream
abatement. This principle favors the upstream region, because all abatement and
pollution costs are borne by the downstream region.
- The civil liability principle guaranties that no spillovers aﬀect the downstream
region without permission. The upstream region must compensate downstream
damages and its own abatement costs. This principle, which allows an optimal
allocation, favors the downstream region.
- The polluters pay principle holds the polluters responsible for undertaking pol-
lution abatement activities. The remaining downstream damage is borne by the
downstream region. This principle is suggested by the Organization of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The literature on international transfrontier pollution often assumes that there is an
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important diﬀerence to the situation within a country. Smets (1974), for example, argues
that national pollution issues are easier to settle because polluters and polluted groups
are part of the same decision-making mechanism. This makes for a relatively smoother
debate because there is a central authority which is absent on the international level
(Muraro (1974) and Baumol and Oates (1988, ch. 16)). This statement could be justiﬁed
because a) either the federal system or b) bargaining between decentralized jurisdictions
internalizes spillovers.
To a): According to the traditional understanding of ﬁscal federalism, whether the
public task of internalization should be fulﬁlled centralized or decentralized depends on
the spatial dimension of the spillovers. It is a common assumption that governments
aim to maximize the welfare of their constituents. However, in the spirit of Oates (1972,
ch. 2), a centralized jurisdiction that takes all spillovers into account is bound to provide
the public good in a uniform quantity within the jurisdiction. For water pollution, this
may be implemented by an emission standard or a water quality requirement. However,
even with complete spillovers both standards are unlikely to lead to the socially optimal
spillover level, since optimality compares marginal damages and marginal abatement
costs and says little on the absolute level of pollution or the water quality. Thus, the
choices for a federal setting, as discussed by Oates, provide only very imperfect solutions
to the problem of inter-regional spillovers. Oates (2002) sees unidirectional spillovers as a
special case and states that [...] this is both a common case in practice and a complicated
one in principle for environmental federalism. Political-economy approaches (see next
section) relax the uniformity restriction, making it even more questionable whether the
federal structure can internalize spillovers.
To b): Bargaining may internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers within a country. The
analysis of ﬂood defense in Germany does not support this optimism, since successful
inter-jurisdictional bargaining does not seem to be taking place (see section 3.2.2). Pes-
simism with regard to the possibilities of inter-jurisdictional bargaining is widespread
in the literature on ﬁscal federalism. Mueller and Oates (1996) argue, with regard to
water pollution in Chesapeake Bay, that bargaining between the diﬀerent user groups is
likely to involve high transaction costs. On a more general level, Inman and Rubinfeld
(1997b) give a wide range of reasons that inter-jurisdictional bargaining is unlikely to be
eﬃcient. The reasons range from diﬀerent concepts of fairness and poor information to
strategic behavior of the involved parties. This basically covers all the same problems
that arise on the internationally level, implying that it is the federal organization that
plays a crucial role for internalizing unidirectional spillovers within a federal state.
There are few empirical studies on unidirectional spillovers in rivers. Sigman (2002)
investigates water quality in international rivers and ﬁnds support for a free-rider hy-
pothesis. Water pollution at measuring stations upstream of an international border is
42% higher than at other comparable stations. This eﬀect is not present within the Eu-
ropean Union, since stations upstream of a border have similar pollution levels as other
stations. This can be seen as an indication that the European Union is able to pre-
vent free-riding. In another study, Sigman (2005) investigates water quality around the
United States with respect of the consequences of local or centralized (federal) respon-
64
4.3 The political-economy of local public goods
sibilities in water policy. The federal Clean Water Act allows the transfer of implemen-
tation and enforcement responsibilities from the federal to the state level, while leaving
it only to the federal level to specify the euent levels and water quality standards. Re-
sponsibilities were gradually transfered after 1973, leaving seven states `unauthorized'
by 1995. The gradual transfer of responsibilities allows the assessment of free-riding
in water policy and its institutional determinants. Sigman ﬁnds that authorization of
an upstream state reduces the water quality index of a bordering downstream state by
4%. This result indicates that decentralized responsibilities give rise to free-riding even
when there are federal standards. However, in trying to quantify the economic costs of
free-riding Sigman comes to the rather modest ﬁgure of $17 million per year.
4.3 The political-economy of local public goods
The discussion of unilateral spillovers and the federal organization neglected an impor-
tant strand of the literature: the public choice mechanism. As it is widely recognized,
the assumption of a benevolent social planner or government is not a very satisfying
approximation of real-world decision making since some form of voting frequently takes
place. Recent contributions capture diﬀerent political-economy aspects of local public
good supply in a federal state.
Lockwood (2002) considers the multi-regions case in a political-economy setting with
majority voting. There are discrete public projects with spillovers to other regions. Un-
der decentralization, only local beneﬁts determine the supply decisions. In contrast,
under centralization voting decisions are mainly driven by externalities, since elected
representative have to form a winning coalition. To ensure a single Condorcet winner,
Lockwood imposes restrictions on internal beneﬁts and externalities. A crucial assump-
tion ensures that all receiving regions agree on the sign of the externality from any
region. Furthermore, he assumes that the last pairwise vote involves the status quo
without the implementation of any projects. Given the assumptions, the political equi-
librium outcome is agenda-independent. If there is a majority of projects with positive
net-spillovers, all these projects get implemented by the winning coalition, regardless of
the internal beneﬁts of projects. In the case of negative net-spillovers, those projects
get implemented that have the least impairing eﬀect on other regions. The comparison
of federal organizations is analogous to Oates's arguments, because decentralization is
sensitive to local preferences, whereas centralization responds to spillovers. With some
qualiﬁcation this leads to the result that centralization is superior to decentralization if
spillovers are positive and suﬃciently large.
Besley and Coate (2003) follow a political-economy approach that is complementary
to Lockwood. In assuming heterogeneous preferences within regions, voters have the
possibility for strategic delegation in the election of representatives. In a two regions
setting there are symmetrically positive spillovers from perfectly divisible public goods.
Public goods are ﬁnanced by equal tax shares of all individuals of a jurisdiction. The
model is a citizen-candidate approach, where elected representatives follow their own
policy when in oﬃce. Under decentralization there is no strategic delegation and the
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resulting Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient because spillovers are neglected. With an unco-
operative central legislature, voters prefer a representative of their own kind who decides
randomly, with equal probability, on both public goods. Centralization is superior to
decentralization if spillovers exceed a critical level. Taking the standard approach in
the spirit of Oates as a benchmark, Besley and Coate show that the political-economy
approach implies a weaker case for centralization. Given the same preference structure
in both regions, the standard approach suggests centralization as soon as there are pos-
itive spillovers. In contrast, the political-economy approach suggests centralization only
for suﬃciently positive spillovers. This is also true for diﬀerent median preferences in
the two regions. The diﬀerent results are driven by diﬀerent assumptions with respect
to centralization. Whereas the standard approach assumes a uniform quantity of public
good provision, the political-economy approaches of Lockwood, and Besley and Coate
allow diﬀerentiated levels of the public good across regions.
Besley and Coate (2003) also investigate a cooperative central legislature. The conjec-
ture that cooperation makes centralization generally superior to decentralization cannot
be conﬁrmed. Instead strategic delegation hampers the performance of centralization.
With symmetrical regions, voters delegate to public good lovers who over-provide the
public good. The over-provision is strongest for small spillover levels and vanishes if
spillovers are complete. Thus the comparison between decentralization and centraliza-
tion comes to a similar result as with an uncooperative central legislature.
As an extension to Besley and Coate (2003), Dur and Roelfsema (2005) introduce
non-sharable local costs that are solely borne by the region where the public good is
provided. They argue that non-sharable costs are important in environmental policy
but also in other policy ﬁelds. With such costs the problem of strategic delegation
is somewhat altered. With small local per capita costs, the incentive to delegate to
public good lovers is similar as in Besley and Coate. If a large part of the costs is non-
sharable, voters try to delegate to conservatives2 in the hope that they will provide a
small amount of the public good in the voters' own region. In addition voters hope for
large spillovers from the other region. This introduces a similar free-riding behavior as
under decentralization. For the extreme case that all costs are local, centralization does
not deviate from the social optimum either when spillovers are absent or if spillovers
are complete. The problem of strategic delegation is therefore particularly high for
intermediate spillover levels. As an extension of their model, Dur and Roelfsema ﬁnd
that appropriate region-speciﬁc taxes or subsidies can prevent strategic delegation in the
election of representatives. This allows the socially optimal supply of public goods in a
cooperative central legislature.
However, if the tax scheme is not given but endogenous, the outcome can be very
ineﬃcient. For the case of an uncooperative central legislature Besley and Coate (2003)
ﬁnd that voting on region-speciﬁc taxes and on public good provision not only leads to
redistribution but also triggers very ineﬃcient public good supply. A representative in
the central legislature has to consider the full cost of public good provision, since there
2`Conservatives' favor less public goods than the median voter. They are the opposite of `public good
lovers', who want more than the median voter.
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is no given cost-sharing rule. Therefore, the public good supply is the same as under
decentralization in the home region of the representative and lower in the other region,
as long as spillovers are not complete. This implies, for all spillover levels, that the
aggregated surplus of centralization never exceeds that of decentralization, even with
quasi-linear utility.3 Therefore a given (uniform) tax scheme may be needed to allow a
meaningful comparison of centralization with decentralization.
Crémer and Palfrey (2003) consider the implications of a federal standard for decen-
tralized provision of public goods. The starting point of the analysis is the conjecture
that a federal standard may avoid the under-supply that occurs under decentralization
when positive spillovers are present. Spillovers from other regions enter the utility func-
tion of a citizen in a non-additive way, which does not lead to dominant voting strategies.
With a binding federal standard, which requires a minimum amount of the public goods
in each district, voting preferences may not be single peaked, which may lead to vot-
ing cycles. However, local equilibria are always possible. For such an equilibrium a
federal standard increases the total spending on public goods, but this increase results
from more public good provision in low demand districts, whereas high demand districts
provide less. This pattern is exactly the opposite of what would be optimal.
Political-economy contributions to ﬁscal federalism do not only analyze voting on
public goods within a given federal structure, but also consider voting on the federal
organization itself. Lorz and Willmann (2005) use a similar setting as Besley and Coate
(2003) and extend the analysis to the endogenous formation of centralization. The
model is set up as a three stage game. Public good provision is made at the third stage
by local and central governments that maximize welfare of their constituents. There
is a continuum of public goods that range from purely local to global public goods.
Centralized decision making has the disadvantage that the supply of public goods causes
some ﬁxed costs. At the second stage, elected representatives bargain on the degree
of centralization and on inter-regional transfers. As the result of bargaining there is a
critical level of spillovers and public goods with stronger spillovers are provided centrally
while those with weaker spillovers are decentralized. The critical level of spillovers is
negatively inﬂuenced by the public good preferences of the representatives, which implies
a high degree of centralization for representatives with a high preference for public goods.
At the ﬁrst stage, there is decentralized voting on the representatives. It turns out that
there is ineﬃcient strategic delegation so that public good preference of the elected
representative is lower than that of the median voter. This implies that the resulting
degree of centralization will be too small.
Another approach on endogenous decisions on centralization is Redoano and Scharf
(2004) who consider a two region setting. There are two types of preferences for public
goods and one region is a high-preference region (with a majority of high-type voters)
and the other region is a low-preference region. At the last stage of the game, the federal
organization (decentralization or centralization) is given and representatives decide on
public goods. Under centralization, which is restricted to a uniform supply of public
goods, this decision is inﬂuenced by symmetrical inter-regional spillovers. Prior to the
3For this argument, see also the discussion paper of Besley and Coate (2000).
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last stage, two diﬀerent possibilities of voting to centralize the supply of public goods
are considered. Either there is a direct referendum or elected representatives decide
unanimously on centralization. Under the representative democracy scenario, the elected
representatives also decide on the public goods at the last stage of the game. Due to
the diﬀerent preferences of the majorities, centralization is not necessarily favored by
both regions. It turns out that, depending on the spillovers, centralization is more likely
to be instituted with representative democracy than with a direct referendum on the
federal setting. This result is driven by the possibility of strategic delegation in the
representative democracy scenario; the high-preference region can credibly commit to a
low-preference representative, which increases the chance that also the low-preference
region favors centralization.
Political-economy approaches on local public goods often see the key problem in
common pool incentives in the central legislature that trigger the over-provision of local
public goods (Persson and Tabellini 2000, Inman and Rubinfeld 1997a). This problem
which was also inherent in the contributions mentioned abovewas subject to a number
of empirical investigations. DelRossi and Inman (1999) investigate the funding of water
projects in the United States. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 introduced
higher local cost shares for water projects such as ﬂood control and navigation measures
and shoreline protection. In response to the changed sharing rules, Congress members
could re-negotiate their local projects that had been already approved but not yet im-
plemented. The adjustments allow the estimation of price elasticities of demand that
range between -0.81 for ﬂood projects and -2.55 for large, deep-draft navigation projects.
DelRossi and Inman also estimate the eﬀect of upstream and downstream users on ﬂood
protection projects. These user groups could potentially have an inﬂuence on ﬂood
projects because legislators can build a coalition and internalize externalities. However,
the number of upstream as well as downstream users (within 50 miles of county borders)
has no signiﬁcant impact on the size of ﬂood protection projects, indicating, according
to DelRossi and Inman, that these projects are fundamentally designed to meet local
constituents preferences.
In another study on common pool incentives, Knight (2004) investigates voting by
US Congress representatives on transportation projects. He ﬁnds that legislators re-
spond to common pool incentives and are more likely to approve projects when they
are provided in their own district. In addition, project approval is negatively inﬂuenced
by tax costs from overall spending. The empirical model estimates several parameters
that yield insight into the welfare implications of the voting outcome. Whereas there is
under-provision in some districts, there is over-provision in a majority of districts. The
actual spending is $7.5 billion, whereas the estimated eﬃcient level is $5 billion. Knight
concludes that his study raises serious doubt on the assumption that a benevolent social
planner maximizes national welfare.
There is some empirical evidence on the normative issue of whether direct democracy
has a positive impact on the supply of public goods. Frey and Stutzler (2004) summa-
rize the literature, which ﬁnds a negative correlation between the possibility of direct
referendums, and public spending and revenues on sub-central governmental levels in
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Switzerland and the United States. Other studies ﬁnd that eﬃciency in public good
provision is positively inﬂuenced by the possibility of direct democratic involvement.
An example is Pommerehne (1983) who showed for Switzerland that the costs of waste
collection is substantially lower in cities with direct democratic participation rights than
in cities with representative democracy only.
In earlier chapters it was argued that the geography of ﬂood defense restricts ben-
eﬁts from public ﬂood protection to areas near rivers. Spatial aspects of public goods
have hardly been researched in the context of ﬁscal federalism. The spatial distribution
of public beneﬁts is the starting point for the literature on the formation of nations
(Alesina and Spolaore 2003), where the size of a state inﬂuences the cost of preference
heterogeneity and the advantage of cost-sharing of public goods. This literature con-
siders a linear representation of space. If there is voting on jurisdictional boundaries, it
turns out that the resulting number of nations is too large, which can be interpreted as
an ineﬃciently high degree of decentralization. Other approaches recognize that public
goods have diﬀerent spatial characteristics and suggest that a ﬂexible system of over-
lapping jurisdictions can eﬃciently provide diﬀerent bundles of public goods within a
nation (Frey 1997). This approach does not take jurisdictional boundaries as given, but
asks what functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions (FOCJ) can best fulﬁll a
particular task. An example that is well suited for a ﬂexible federal setting is water
management at Chesapeake Bay in the United States. Mueller and Oates (1996) discuss
the creation of a new jurisdiction that can better address the interests of diﬀerent user
groups than the existing federal structure, since the current structure is not well suited
to incorporate the diﬀerent bilateral and unilateral externalities.
The issue of ﬂood defense certainly does not raise such principle issues as the formation
of nations, but it does raise the issue of whether jurisdictions should be tailored to ﬂood-
prone areas. This can be done through single issue authorities that complement an
existing federal structure. Such considerations seem important in a political-economy
context, where the beneﬁts from public goods drive voting preferences. In assuming
that voting preferences of the median and the average voter are the same, the current
literature says little about the conditions under which single issue authorities are well
suited to provide public goods such as ﬂood defense. Another issue that has received
little attention in the literature is that of unidirectional spillovers. In a political-economy
setting, such spillovers are likely to inﬂuence the outcome under centralized supply.
However, unidirectional and also asymmetrical spillovers are neglected in much of the
political-economy literature.
4.4 Migration in a federal state
The literature on local public goods and migration traditionally focused on decentralized
jurisdictional settings and asked if they are able to achieve an eﬃcient outcome. Often
the implicit, and sometimes also explicit, assumption of these studies is that the central
government can achieve the eﬃcient outcome, see for example Wellisch (1993, 675).
With this focus, the literature says little on the classical question of ﬁscal federalism:
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What is the appropriate federal level that should provide a public good? Nechyba (1997)
remarks that the literature on issues of ﬁscal federalism is separated from that on issues
of local public goods and migration that followed Tiebout (1956). The following section
will ﬁrst focus on the latter strand of literature that was inspired by Tiebout before
turning to the literature that also captures aspects of ﬁscal federalism.
Public goods have a spatial pattern of beneﬁts and costs that may be a cause for
migration. Utility diﬀerences induce migration if relocation improves utility. With
free and costless migration, individuals are highly responsive to changes in public good
provision. The opposite is the case if there are high migration costs or preferences that
attach individuals to regions. A migration equilibrium is reached if nobody can improve
his utility by relocation. This equilibrium concept allows unilateral action but not the
coordinated relocation of a subgroup (Scotchmer 2002, 2004).
In considering the possibility of migration, Tiebout (1956) came to his seminal hy-
pothesis that voting-with-the-feet can ensure Pareto-optimal public good provision.
This hypothesis is in contrast to the rather skeptical conclusion of Samuelson (1954),
who oﬀered a rule for Pareto-optimal provision but could not propose any decision pro-
cedure for implementing the optimal solution. Therefore it is well established in the
literature that, while markets can ensure an eﬃcient allocation of private goods, there is
no such mechanism for public goods, since individuals are reluctant to reveal their true
preferences. Tiebout's hypothesis is based on a number of assumptions. The economy
comprises enough communities so that all desired public good bundles are available.
Citizens are fully mobile and well informed on the characteristics of the communities.
Their income opportunities are the same in all communities. Each desired public good
bundle is available at minimum average cost, which implies that each community has
its optimal size. There are no spillovers between communities. Public goods are not
provided by a central government, but by local communities that are run by city man-
agers. Given the assumptions, Tiebout postulates that citizens can choose a community
with a public good supply that best suites their preferences. Since citizens can choose
between communities, there is a market-like framework that promotes Pareto-eﬃciency.
Tiebout stimulated a whole strand of literature that formalized diﬀerent aspects of
local public goods and migration; for surveys see Wildasin (1987) or Scotchmer (2002).
One of the main purposes of spatial models of local public goods is the analysis of
the population distribution across space. There are diﬀerent forces at work that either
a) favor the concentration of individuals at one location or b) scatter the population
to a rather even spatial distribution. These forces can be explained by referring to
Boadway and Flatters (1982), who consider two regions, purely local public goods, and
local governments that maximize welfare of their citizens. Beside public goods, there
is a private good, which is produced with labor, and a region-speciﬁc factor (which is
typically interpreted as land). Governments are myopic in the sense that they assume
that public goods do not induce migration. Approximating the population size of region
i with the continuous variable ni, this optimization problem leads to the indirect utility
function, vi(ni), that is the indirect utility of a representative citizens in region i.
To a): A large population size, ni, comes together with a low individual cost-share
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that ﬁnances public goods. This has a positive eﬀect on the indirect utility, since pure
public goods allow the same quantity of consumption independent of the consumption
of other individuals. Since public good provision needs the input of scarce resources, it
is always more eﬃcient to share these costs within a larger population. This argument
is weakened if there are crowding eﬀects in public good consumption (congestion), so
that additional consumers have a negative impact on other consumers.
To b): A large population size, ni, leads to a low indirect utility because per capita
output of the private good is low. With a concave production function, the per capita
level of the private good always decreases in the population size (work force) of a region
even when the marginal output of labor is positive.
size of region 1 size of region 2
utility in region 1 utility in region 2
size of region 1 size of region 2
utility in region 1utility in region 2
Figure 4.1: Migration equilibria in a two region local economy. Left: The crossing point
indicates a migration equilibrium. Right: At the crossing point the necessary
but not the suﬃcient conditions for a migration equilibrium are met.
Depending on the magnitude of these two eﬀects, an additional citizen can increase or
decrease the utility of residents in a community. With respect to the partial derivative
∂vi
∂ni
, it is often assumed that the cost-sharing eﬀect dominates for a small population,
whereas the decreasing per-capita level of the private good dominates for a large popu-
lation. This eﬀect of an additional citizen is of course a local property and can vary in
the population size. For the two region case, an illustration of the two eﬀects is given
in ﬁgure 4.1 for two scenarios.4 In both scenarios, indirect utility is ﬁrst increasing and
then decreasing in the population size of the region, implying that there is a population
size that yields to a maximal utility level. This size is sometimes referred to as the
optimal population size of a jurisdiction.
There are several migration equilibria in ﬁgure 4.1. As introduced above, a migration
equilibrium requires that nobody has an incentive for relocation. Following the lead
4The consequences of migration depend on the assumptions of the model. Figure 4.1 shows a situation
where governments immediately re-optimize the public good in response to migration. Graphs of
similar shape would be reached if the level of public goods is held ﬁxed and the public goods are
ﬁnanced by the ﬁnal residents of a region. The following chapters will oﬀer more detail on this point.
71
Chapter 4 Local public goods and ﬁscal federalism
of the literature (Stiglitz 1977, Wildasin 1987), Boadway and Flatters (1982) assume
identical preferences and equal treatment of individuals within a community. With
respect to land rents Boadway and Flatters assume that they are distributed to the ﬁnal
residents of a region. With these assumptions the crossing points of the two graphs in
ﬁgure 4.1 indicate the natural candidates for a migration equilibrium, since utility is the
same in both regions. However, whereas the left crossing point is a migration equilibrium,
the right one is not. The crossing point on the left part of ﬁgure 4.1 depicts a situation
where nobody can improve his utility by migration and therefore a migration equilibrium
prevails. In contrast, the right crossing point indicates a situation where migration can
still improve the utility level of the immigrant, which is sometimes referred to as an
unstable migration equilibrium. In the right part of the illustration, migration results in
the complete concentration of all individuals in one of the two regions. In the left part
of ﬁgure 4.1 there are no migration equilibria with complete concentration. Additional
possible migration equilibria are illustrated in Stiglitz (1977). For the two region case
of Boadway and Flatters (1982), the suﬃcient condition for a migration equilibrium
requires ∂v
i−vj
∂ni
< 0, which they refer to as an over-populated federation.
From a normative perspective migration equilibria are often not optimal. Normative
judgments crucially depend on the underlying welfare function. With a utilitarian wel-
fare function, migration equilibria are not generally optimal, because optimality may
require that equal individuals be treated unequally, because this leads to the highest
social welfare (Mirrlees 1972, Stiglitz 1977). Optimality in the utilitarian sense requires
a direct control of locational choices of individuals. If a direct control is not possible,
one naturally chooses a Rawlsian welfare function, because it is compatible with the
free migration restriction. Such a welfare approach concentrates on the Pareto-optimal
allocation that is compatible with free migration (Wellisch 1993).
With a Rawlsian welfare function, a migration equilibrium can be ineﬃcient for two
reasons. Firstly, ineﬃciency arises when public goods are not provided according to
the Samuelson rule. Secondly, the migration equilibrium can be locationally ineﬃcient.
Locational eﬃciency requires that the social net-beneﬁts of an immigrant to a region
must be equalized. The net-beneﬁt is the additional output (the marginal labor produc-
tivity) minus the private good consumption of an immigrant. Without public goods, an
eﬃcient locational pattern of individuals is given if the marginal labor productivity is
the same in all regions, because this maximizes the total output of the economy. With
concave production functions and competitive labor markets it is only a question of rent-
distribution how to achieve such an outcome. With (pure) public goods, the equilibrium
consumption of the public goods can be diﬀerent across regions. For a locationally ef-
ﬁcient migration equilibrium, two conditions must hold. First, to ensure a migration
equilibrium, utility diﬀerentials stemming from public good consumption need to be
compensated by the private good so that utility is equalized across regions and the con-
ditions for a migration equilibrium are given. In addition, to ensure locational eﬃciency
of the migration equilibrium, a region favored by high public good consumption (and
a low consumption of the private good) must have a relatively low labor productivity.
Thus, locational eﬃciency requires that the social marginal net-beneﬁt of an immigrant
to a region is the same for all regions (Wildasin 1987).
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A migration equilibrium is locationally ineﬃcient if the net-beneﬁt of an immigrant to
a region deviates across regions. A Pareto-improvement is possible through migration to
the region with the higher net-beneﬁt. However, due to institutional shortcomings there
might be no incentive for migration. The literature investigates diﬀerent tax and income
distribution schemes with regard to locational eﬃciency. Boadway and Flatters (1982)
ﬁnd that competitive labor markets and rent distribution to residents lead to locational
ineﬃciency, if public goods are ﬁnanced by head taxes. Their model, as well as many
others, assumes a concave production function and no public good spillovers between
regions. Locational eﬃciency is possible if transfers between regions are introduced.
Also, without inter-regional transfers, a locationally eﬃcient migration equilibrium can
be reached if land rents do not accrue to residents as assumed above, but are distributed
to land owners. Boadway (1982) shows that with equal property shares of all citizens
the resulting migration equilibrium is locationally eﬃcient. This result holds regardless
of whether local governments, which provide purely local public goods, are aware of the
free migration restriction or not.
Wildasin (1987) summarizes the literature and states, in a model that also allows for
congestion in public good consumption, that a combination of head and land-rent taxes
can yield locational eﬃciency of the migration equilibrium. This result is achieved when
head taxes equal the marginal crowding eﬀects of an immigrant and taxes on land rents
assure that the budget constraint for public good provision is met.
The literature makes diﬀerent assumptions with respect to the awareness of migration.
The above approach of Boadway and Flatters (1982) considers myopic local governments.
Other approaches assume non-myopic behavior, so that local governments consider the
linkage between public goods and locational choices. In a contribution of Boadway
(1982), for example, diﬀerences between myopic and non-myopic behavior arise, when
public goods are ﬁnanced by property taxes that are also collected from non-residents.
Whereas with myopic decisions this leads to an over-provision with public goods, with
non-myopic behavior that correctly anticipates the (potential) migration responses, the
public good is provided according to the Samuelson rule.
The approaches presented so far followed Tiebout in neglecting inter-regional spillovers.
Such spillovers are crucial in the context of ﬂood defense. One local economy approach
that considers spillovers and mobile households is Wellisch (1993; 1994). In a two region
model he comes to the result that regional governments that maximize the welfare of
their residents provide the public good according to the Samuelson rule and promote
locational eﬃciency. This result relies on the assumption that regional governments
have the appropriate tax and transfer instruments to implement the ﬁrst-best allocation
under the restriction of free migration. Furthermore, regional governments are aware
of potential migration responses when deciding on public good provision and take the
action of the other regional government as given. Thus, the resulting socially optimal
allocation is a Nash-equilibrium. Wellisch argues that the optimal outcome is reached,
because local governments have essentially the same objective as a social planner: both
aim to maximize utility of a representative household. The resulting allocations coin-
cide, since both face the equal utility constraint, and local governments are aware of
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migration and can use the appropriate tax instruments.
The analysis of migration equilibria becomes more complicated if the total number
of jurisdictions is not given but endogenous. Such a setting is the starting point for the
analysis of clubs. Clubs also oﬀer (impure) public goods, but, unlike jurisdictions, they
are usually not deﬁned over geographic space. In the theory on club formation diﬀerent
equilibrium concepts are used. One of them is the free mobility equilibrium that was
introduced above. Other equilibrium concepts in club theory, for example the core, allow
coordinated actions of more than one individual and not just unilateral actions. With
these concepts it is often diﬃcult to ﬁnd an equilibrium of the economy (Scotchmer
2002). Since ﬂood defense is a public good where beneﬁts are closely linked to space,
a free migration equilibrium for public goods provided in jurisdictions seems to be the
adequate equilibrium concept for the present problem. Therefore a broader overview of
club theory is not given here.
Voting has been introduced to the literature on local public goods and migration.
With the focus on decentralized voting and a one-dimensional voting problem, voting
cycles are usually avoided (Scotchmer 2002). Stiglitz (1977) adapts simple majority
voting in a setting akin to Boadway and Flatters (1982) and comes to similar results.
With non-myopic voters and equal property shares of all voters, the resulting migra-
tion equilibrium is Pareto optimal; a result similar to that found by Boadway (1982).
Westhoﬀ (1977) relaxes the assumption of identical voters and considers diﬀerences in
preferences. With a proportional wealth tax that ﬁnances local public goods, he ﬁnds
that a stable migration equilibrium exists if a continuous ordering of consumers prefer-
ences is possible. However, Konishi (1996) notes that the assumptions of no scarcity of
land and pure public goods are a serious shortcoming of the model, because consumers
could concentrate in one community and enjoy a much higher public good supply. Thus,
the relevance of the migration equilibrium found by Westhoﬀ is not clear. Konishi (1996)
gives a general existence theorem for a migration equilibrium in a multi region setting
with inter-regional spillovers. Public goods are ﬁnanced by local income taxes that avoid
the problem of non-convexities that was present in similar earlier models.
With the focus on decentralized settings, the literature on local public goods and
migration by and large omits the classical issue of ﬁscal federalism, which questiones
whether a public good should be provided by decentralized or centralized decision mak-
ing. Some contributions consider such complex settings that normative issues are ne-
glected all together. However, there are some contributions concerned with issues related
to the federal structure of an economy. Nechyba (1997) combines the analysis of local
public goods with an additional national public good, so that there is a hierarchical gov-
ernmental structure. There is majority voting on the local and on the national public
goods, which are ﬁnanced by property and income taxes, respectively. A voting and
migration equilibrium is shown to exist under certain assumptions. But, even though
local public goods with inter-jurisdictional spillovers are allowed, variations of the federal
setting that provides the public goods are not considered.
Empirical studies have tried to conﬁrm links between public goods and mobile eco-
nomics units, particularly capital and labor. A number of studies assess the impact of
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public environmental regulation on investment decisions. Levinson (2003) summarizes
studies that ﬁnd evidence for a negative impact of regulation stringency on investment in
polluting industries in the United States. However, a transfer of regulation responsibility
from the federal to the State level in the early nineteen-eighties was not accompanied
by degradation of air quality, so that there is no conﬁrmation for a race to the bottom.
Levinson notes that the eﬃciency of inter-jurisdictional competition cannot be judged
by the absolute air quality alone, but also depends on the responsiveness of individual
states to regulatory stringency in neighboring states. Levinson presents his own evi-
dence and that of other studies showing that neighboring states have a positive impact
on the environmental regulation in a state. A result that he interprets as a case against
decentralized responsibilities.
In a textbook context, Mueller (2003, 199-202) summarizes the empirical evidence
with regard to migration and public expenditure. There are several examples that show
that emigration from a jurisdiction positively correlates with high tax levels. Welfare
payments of a state correlate negatively with the number of poor people in neighboring
states. As a consequence of voting-with-the-feet, Tiebout (1956) predicted a preference-
driven sorting of individuals into communities. Sorting according to income could be
observed for diﬀerent urban areas in the United States, as Mueller reports.
4.5 The economic problem of ﬂood defense
The review of the literature shows that numerous theoretical and empirical contributions
are of relevance for ﬂood management and its federal organization. The discussion of the
relevant economic theory complements the institutional analysis of ﬂood management
in German (chapter 3) and helps to deﬁne the economic question that will be the focus
of this dissertation. The literature is the starting point for the formal analysis of public
ﬂood defense as a local public good with unidirectional spillovers and a distinct spatial
distribution of beneﬁts.
. Public ﬂood protection measures cause spillovers that are unidirectional. Recent
contributions to ﬁscal federalism emphasized political-economy aspects, whose rele-
vance was also suggested by empirical studies. However, these contributions mostly
focus on symmetrical, inter-regional spillovers and do not discuss the consequences
of unidirectional spillovers. So it is an open question, under what conditions cen-
tralization or decentralization is the better federal organization if unidirectional
spillovers are present. This is not only a question for the case of positive spillovers,
but also when spillovers are negative. The latter case is hardly discussed in the
literature. Therefore one can conclude that unidirectional spilloverswhich Oates
referred to as a relevant as well as complicated issue in ﬁscal federalismare a
fruitful ﬁeld for an analysis in a political-economy context.
. Heterogeneous beneﬁts from public goods may lead to a deviation of the median
and the average voting preference of a region. With the geography of ﬂood defense,
it is possible to create a single issue authority that increases the homogeneity of
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voting preferences within a jurisdiction. The political-economy of this issue is
hardly researched.
. Since unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts are both present in ﬂood
defense, it is interesting to to investigate the linkages between these issues.
. The possibility of relocation creates a more complex setting for public ﬂood defense.
Whereas there is a substantial literature on the linkage between public goods and
migration, there is little insight into what kind of federal setting is recommended
for public goods with unidirectional spillovers. The answer to this question is likely
to depend on the voting behavior, which can be either myopic or non-myopic with
respect to potential migration.
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The political-economy of local public goods
This chapter gives a formal analysis of local public good provision with unidirectional
spillovers and spatially heterogeneous public good beneﬁts, where the amount of public
goods are determined by voting. Unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts
were found to be crucial in ﬂood management and are not well covered in the literature.
The recent political-economy approach of Besley and Coate (2003) to the issue of
the optimal vertical federal structure is the starting point of the analysis. In a two
region setting, this approach allows the comparison of decentralized and centralized
public good provision. As an extension of Besley and Coate, spillovers are allowed to
be asymmetric, covering the extreme case of unidirectional spillovers, which is present
in ﬂood management and also in other water related issues. Spillovers are allowed to be
positive as well as negative. Thus, in the two region economy it is possible to consider
positive and negative unidirectional spillovers between an upstream and a downstream
community along a river.
In addition, the model allows for public goods with unevenly distributed beneﬁts.
Beneﬁts are high in some parts of a region and low in other parts. For the case of
ﬂood defense there are high-beneﬁt individuals that live in ﬂood-prone areas, where
beneﬁts from public goods are high. Low-beneﬁt individuals live outside these areas.
The location determines the voting preference of citizens.
The uneven distribution of the beneﬁts from public goods allows the spatial separation
of citizens into high and low-beneﬁt groups. Such a separation might be a promising
possibility, since public good provision is determined by voting. Through separation,
high-beneﬁt individuals can establish their own jurisdiction, a single issue authority,
which only comprises individuals of the same voting preference. Since there is the pos-
sibility of spillovers between the high-beneﬁt groups in diﬀerent regions, the single issue
authority can be established with a decentralized or centralized structure. Single issue
authorities are viewed as some kind of new jurisdictions, which are new in comparison
to the status quoor classicaljurisdictions.
Using majority voting as a decision rule is a simple way to capture the fundamen-
tal conﬂict of interests between upstream and downstream and high and low beneﬁts
citizens within a political-economy framework. As the last chapter showed (see section
4.3), political-economy approaches are not only used in theoretical approaches on ﬁscal
federalism, but they are also found to be of empirical relevance.
With spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts, the two region political-economy can be
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organized into four diﬀerent federal organizations: classical decentralization or central-
ization and decentralized or centralized single issue authorities. In focusing on diﬀerent
federal structures and simple majority voting, this approach does not contain the dele-
gation problem which arises in the framework of Besley and Coate (2003) and also other
political-economy contributions (Lorz and Willmann 2005, Dur and Roelfsema 2005).
A more sophisticated modeling of the political process usually involves the election of
representatives, who then decide on public goods.
A formal analysis of single issue authorities seems promising because the institutional
analysis of ﬂood management in Germany (see section 3.3.3) showed their practical rel-
evance for many water related issues. Unlike many other public goods, for many water
related issues it is possible to clearly identify (sub-) regions where beneﬁts are concen-
trated. In addition, single issue authorities draw on contributions to a new federalism
(see also section 4.3), such as Frey (1997) who promotes `functional, overlapping, com-
peting jurisdictions'. Single issue authorities are of high relevance in water issues, since
the literature speculates that in a rational federal system, fairly sizable jurisdictions
would extend over watersheds containing smaller jurisdictions of metropolitan and lo-
cal areas (Oates 1999). However, crucial aspects of such `watershed' jurisdictions are
unidirectional spillovers and unevenly distributed beneﬁts.
As is common in the ﬁscal federalism literature, there is no federal setting that always
reaches the ﬁrst-best outcome. All federal settings have their own imperfections and
which setting is best depends on the context. In focusing on second-best settings, the
economy under consideration has an imperfect constitution that can be interpreted as
the result of an incomplete social contract. The literature on social contracts usually
assumes that behind a veil of ignorance everybody could agree on a social contract
that yields eﬃcient outcomes. However, as such a contract cannot foresee all future
contingencies, it has to remain incomplete. Because a deviation from an incomplete
social contract can be beneﬁcial from an ex-post point of view, the question arises under
what social decision rule to decide on such a deviation. The literature on social contracts
ﬁnds that some kind of majority voting and not unanimity is optimal if compensating
transfers within a society are costly (Aghion and Bolton 2003). This general setting
can be applied to the case of ﬂood defense, if a constitution cannot diﬀerentiate taxes
because the exposition to ﬂood risk is not ex-post veriﬁable. If, however, ﬂood risk
zones are observable at the constitutional stage, it is possible to assign the responsibility
of ﬂood defense to single issue authorities or other jurisdictions. Thus, one could see
the following analysis as reﬂecting the situation at the time a social contract is made.
After the constitutional phase, majority votinginstead of unanimityallows greater
ﬂexibility to change the status quo in ﬂood defense. However, it can be asked which
federal organization avoids very ineﬃcient supply patterns in ﬂood defense through the
tyranny of the majority. As the following analysis concentrates on majority voting, it
does not consider or allow purely redistributive policies. Instead, it focuses on public
good provision in a federal economy.
The four federal organizations will be compared with respect to their aggregated
public surplus. To shed light on the diﬀerent forces that drive the results, the analy-
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sis will proceed step by step and considers three voting scenarios. After establishing
the benchmark case of socially optimal public good provision, the ﬁrst voting scenario
considers the general case of asymmetrical spillovers, which capturesas an extreme
caseunidirectional spillovers. However, it is assumed that the whole population enjoys
the same public good beneﬁts. In a second scenario the population has heterogeneous
beneﬁts but spillovers are symmetrical. The last scenario captures heterogeneous ben-
eﬁts as well as unidirectional spillovers. As extensions, central standards and partial
centralization are investigated as potential ways to improve the outcome under central-
ization.
The three scenarios consider aggregated surplus as a welfare measure to compare
diﬀerent federal organizations. As one of the important results of this chapter it will
turn out thatwith unidirectional spilloverscentralized federal organizations are never
surplus superior to decentralized ones if regions have the same population size. With
centralized voting there is either an extreme over- or under-provision of the downstream
public good, which makes central jurisdictions inferior to a decentralized federal organi-
zations. Centralized jurisdictions that are bound to provide the same consumption level
of the public good upstream and downstream or that only provide the upstream public
good can improve on the performance of unrestricted centralized public good provision.
The chapter is organized as follows. First the model is introduced. Then section 5.2
compares aggregated surplus of jurisdictional organizations for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
the model. Section 5.3 considers extensions of the model with variations in centralized
public good supply. The last section of the chapter summarizes the results and concludes.
5.1 The model
There is a two region economy with public goods. The collective decision on public
good supply is based on individual preferences, physical characteristics of the public and
private goods, and income restrictions.
Two regions (or communities) i ∈ {1, 2} are considered. The size of the population
in region i is ni, which, for simplicity, is unity for most of the chapter. A public good
can be provided in both regions. The quantity of the public good in region i is gi, with
gi ∈ R+. Beside the public goods there is a private good and the endowment of the
private good is the same for all individuals. The public good can be produced by using
the private good. Expressing the cost of the public good in units of the private good,
the cost function of the public good is given by g
2
i
2
. It is assumed that the private good
is available in suﬃcient quantity to ﬁnance the public good.
Preferences are assumed to be the same for all citizens. However, public good beneﬁts
are unevenly distributed across a region so that voting preferences are not necessarily the
same for all citizens. Within a region it is possible to diﬀerentiate between a high-beneﬁt
areawhich represents the ﬂood-prone areaand a low-beneﬁt area. For simplicity it
is assumed that beneﬁts in a low-beneﬁt area are zero. Marginal public good beneﬁts
are the same throughout the high-beneﬁt area of a region. They are captured by the
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parameter λi, with λi  0. Therefore no index for individuals is used and λi is the
beneﬁt parameter of a representative citizen living in the high-beneﬁt sub-region of
region i. For the case of ﬂood protection, λi can be seen as a parameter that closely
relates to the expected ﬂood loss in region i. A large expected ﬂood loss translates into
a large λi because beneﬁts from public ﬂood defense are high.
α denotes the share of the high-beneﬁt individuals of the population, therefore α ∈
[0, 1]. It is assumed that high and no-beneﬁt individuals can be geographically separated.
Utility is assumed to be linear in the private as well as in the public goods. λ is
therefore the constant marginal utility in public goods. For a representative high-beneﬁt
individual of region i, utility can be expressed by
yi + λi(gi + κigj), (5.1)
where yi denotes consumption of the private good. The consumption of the public
goods is the sum of the public good provided in the home region and that provided in
the foreign region. The foreign public good is weighted by a spillover parameter. Public
good consumption is weighted by the beneﬁt parameter. With linear utility the model
assumes risk neutral agents. Hence, problems related to risk management that arise
when risk-averse agents are exposed to ﬂood risk are not captured by the model.
With increasing marginal costs of supplying public goods, the utility function captures
a basic trade-oﬀ in ﬂood defense: Without ﬂood defense, the utility of citizens in ﬂood-
prone areas is low, because ﬂood damages can be expected. With ﬂood defense, utility
is higher because of lower expected ﬂood losses. However, at the same time public ﬂood
defense must be ﬁnanced by taxes, which decreases the consumption of the private good.
To keep the model simple there is no explicit variable for the ﬂood loss without ﬂood
defense.
κi captures spillovers from the public good provided in region j to region i. It indicates
how the public good provided in region j translates into public good consumption in
region i. It is assumed that κi ∈ [−1, 1]. Without spillovers (κi = 0), gj is a purely local
public good with all beneﬁts accruing in region j and no physical impacts on region i.
κi = 1 is the case of a complete positive spillover, representing the case that the public
good provided in region j is a national public good. With unidirectional spillovers it
will be assumed that the spillover goes from region 1 to region 2, therefore κ1 = 0, and
κ2 ∈ [−1, 1]. For the example of ﬂood prevention, the upstream community is region 1
and the downstream community is region 2.
Individuals outside of ﬂood-prone areas do not beneﬁt from public good supply. How-
ever, depending on the federal organization, they may be obliged to pay taxes. It is as-
sumed that public goods are ﬁnanced by head taxes on all citizens of the jurisdiction that
provides the public good. This assumption is common in much of the political-economy
literature on federalism.1
1Lockwood (2002) allows for regionally diﬀerentiated taxes. However, it is important that the tax
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Public good provision is determined by simple majority voting of the residents of
a jurisdiction. With two regions under consideration, there can be decentralization
or centralization. This is the classical situation in ﬁscal federalism, where the best
federal organization is determined by the size of the spillover. However, beneﬁts within
regions can be heterogeneous and the separation of individuals into jurisdictions with
high beneﬁts and without beneﬁts is possible. Such a separation is assumed to be
feasible and costless. Thus, a high-beneﬁt jurisdiction can provide the public good at
the same cost as a large jurisdiction with heterogeneous beneﬁts. Possible jurisdictional
organizations are therefore:
. Classical decentralization. Each community is an independent jurisdiction. There
is decentralized voting on public good supply in each of the two jurisdictions. All
citizens participate in voting. With a population size of unity in each community,
cost shares for public good provision in region i are given by g
2
i
2
.
. Classical centralization. Both communities are uniﬁed in one jurisdiction and all
citizens vote centralized on public good supply. Individual cost-shares for public
good provision are given by
g2i+g
2
j
4
.
. Decentralized single issue authorities. In each region high-beneﬁt individuals are
separated from individuals without beneﬁts from the public good. The high-beneﬁt
groups form two separate jurisdictions and the public good supply is determined
by decentralized voting. Citizens without beneﬁts from the public goods are not
part of the voting decisions. Cost shares for public good provision in region i are
given by g
2
i
2α
.
. A centralized single issue authority. Areas with citizens who beneﬁt from the
public good constitute one jurisdiction. Therefore this jurisdiction comprises the
high-beneﬁt individuals from both regions. Citizens without public good beneﬁts
are not part of the voting decisions. Cost shares for public good provision are
given by
g2i+g
2
j
4α
.
Classical decentralization and centralization are seen as `natural' federal organiza-
tions, since they cover the whole territory of the economy. One can imagine a more
complex setting where the classical decentralized and centralized jurisdictions provide
additional public goods. However, the present approach focuses on unevenly distributed
beneﬁts of a particular public good and the possibility of the spatial separation of in-
dividuals into high-beneﬁt jurisdictions. These jurisdictions serve a single purpose and
are therefore referred to as single issue authorities.
Public good supply is determined by simple majority voting. The analysis will focus
on voting outcomes that are preferred by a majority over any other outcomes. Thus,
the voting outcomes under consideration are Condorcet winners, where such a winner is
deﬁned as an outcome that beats any other feasible outcome in a pair-wise vote (see for
scheme is given and not endogenously determined if excessive redistribution in non-cooperative
central legislatures shall be avoided. As Besley and Coate (2003; 2000) note, a (uniform) tax scheme
may be needed to allow a meaningful comparison of diﬀerent federal settings. To keep the model
simple, this leads to the above assumption of uniform head taxes within jurisdictions.
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example Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 2)).
Given the assumptions, preferences on public goods are single peaked in the case
of a single voting issue. Therefore the median voter theorem holds and the median
voter determines the level of the public good provision. A single voting decision is
made in decentralized jurisdictions. However, in a centralized jurisdiction there are two
variables to be determined, upstream and downstream public good provision; therefore
the decision problem is two-dimensional. Mueller (2003, ch. 5) discusses ways to avoid
voting cycles and to ensure a voting equilibrium. One possibility is sequential decision
making, where decisions are made on one dimension at a time. This approach is followed
here. Due to the special form of the utility function, the sequence of decision making is
not crucial.
With the given beneﬁt structure of public goods, voting preferences of the population
are quite basic, so that the set of most preferred allocations is restricted to few cases
and not to a continuum of values. Therefore the group sizes of individuals with diﬀerent
beneﬁts play a crucial role for the voting outcome.
5.2 Public good provision under diﬀerent federal
organizations
5.2.1 The socially optimal outcome
To compare diﬀerent jurisdictional settings in a political-economy framework, the welfare-
optimal provision of public goods is determined as a benchmark. Concentrating on the
public goods and their opportunity costs in units of the private good, aggregated pub-
lic good surplus, S, is taken as a welfare measure, which implies a purely utilitarian
framework.2
The objective function of a benevolent social planer is given by
S(gi, gj) = αλi(gi + κigj) + αλj(gj + κjgi)− g
2
i+g
2
j
2
. (5.2)
S(gi, gj) is strictly concave for non-negative values of gi and gj. For interior solutions,
one can easily check that the second-order conditions for a maximum are met, and the
ﬁrst-order conditions indicate a unique absolute maximum. The socially optimal level
of public good supply in region i, denoted by g∗i , for interior solutions is given by
g∗i = αλi + ακjλj for λi + κjλj ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (5.3)
The level of public good supply in region i depends positively on the marginal beneﬁts
in region i and the share of the high-beneﬁt population in the providing region. In
2Similar benchmarks are used, for example, by Oates (1972), Besley and Coate (2003) and Lockwood
(2002).
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addition, beneﬁts in the foreign region have to be taken into account. Positive spillovers
have a positive eﬀect on public good supply and negative spillovers reduce the optimal
level. With large marginal utility in public goods and large negative spillovers in the
foreign region, the optimal level of the public good may become zero. For unilateral
spillovers with κ1 = 0 the public good in region 2 only depends on the beneﬁts of region
2, g∗2 = αλ2.
Aggregated public good surplus for inner solutions (g∗i > 0) is given by
S(g∗i , g
∗
j ) = α
2λ2i (1 + κ
2
i )
1
2
+ α2λ2j(1 + κ
2
j)
1
2
+ α2λiλj(κi + κj) . (5.4)
In the following sections it will be investigated how public goods are provided under
majority voting. Diﬀerent jurisdictional settings will be investigated and diﬀerent as-
sumptions apply with respect to the share of high-beneﬁt individuals and the spillovers
(bilateral, unilateral).
5.2.2 Asymmetric spillovers and homogeneous regions
Following a political-economy approach, there is simple majority voting on public good
provision. Assumingas a ﬁrst casea homogeneous population of high-beneﬁt individ-
uals, α = 1, there are two possible jurisdictional organizations: classical decentralization
and centralization.
The political-economy literature on ﬁscal federalism focuses mainly on the case of
bilateral, symmetrical spillovers. Symmetrical spillovers imply that κ1 = κ2.3 How-
ever, the case of ﬂood defense shows that there are also relevant cases of unidirectional
spillovers. Since the model is set up to analyze ﬂood defense, it allows the general case
of asymmetrical spillovers, covering the extreme cases of either symmetrical or unidirec-
tional spillovers. With unidirectional spillovers it will be assumed that κ1 = 0, implying
that the spillover goes from the upstream region 1 to the downstream region 2.
Classical decentralization
Under classical decentralization there are two jurisdictions, each deciding independently
on public good supply. Public good costs are divided equally among individuals of
the providing region. Since public good supply is determined by majority voting, the
optimization problem is that of the median voter in each jurisdiction. Let λmi denote the
public good beneﬁt parameter of the median voter in region i. The median voter takes
the public good in the other jurisdiction as given. The ﬁrst-order condition determines
the reaction functions. The Nash equilibrium is the solution of the problem. Omitting
consumption of the private good, the optimization problem of the median voter under
decentralization in region i is given by
3Besley and Coate (2003) consider symmetrical spillovers and give roads or parks as examples of such
public goods.
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gdi = argmaxgi∈R+ λmi(gi + κigj)− g
2
i
2
for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (5.5)
The superscript `d' denotes outcomes under decentralization. The utility of the median
voter in region i with decentralized public good provision is given by
- the utility from the provision of public goods in the home region. This term
depends on the beneﬁt parameter of the median voter. Given the assumption
of a homogeneous high-beneﬁt population the median voter is also a high-beneﬁt
citizen and the beneﬁt from public good provision is positive. If the median voter
would have no beneﬁts from public goods, utility from public good provision is
zero.
- utility from public good provision in the foreign region. With a high-beneﬁt median
voter, this term can be positive or negative depending on spillovers.
- the cost-share of the median voter for the given level of public good provision. The
cost-share reduces the possibility for private good consumption and has therefore a
negative sign. For decentralized public good provision costs are shared among the
population of the whole region. Other federal organizations are associated with
other cost-shares. Citizens without beneﬁts from public goods are only aﬀected by
the diﬀerent cost-shares of the federal organizations.
Since citizens within a region have the same beneﬁts from the public good, the median
voter is easily identiﬁed as a high-beneﬁt type, λmi = λi since λmi ∈ {λi}. Given the
linear utility function, the solution of the problems are dominant strategies with reaction
functions independent of the public good provision of the foreign region. Hence, the
timing of decentralized voting it irrelevant for the voting outcome. With concave utility
of region i in gi, the second-order suﬃcient conditions are met for the optimal public
good choices and the Nash-equilibrium is given by
(gd1 , g
d
2) = (λm1, λm2) = (λ1, λ2) . (5.6)
Since the high-beneﬁt median voters neglect positive (or negative) spillovers to the other
region, decentralized public good supply is either too small (or too large) in both juris-
dictions compared to the social optimum.
Besley and Coate (2003) as well as Dur and Roelfsema (2005) ﬁnd a similar result
by allowing a continuum of public good preferences within a region. In their approach,
where elected representatives decide on public good provision, there can be another
reason for ineﬃcient public good provision. Depending on the utility function, (positive)
spillovers induce strategic delegation, which creates an additional free riding problem.
Citizens vote for a representative with a low public good preference which aggravates
the under-supply of the public goods. However, both contributions focus primarily on
utility functions that do not induce strategic delegation under decentralization.
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Classical centralization
Under classical centralization there is only one jurisdiction in which voters decide on
public good supply. As mentioned above, there is sequential voting on the two public
goods (gi and gj). The order of the decisions can be either g1 at the ﬁrst stage and g2 at
the second stage, or the other way around. In principle, the second decision takes the
outcome of the ﬁrst stage into account, by responding according to the reaction function.
This reaction at the second stage can be anticipated at the ﬁrst stage. At each stage
the median preference determines the outcome. Given the linear utility function, the
sequence of decision making does not inﬂuence the outcome, since dominant strategies
are present. Therefore there are two independent voting decisions that are voted on
sequentially. The median voter from region i or j, with the public good beneﬁt parameter
λm and λm ∈ {λi, λj}, faces the following optimization problem for public good provision
in region i:
gci = argmaxgi∈R+
 λm(gi + κi gj)−
g2i+g
2
j
4
median voter region i
λm(gj + κj gi)− g
2
i+g
2
j
4
median voter region j
for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j .
(5.7)
The superscript `c' denotes the outcome under classical centralization. It is important
to note that, due to sequential decision making, there are two votes on public good supply
and not just one simultaneous vote. With the given voting preferences this rules out
the possibility of voting cycles and ensures the existence of a Condorcet winner in each
voting decision. This aspect becomes important if there are more than two preference
groups involved in centralized decision making. With the size of both regions being
unity, the question arises: which region is decisive for the voting decision? To answer
this question the following tie-braking rule is used:
Assumption 5.1 There is an inﬁnitesimal diﬀerence in the population size of the two
regions. The larger region will be denoted by i, the smaller region by j. For matters of
convenience the population size will be approximated as being unity.
With inﬁnitesimal diﬀerences in size, voting on public good provision leads to clear-cut
results, since the median voter resides in the larger region. The assumption implies that
size does matter and therefore guarantees that the outcome of voting is not random, as in
Besley and Coate (2003). If the residence region of the median voter would be random
in each voting decision, then both public goods could be determined by non-resident
voters. With small diﬀerences in the population size and homogeneous beneﬁts, voters
from one region determine the public good in the majority as well as in the minority
region. The implications of explicitly accounting for diﬀerences in the population size
will be analyzed for homogeneous regions latter on.
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Denoting the marginal utility in public good consumption of the median voter with
λm = λi, and using the superscript c for centralization, the outcome is given by
(gci , g
c
j) =
 (2λi, κi 2λi) for κi ≥ 0(2λi, 0) for κi < 0 . (5.8)
With positive spillovers there is an interior solution that is a global maximum, since
strict concavity of the utility in public goods is given. With negative spillovers, a corner
solution occurs with respect to the foreign public good. With this public good supply,
it is clear that centralization is not generally socially optimal. With positive spillovers,
the public good tends to be over-provided in the majority region and under-provided in
the minority region. The median voter from the majority region considers only his own
public good beneﬁt, but relies on the tax base of the whole population of both regions.
Faced with the common pool incentive, he favors his own region and neglects beneﬁts
to the minority region in his public good decisions.
The median voter is in a situation similar to that of the decisive representative under
centralization in the contribution of Besley and Coate (2003). Uncooperative representa-
tives would determine the same public good allocation as above, if the randomly picked
decisive representative would come from the majority region.
For a unidirectional spillover and an upstream majority (region 1) this implies that
no public good is provided downstream (region 2), gc2 < g
∗
2 ⇔ 0 < λ2. An ineﬃciently
large level is supplied upstream since gc1 > g
∗
1 ⇔ 2λ1 > λ1+κ2λ2, which holds as long as
spillovers and beneﬁt diﬀerences between regions are not too large. With a downstream
majority (region 2) the public good is provided in both regions, however the supply is
ineﬃciently large in the downstream region with gc2 > g
∗
2 ⇔ 2λ2 > λ2. The upstream
good tends to be under-supplied as long as beneﬁts and spillovers are not too large since
gc1 < g
∗
1 ⇔ 2κ2 λ2 < λ1 + κ2λ2.
For positive spillovers, it is apparent that centralization leads to a partial internal-
ization of spillovers. Only the spillover received by the majority region is taken into
account, whereas the spillover received by the minority region is irrelevant for public
good provision.
Comparison of classical decentralization and centralization
With the majority region i, the comparison of decentralization and centralization yields
a critical level of spillover, where both federal organizations have the same aggregated
surplus. This critical level of spillovers is determined by equating Sd(gdi , g
d
j ) = S
c(gci , g
c
j).
If the majority region receives a positive spillover, the critical spillover level can be de-
rived from (λ2i + λ
2
j)
1
2
+ λi λj (κi + κj) = 2λi λj (κi + κj). As it is evident, the surplus
under centralization is not inﬂuenced by the location of the majority, as a region j ma-
jority would lead to the same surplus. With a negative κi, the critical level is determined
from (λ2i + λ
2
j)
1
2
+ λi λj (κi + κj) = 2λi λj κj.
Normalization of the beneﬁts leads to a marginal public good utility in region i of
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λi
λi
= 1 and in region j of λj
λi
≡ λ. λ is the marginal beneﬁt in region j, in relation to the
marginal beneﬁts in region i. With region i as the majority region, a large λ indicates
that the marginal public good beneﬁt in the minority region is high in comparison to
the majority region. It turns out that the critical value of spillovers does not depend on
the absolute beneﬁt parameters in both regions, but only on the relative beneﬁts λ:
κcrit1i =
 1+λ
2
2λ
− κj for κi ≥ 0
−1+λ2
2λ
+ κj for κi < 0
(5.9)
The critical spillover level not only depends on the relative marginal beneﬁts of the
minority region λ, but also on the spillover that is received by the minority region. For
positive spillovers received by the majority region, the critical spillover level decreases in
the spillover received in the minority region. The opposite holds for negative, majority-
region spillovers. This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 5.1 Simple majority voting and assumption 5.1 imply the following result,
if all citizens have an identical high-beneﬁt parameter and spillovers are asymmetrical:
There is a critical level of the spillover received by the majority region, κcrit1i (κj), for
κj ≥ 0. If the absolute value of κi is below this level, decentralization is surplus superior;
if it is above this level, centralization is superior. For κj < 0 decentralization is always
superior.
kj
ki
surplus advantage for
decentralization
surplus advantage for
centralization
Figure 5.1: Surplus optimal federal organizations with asymmetrical spillovers and iden-
tical marginal beneﬁts
Proposition 5.1 is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.1, which is based on κcrit1i as calculated in
equation 5.9. For positive spillovers in both regions, the sum of spillovers must be
large enough to justify centralization. With λ = 1 and regions of the same population
size, both spillovers are perfect substitutes and a change of the majority region has no
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impact on public good surplus, even for very asymmetric spillovers. For the comparison
of centralization and decentralization, it does not matter if the majority region receives
a large or a small spillover.
If the majority receives a negative and the minority region a positive spillover (the
lower right quadrant in ﬁgure 5.1), centralization is again superior, if the sum of the
absolute values of the spillovers is large enough. Centralization is superior to decentral-
ization, because the majority does not provide the public good in the minority region
and therefore avoids negative spillovers that would be present under decentralization.
At the same time there is still a positive spillover received in the minority region.
If the minority region receives negative spillovers (the left half of ﬁgure 5.1), decen-
tralization is always superior to centralization. Under centralization the majority region
pays no attention to the negative spillover to the minority region and at the same time
over-provides the public good in the home region. Both eﬀects impair the surplus under
centralization, so that decentralization is always the better federal organization.
This leads to the conclusion that the surplus resulting from centralized voting de-
pends on political-economy factors if one spillover is negative. If one public good causes
negative spillovers, whether or not centralization is superior to decentralization depends
on the majority constellation. The surplus is higher if the majority and not the minority
region receives the negative spillover.
The case of unidirectional spillovers is found on either of the two axes in ﬁgure 5.1.
With a unidirectional spillover received in the minority region, the horizontal κj-axes
illustrates the possible range of spillovers. If the majority region receives the spillover,
the vertical κi-axes shows the relevant values of spillovers. As it is evident in ﬁgure 5.1,
neither of the two axes includes spillovers where centralization is superior to decentral-
ization. This allows the statement that unidirectional spillovers favor decentralization.
The disadvantage of centralization can be explained with respect to an upstream and
a downstream majority in ﬂood defense. With unidirectional spillovers, an upstream
majority over-provides ﬂood defense in the upstream region and does not protect the
downstream region (see above). This pattern extremely favors upstream voters, be-
cause the downstream region pays for the over-provided ﬂood defense upstream without
getting much (or anything) back. In case of negative spillovers, it is even harmed by
upstream ﬂood defense. One can summarize: An upstream majority always fails to
provide ﬂood defense downstream (which has purely local beneﬁts), and it is insensitive
to spillovers from upstream ﬂood defense. This supply pattern is very ineﬃcient for
negative spillovers, and it is also not better than decentralized provision when positive
spillovers are very large.
A downstream majority causes a signiﬁcant over-provision of downstream ﬂood de-
fense. Since the upstream majority does not receive any beneﬁt from downstream ﬂood
defense, this over-provision does not allow a high aggregated surplus. In addition, the
downstream majority under-provides ﬂood defense upstream unless positive spillovers
are complete.
Figure 5.1 also contains the case of symmetrical spillovers, which is considered by
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Besley and Coate (2003). The case of κ1 = κ2 is given at the curve with the slope unity
that traverses the point of origin. The critical level of spillovers, where decentralization
and centralization yield the same surplus, is given by κ1 = κ2 = 12 .
Variations in the population size and marginal public good beneﬁts
Proposition 5.1 assumed, ﬁrstly, that regions have the same population size, and, sec-
ondly, that the public good beneﬁt parameter is the same in both regions. If these
assumptions are relaxed, the case for centralization can become stronger or weaker.
This can be discussed with respect to unidirectional spillovers. Let n denote the rel-
ative size of the minority region j in relation to the majority region i, which implies
n ≡ nj
ni
∈ (0, 1). With λ = λj
λi
this leads to the critical spillover level where decentraliza-
tion and centralization yield the same surplus (Sd = Sc):
κcrit2 =

1+λ2
2λ
for an upstream majority
−n2 λ+
√
n2(1+λ2)−n4
1−n for κ2 ≥ 0 and a downstream majority
−n1+λ2
2λ
for κ2 < 0 and a downstream majority .
(5.10)
0.31
3
lambda
0
0.5
1 n
0
1
-1
k2crit
Figure 5.2: Critical unidirectional spillover, κcrit2 , with a downstream majority for n ∈
(0, 1) and λ ∈ (1
3
, 3). n is the relative population size of the upstream region
in comparison to the majority region downstream. Similarly, λ stands for
the relative level of the public good beneﬁt parameter in the minority region.
There can be an upstream or a downstream majority. For an upstream majority,
the upstream region does not receive any spillovers and public good supply is given by
g1 = λ1(n1 +n2) and g2 = 0. Equating surplus from decentralization and centralization,
and using relative size and marginal public good utility, yields the critical value of the
unidirectional spillover κcrit2 =
1+λ2
2λ
. This expression, which is independent of size of the
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regions, has its minimum at λ = 1.4 Therefore there is no κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] where centraliza-
tion with an upstream majority is superior. The example of ﬂood defense can illustrate
the poor performance of centralization with an upstream majority. Independent of the
size of the spillover there is no downstream and a very high level of upstream ﬂood
defense. If negative spillovers are present, it is evident that this supply pattern is very
ineﬃcient. Also with positive spillovers this supply pattern is far from being eﬃcient,
since there is no downstream ﬂood defense. A relatively large upstream population im-
plies a relatively small minority region downstream, which is exploited by the majority.
However, such size diﬀerences do not make centralization better than decentralization.
Figure 5.2 shows the critical level of the unidirectional spillover for a downstream
majority. With a downstream majority public good supply is given by g1 = κ2λ2(n1+n2)
and g2 = λ2(n1 + n2) for positive spillovers, and g1 = 0 and g2 = λ2(n1 + n2) for
negative spillovers. The critical spillover level depends on the relative size of the minority
(upstream) region n and on the relative size of the public good preference parameter λ.
If the minority region is small in relation to the majority region, n takes small values.
λ > (<) 1 represents the case that the minority region has larger (smaller) marginal
public good beneﬁts than the majority region. Figure 5.2, ﬁrstly, illustrates proposition
5.1. For the same marginal public good beneﬁts and the same population size in both
regions (n = 1 and λ = 1), centralization is never superior to decentralization, since
the critical spillover level is either a complete positive spillover or a negative spillover of
minus 1. Secondly, ﬁgure 5.2 shows that a small population in the upstream regiona
small minority region, n 1comes together with a smaller (larger) level of the critical
spillover when spillovers are positive (negative). Thirdly, diﬀerences in the marginal
public goods beneﬁts (λ 6= 1) make the critical spillover levels more extreme. Thus,
centralization is only the favorable federal setting if spillover levels are higher or lower
compared to the case of identical marginal public good beneﬁts.
The logic of ﬁgure 5.2 and a downstream majority can be discussed with respect
to ﬂood defense. For ﬂood defense measures with positive spillovers, such a retention
basins, centralization is not recommended if the upstream and downstream region are of
similar size and κ2 < 1. However, if the downstream region is much larger, centralization
may be the better federal setting. A large downstream region has the advantage that the
over-provision of the downstream public good is not quite as extreme as with regions of
the same size. In addition, with positive spillovers there is also ﬂood defense upstream,
what is the crucial diﬀerence to a upstream majority, which only provide ﬂood defense
in one region. With negative spillovers there is no upstream ﬂood defense. Centralized
provision with this supply pattern is desirable when negative spillovers, for example
from levees, are very strong and the downstream region is large in comparison to the
upstream region.
One can conclude that, with unidirectional spillovers, the population size of both re-
gions and the marginal public good beneﬁts inﬂuence if decentralization or centralization
is superior. In addition, it depends on the location of the majority, which federal setting
is superior. With an upstream majority decentralization is always superior to central-
4The minimum is calculated by ∂κ
crit
∂λ =
1
2 − 12λ2 = 0. ∂κ
crit
∂λ = 0 is given for λ = 1.
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ization. With a downstream majority diﬀerences in size improve the performance of
centralization and may make it better than decentralization. Diﬀerences in the marginal
public good beneﬁts improve the performance of decentralization.
5.2.3 Heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions, no spillovers
In many situations public good beneﬁts are not evenly distributed within a region. Some
individuals may have high and others low marginal beneﬁts. In recent political-economy
contributions to federalism, voting preferences are usually not assumed to be the same
for all individuals. However, the literature does not consider the case that the average
and the median voter diﬀer.5 Such a deviation is not unrealistic. In this model a
deviation of the mean and the average voter arises, if the share of individuals with high
beneﬁts is smaller than one, 0 < α < 1. Since heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions can
be the consequence of the geography of a region, the separation of a region into high
and low-beneﬁt citizens is possible. Flood defense is a good example of heterogeneous
beneﬁts, since the beneﬁts are concentrated on ﬂood-prone areas, whereas people outside
the ﬂood plain do not beneﬁt. This leads to the question if voters should be separated
into diﬀerent jurisdiction according to the distribution of beneﬁts.
To answer this question it is worthwhile to start by neglecting spillovers (κi = 0 for
i = 1, 2) and to focus on the role of α in public good provision. Under decentralization
the role of the high-beneﬁt share is not continuous but discrete. Assuming a population
size of one, the optimization problem is given by
gdsi = argmaxgi∈R+ λmi gi − g
2
i
2
for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (5.11)
The preference of the median voter is given by λmi ∈ {0, λi}. The public good will be
provided in quantity gi = λi, as long as α ∈ (0.5, 1], since the median beneﬁt parameter
is given by λi. When α ∈ [0, 0.5], the group of high-beneﬁt individuals is a minority
and the median voter will vote for gi = 0. In comparison to the socially optimal level of
the public good, g∗i = αλi, there is an over-provision of the public good as long as the
median voter has high-beneﬁts, and an under-provision when the median voter has no
beneﬁts from the public good. Over-provision of the public good is accompanied by a
cost-sharing spillover, which reduces the utility of individuals with no beneﬁts from the
public good.
With decentralized single issue authorities the population size of a jurisdiction that
provides the public good is α. If there are no spillovers, the optimization problem in a
decentralized single issue authority, which is denoted by the superscript `ds', is given by
gdsi = argmaxgi∈R+ λmi gi − g
2
i
2α
for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (5.12)
5An exception is Redoano and Scharf (2004). However, since high and low preferences are not tied
to the geography of a region, they do not analyze the implications of diﬀerent federal organizations
beyond the comparison of decentralization and centralization.
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Since all voters within a jurisdiction have the same voting preference, the median pref-
erence is λmi ∈ {λi} and the resulting amount of public good is given by
(gds1 , g
ds
2 ) = (αλ1, αλ2) . (5.13)
It is evident that this supply pattern is socially eﬃcient since there are no spillovers.
For heterogeneous beneﬁts within a region, α ∈ (0, 1), the supply pattern is not eﬃcient
under decentralization. The next proposition follows directly from this.
Proposition 5.2 Simple majority voting and α ∈ (0, 1) implies that decentralized sin-
gle issue authorities are the best federal organization if no inter-regional spillovers are
present.
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supply for partial centralization, denoted with the superscript c, p:
(gc,p1 , g
c,p
2 ) =

(κ2 2λ2, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 < 0
(0, λ2) for 1− α ≥ 12 .
(4.23)
In a similar the outcome of partial centralization with a central single issue authority is
given by
(gcs,p1 , g
cs,p
2 ) =

(2αλ1, αλ2) for a upstream majority
(κ22αλ2, α λ2) for a downstream majority and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, α λ2) for a downstream majority and κ2 < 0 .
(4.24)
With this public good provision the comparison of the four possible federal organization
yields to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6 Assume unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous populations. Assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold. The comparison of the four fed ral organizat ons decent alization, de-
centralized single issue authorities, partial centralization (centralized v ting on g1 and decen-
tralized voting on g2) and partial centralization through a single issue authority lead to the
following results:
With posi ive spillovers there is critical level of spillovers κcrit2 =
1
2 . Below this l vel
decent aliz d and a ove that level partially centralized voting leads to the highes surplu .
Single issue authorit es yield to th highest surplus unless the high preference share is large.
With negative spillovers decentralized single issue authorities are surplus superior with a
upstream majority. With a downstream majority there is a critical level of spillover κcrit2 =
−12 . For smaller spillovers level decentralized single issue authorities are surplus superior and
for lower spillovers a partial centralized single issue authority is the best federal organization.
(a)
(b)
Proves of the proposition are given in the appendix to this chapter. Figure 4.9 illustrates
proposition 4.6. Public good provision through partial centralization improves the outcome
of centralized voting and can be the best possibility of public good provision if spillovers are
large enough (positive or negative). This in in contrast to proposition 4.4, which stated that
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deviation from the Samuelson rule since this rule can be followed also for very inefficient locational
patterns.
Illustration of A1A2 ?...
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of public good provision with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1,
and x¯ = 1
The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for social optimal
provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers have a larger impact on the
the population size for both federal settings than for the social optimum, since the range between the
respective maximum and minimum upstream population size is larger.
Utility increases in spillovers. This characterizes the social optimum as well as decentralization
and centralization. There is only a very small deviation from the social optimum for centralization,
whereas decentralized public good provision falls short of the social optimum for positive spillovers,
particularly if they are large.
After this brief overview both federal organizations are described in more detail below. The
main drawback of decentralization is the low upstream supply with the public good when spillovers
are positive. This reflects the missing opportunity of downstream citizens to pay for the upstream
provision. With negative spillovers decentralized provision is close to the social optimum. Thus,
there is an asymmetry between positive and negative spillovers. Whereas it is very inefficient for the
upstream voters to increase the provision for positive spillovers, it is possible to decrease the supply
for negative spillover without accepting a large deviation from the social optimal utility level. For
very negative spillovers decentralized provision leads to a corner solution without upstream provision.
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are positive. This reflects the missing opportunity of downstream citizens to pay for the upstream
provision. With negative spillovers decentralized provision is close to the social optimum. Thus,
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
CHAPTER 5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 28
majority voting
Figure 5.3: Majority decision depending on the high-beneﬁt share, α. (a) socially opti-
mal surplus and surplus under majority decision, (b) surplus losses due to
majority decision.
The impact of the high-beneﬁt share on the public good surplus is demonstrated in ﬁgure
5.3a. It depicts socially opti l surplus (the upper curve) nd the surplus resulting from
majority voting (the lower curve). The socially optimal surpluswhich is the same than
surplus resulting from single issue authoritiesgradually increases in α. Under majority
voting the amount of the public good is zero as long as α ≤ 1
2
. Therefore the surplus is
also zero. With α > 1
2
the public good is rovided in quantity gi = λi, and the surplus
gradually increases in α. For α = 1, majority voting leads to the socially optimal surplus.
For a high-beneﬁt share close to 1
2
the welfare loss due to majority voting is the largest.
The closer α is to 1 or 0, the smaller the diﬀerence between the mean and the average
voter, and the smaller the surplus-loss due to majority voting (ﬁgure 5.3b). It is a special
feature of the utility function used here that there is a s mmetry of the welfare-loss due
to an over- and under-provision of the public good. Thus, a high-beneﬁt majority leads
to the same surplus than a no-beneﬁt majority if the the size of the majority population
is the same.
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One can conclude: if there is a deviation of the median and the mean voter due to
spatially heterogeneous beneﬁts within a region, the separation of a region into diﬀerent
jurisdictions is surplus improving. In the current setting and the example of ﬂood
defense, a separation can be achieved by the establishment of single issue authorities
in ﬂood-prone areas. In the absence of spillovers such a separation is clearly surplus
enhancing, if there are no costs of separation. As the next section shows, the argument
is less clear when spillovers are present.
5.2.4 Unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous regions
In a two region economy with unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts within
regions, it is not only the question of classical decentralization and centralization, but
also, if regions should be sub-divided. This leads to the additional federal organizations
of decentralized or centralized single issue authorities. As discussed in the previous
chapters, unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions are typical
for ﬂood defense. This section analyzes how the diﬀerent federal organizations provide
upstream and downstream ﬂood defense. The unidirectional spillover originates in the
upstream region 1 and is received by the downstream region 2, hence, κ1 = 0 and
κ2 ∈ [−1, 1]. To focus on heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions, the following assumption
will be made.
Assumption 5.2 The public good beneﬁt parameter is the same in both regions, thus
λi = λj.
Public good supply
Under classical decentralization the objective function of the median voter is similar
to the case of asymmetrical spillovers, see equation 5.5. With heterogeneous beneﬁts,
there can be a majority or minority of high-beneﬁt voters within each region. With the
median voting preference of λmi ∈ {0, λi}, the supply pattern of public goods is given
by
(gd1 , g
d
2) = (λm1, λm2) =
 (λ1, λ2) for α > 12(0, 0) for 1− α ≥ 1
2
.
(5.14)
If the majority of voters lives in the ﬂood plain, the ﬂood protection level is high, and
if the majority of voters lives outside the ﬂood plain there is no ﬂood defense.
For classical centralization the optimization problems for high-beneﬁt voters is given
by equation 5.7. However, there is an additional potential median beneﬁt parameter,
hence λm ∈ {0, λi, λj}. With heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions, there are now
three group of voters with diﬀerent interests. There are the high-beneﬁt groups in the
upstream and the downstream region. In addition, there is a third groupliving outside
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the ﬂood plainwithout beneﬁts from public goods. Each group of voters has its own
ideal allocation. With the assumption of sequential majority voting, the public good
speciﬁc median preference determines the amount of the public good and voting cycles
are avoided. With the same population size in both regions and assumption 5.2, this
yields the following supply pattern
(gc1, g
c
2) =

(κ2 2λ2, 0) for α > 12 and κ ∈ (0, 1] ≥ 0
(0, 0) for α > 1
2
and κ ∈ [−1, 0]
(0, 0) for 1− α ≥ 1
2
and κ ∈ [−1, 1] .
(5.15)
With the respective optimization problems, the second-order suﬃcient conditions are met
and the given solutions lead to the unique absolute maxima. There may be a positive
level of upstream public good provision depending on the majorities. Independent of the
majorities, there is no upstream supply when spillovers are negative, because only the
group of upstream voters with high beneﬁts have an interest in it. However, since both
regions have the same population size, this group of voters has no majority on its own.
There is no public good provision downstream, because neither the no-beneﬁt group nor
the upstream high-beneﬁt group has an interest in it.
If the assumptions of the same population size and the same high-beneﬁt parameter
in both regions were relaxed, there could be additional patterns of public good supply.
Diﬀerences in the population size of the regions make it possible that a high-beneﬁt
majority from one region determines public good supply in both regions. If the high-
beneﬁt parameter is not the same in both regions and there is no single group majority,
the median voter in both votes may come from the same region, if spillovers are large
enough. However, to keep the model from becoming too complex these cases are omitted.
The optimization problem of voters in a decentralized high-beneﬁt single issue au-
thority yield:
gdsi = argmaxgi∈R+ λmi(gi + κjgj)− g
2
i
2α
i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (5.16)
With λmi ∈ {λi}, the solution is
(gds1 , g
ds
2 ) = (αλm1, α λm2) = (αλ1, α λ2) . (5.17)
It is evident that decentralized single issue authorities do not take spillovers to other
regions into account, since their optimization problems are similar to decentralized ju-
risdictions with homogeneous beneﬁts.
A centralized single issue authority is very similar to a centralized jurisdiction with
homogeneous beneﬁts within regions. With α = 1 it would be the same in fact. Denoting
the allocation resulting from a centralized single issue authority with the superscript `cs',
the optimal public good provision from the point of view of the median voter is given
by
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gcsi = argmaxgi∈R+
 λm(gi + κi gj)−
g2i+g
2
j
4α
median voter region i
λm(gj + κj gi)− g
2
i+g
2
j
4α
median voter region j
for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j .
(5.18)
Depending on the majority, the median public good beneﬁt parameter is given by
λm ∈ {λi, λj}. With very small size diﬀerences between regions (assumption 5.1) and
unidirectional spillovers, public good supply is
(gcs1 , g
cs
2 ) =

(2αλ1, 0) upstream majority
(κ22αλ2, 2αλ2) downstream majority and κ2 > 0
(0, 2αλ2) downstream majority and κ2 ≤ 0 .
(5.19)
A centralized single issue authority comprises two groups, the high-beneﬁt citizens of
the upstream and downstream regions. With an upstream majority there is no public
good provision downstream. With a downstream majority the upstream public good is
provided if spillovers are positive.
Comparison of federal settings
Inserting the public good allocations into aggregated public good surplus allows the
comparison of the diﬀerent federal organizations. Aggregated surplus for each federal
organization and the critical values of spillovers are derived in the appendix to this
chapter. In addition, the appendix speciﬁes the parameter constellations where one
federal organization is superior to all other federal organizations. The comparison of the
federal settings yields the next proposition.
Proposition 5.3 Assume simple majority voting, unidirectional spillovers and hetero-
geneous populations. Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 hold.
For α ∈ (0, 1) neither classical centralization nor a centralized single issue authority
is ever surplus superior to decentralized jurisdictions. For a positive spillover received
by region 2, there is a critical value of the spillover which depends on the high-beneﬁt
share, κcrit2(α) = 1−α
α
. For large high-beneﬁt shares and a large spillover, classical decen-
tralization is superior to decentralized single issue authorities. For all other parameter
constellations the opposite holds. If the spillover is complete and the high-beneﬁt share
is one, all jurisdictional organizations produce the same surplus.
Figure 5.4 illustrates proposition 5.3. It is apparent that any form of centralization is
inferior to decentralized jurisdictions. A centralized single issue authority is not superior
to decentralized single issue authorities for the same reasons as stated in proposition
5.1. Unidirectional spillover and centralized decision making is very ineﬃcient with an
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alpha
k2
k
crit4
surplus advantage for
classical decentralization
surplus advantage for a
decentralized single issue
authority
Figure 5.4: Federal organizations with unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous ben-
eﬁts within regions
upstream majority, since there is no ﬂood defense downstream. With a downstream
majority, there is an extreme over-provision downstream, which makes a centralized
single issue jurisdiction inferior to decentralized ones.
The comparison between classical centralization and decentralization is less clear.
With a positive spillover, classical centralization can be superior to decentralization, but
only for a high-beneﬁt share that barely exceeds 1
2
. Even though the no-beneﬁt minority
is exploited under classical centralization, public good provision is not excessively large
because it depends on the (unidirectional) spillover. If this spillover is not too large,
there is a moderate level of upstream ﬂood defense and no ﬂood defense downstream. For
larger high-beneﬁt shares and a large spillover, classical centralization is not superior to
classical decentralization because the former provides ﬂood defense only in the upstream
region.
Complete decentralization is superior to all other jurisdictional organizations, if there
is only a minority of voters living in the ﬂood plain (a minority of high-beneﬁt voters)
or if the spillover is negative. For positive spillovers and a majority of individuals living
in the ﬂood plain, classical decentralization can be superior to decentralized single issue
authorities. The reason is that under decentralization the cost-sharing spillover drives
the amount of ﬂood defense up. Therefore classical decentralization is eﬃcient because it
exploits the no-beneﬁt minority outside the ﬂood plain and not because it internalizes the
inter-regional spillovers. The co-ﬁnancing of ﬂood defense by citizens outside the ﬂood
plain only has a positive surplus eﬀect when spillovers are positive. Hence, with negative
spillovers, heterogeneous beneﬁts within a jurisdiction are undesirable and decentralized
single issue authorities are superior to classical decentralization.
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5.3 Extensions: central standards and partial
centralization
The preceding analyses showed for unidirectional spillovers that centralized jurisdictions
may not lead to better results than decentralized jurisdictions. This result was found for
homogeneous beneﬁts within regions, but also for heterogeneous beneﬁts with the option
of single issue authorities. Of course, one could now consider the implications of diﬀerent
population sizes of regions and also of region-speciﬁc high-beneﬁt shares or region-speciﬁc
marginal beneﬁts. As seen in the preceding sections, such asymmetries can strengthen
the case for centralization. One example were diﬀerences in the population size of
regions. However, it is evident that unidirectional spillovers can challenge the federal
organization. This raises the question if there are better organizations of regions into
jurisdictions or if other mechanisms can foster better outcomes.
The following analyses will concentrate on two potential ways to improve public good
provision under centralization. The ﬁrst one is a uniformity restriction on centralized
supply of public goods. Such a restriction is seen by Oates (1972) as crucial for cen-
tralization. With a uniformity restriction, a benevolent central government is not able
to provide the public good eﬃciently because it cannot diﬀerentiate the public good
level according to local preferences. An example of a uniformity restrictionwhich are
common in many policy ﬁeldsis a common ambient air quality standard in a coun-
try. Besley and Coate (2003) ﬁnd the uniformity restriction not very plausible for a
welfare maximizing central government and follow a political-economy approach where
region speciﬁc levels of public good provision is allowed. However, voting on public good
provision does not exclude a uniformity restriction, so that it is worthwhile to consider
the consequences of such an approach for unidirectional spillovers. A formal analysis
uniformity restrictions is given below.
A second potential way to improve the outcome of a central jurisdiction is the partial
centralization of public good provision. It would be possible to provide the upstream
public good in a centralized jurisdiction and the downstream public good decentralized.
Partial centralization, through a single issue authority, leads to a central jurisdiction
which is a single issue authority in the true sense of the word, since it is responsible for a
single public good only. Also for partial centralization, a formal analysis is given below.
Central standards
A uniformity restriction can be seen as a central standard with regard to public good
provision. Since spillovers are present, such a standard can refer to public good supply
or to the consumption of the public good. With regard to ﬂood protection it seems
natural to interpret a common standard as a certain level of ﬂood protection, which is a
uniform consumption quantity of the public good. However, it is also possible to require a
certain spending on ﬂood protection that might result in diﬀerent ﬂood protection levels
upstream and downstream. The recent ﬂood protection act in Germany introduced a
federal ﬂood protection level for the whole of Germany (see section 3.1). This can be
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seen as uniform consumption requirement for ﬂood protection. In addition, the Flood
Protection Act also has an element of uniform supply, since the Q100-ﬂood-outline is
now legally protected as a ﬂood basin along the whole river. The protection of the
Q100-ﬂood-outline provides room for water retention.6
For the following analyses both forms of standards are sequentially considered, which
leads to new comparisons of the four federal organizations.
Standards regulate centralized decision making. With a uniform upstream and down-
stream public good supply, public good levels must be the same, g1 = g2 = g in both
regions. The same consumption level implies that the optimization problems of the me-
dian voter is restricted by g1 = g2 +κ2g1. In the following analyses assumptions 5.1 and
5.2 apply: marginal public good beneﬁts are the same upstream, and downstream and
regions are of similar size.
For classical centralization, the optimization problems with the two uniformity restric-
tions are given below, where the superscript `c, us' and `c, uc' refer to centralization with
uniform public good supply and with uniform public good consumption, respectively.
With a uniform restriction, the optimization problems reduce to a one-dimensional vot-
ing problem.7
gc,us = argmaxg∈R+
 λm g −
2 g2
4
up. median voter
λm(g + κ2 g)− 2 g24 do. median voter
gc,uc2 = argmaxg2∈R+
 λm
g2
1−κ2 −
(
g2
1−κ2 )
2+ g22
4
up. median
λm(g2 + κ2
g2
1−κ2 )−
(
g2
1−κ2 )
2+ g22
4
do. median.
(5.20)
For interior solutions the optimization problems lead to unique absolute maxima, since
the second-order suﬃcient conditions are met and utility is concave in public goods.
Corner solutions do not occur for spillovers that are restricted to the interval κ2 ∈ (−1, 1).
With λm ∈ {0, λi, λj} and depending on the majority constellation the optimization
problems lead to:
(gc,us1 , g
c,us
2 ) =

(λ1, λ1) for α > 12 and κ2 ≥ 0
(λ2(1 + κ2), λ2(1 + κ2)) for α > 12 and κ2 < 0
(0, 0) for 1− α ≥ 1
2
(gc,uc1 , g
c,uc
2 ) =

(λi
2
2−(2−κ2)κ2 , λi
2(1−κ2)
2−(2−κ2)κ2 ) for α >
1
2
and
λi = min{λ1, λ2}
(0, 0) for 1− α ≥ 1
2
.
(5.21)
6Note, however, that the central standards of the Flood Protection Act do not represent a total regime
change to centralization in ﬂood defense, since the ﬁnancing is still left to decentral jurisdictions.
The concluding chapter 8 will discuss the implications of this arrangement.
7With uniform consumption g1 = g2 + κ2g1 implies g1 = g21−κ2 .
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If spillovers are positive and the uniform supply restriction holds, there is no diﬀerence
between centralized or decentralized public good provision. For negative spillovers, the
median voting preference is the downstream preference and negative spillovers are taken
into account. With uniform consumption, the most preferred allocation is the same for
upstream and downstream high-beneﬁt citizens. This is the case despite the fact that
the objective functions of upstream and downstream citizens are diﬀerent.
In a centralized single issue authority, the optimization problems of the median voter
from the majority region i, for uniform supply and uniform public good consumption,
are as follows:
gcs,us = argmaxg∈R+
 λm g −
2 g2
4α
up. median voter
λm(g + κ2 g)− 2 g24α do. median voter
gcs,uc2 = argmaxg2∈R+
 λm
g2
1−κ2 −
(
g2
1−κ2 )
2+ g22
4α
up. median.
λm(g2 + κ2
g2
1−κ2 )−
(
g2
1−κ2 )
2+ g22
4α
do. median.
(5.22)
For interior solutions the optimization problems lead to unique absolute maxima, since
the second-order suﬃcient conditions are met and utility is concave in public goods.
Corner solutions do not occur for spillovers that are restricted to the interval κ2 ∈ (−1, 1).
With λm ∈ {λi, λj} the optimal levels of public good supply are
(gcs,us1 , g
cs,us
2 ) =
 (αλ1, αλ1) up. majority(αλ2(1 + κ2), α λ2(1 + κ2)) do. majority
(gcs,uc1 , g
cs,uc
2 ) =
{
(λi
2α
2−(2−κ2)κ2 , λi
2α (1−κ2)
2−(2−κ2)κ2 ) region i majority.
(5.23)
A centralized single issue authority always provides a positive level of public goods, unless
there is a complete negative spillover. With a uniform supply, public good provision
depends on the majority region. An upstream majority provides the same quantity as
decentralized single issue authorities. A downstream majority provides more if spillovers
are positive, and less if they are negative. With a uniform consumption restriction, public
good provision does not depend on the location of the majority, as both high-beneﬁt
groups prefer the same allocation, given the assumption that they have the same beneﬁt
parameter.
Proposition 5.4 Assume simple majority voting, unidirectional spillovers and hetero-
geneous populations. Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 hold. If centralized public good provision
is restricted to uniform supply or uniform consumption of the public good, the best fed-
eral organization is either a centralized single issue authority with uniform public good
consumption or classical decentralization.
A centralized single issue authority with uniform public good consumption leads to the
same surplus as classical decentralization for αcrit = 1
4
(4+κ32+κ2(−2±
√
κ2(8− 4κ2 + κ32)− 4)).
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k2
alpha
surplus advantage for
classical decentralization
surplus advantage for a
centralized single issue
authority with uniform
consumption
Figure 5.5: Surplus optimal federal organizations with unidirectional spillovers, hetero-
geneous beneﬁts within regions, and uniformity restrictions
Figure 5.5 illustrates proposition 5.4. All critical parameter constellations where two
diﬀerent federal organizations yield the same public good surplus are given in the ap-
pendix to this chapter. In addition, the appendix speciﬁes the parameter constellations
where one federal organization is superior to all other federal organizations. With the
same level of public good consumption in both regions, a centralized single issue author-
ity is superior for almost all high-beneﬁt shares and spillover levels. Only for very large
spillovers and a high-beneﬁt majority, classical decentralization yields a higher surplus.
The comparison of the diﬀerent possible federal organizations is a bit tedious and the
details are left to the appendix to this chapter. However, it is illuminating to compare
public good provision under the diﬀerent federal settings in order to see the sources of
ineﬃciencies. This is done in ﬁgure 5.6, which also shows the optimal supply levels of
public goods.
Figure 5.6 shows public good provision in centralized jurisdictions for an upstream
and a downstream majority and a high-beneﬁt majority, α > 1
2
. For each form of
centralization it shows public good provision without any uniformity restrictions and
with uniform public good supply and uniform consumption.
Figure 5.6 shows how ineﬃcient public good supply tends to be without any uniformity
restrictions (the bold dotted lines). Under classical centralization there is no public good
provision downstream and also no provision upstream if spillovers are negative. For
positive spillovers there is an over-provision if the spillover is large. A centralized single
issue authority either over-provides the upstream public good and under-provides the
downstream public good (with an upstream majority) or vice versa (with a downstream
majority).
With uniform supply of the public good, an upstream majority provides the public
good independently of spillovers. A centralized single issue authority is eﬃcient for
downstream public good supply, but ineﬃcient for the upstream public good, since
spillovers are not taken into account. The opposite holds with a downstream majority,
since it provides the public good eﬃciently upstream, but over- or under-provides the
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Figure 5.6: Centralized public good provision with and without uniformity restrictions
for α = 0.7 and λ1 = λ2 = 1. The non-linear curves result from the uniform
public good consumption restriction.
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downstream public good.
With uniform public good consumption (represented by the non-linear curves) this
dilemma can be avoided. With this restriction, upstream and downstream high-beneﬁt
citizens want the same pattern of public good supply, which is also fairly eﬃcient as long
as spillovers are not too large. A centralized single issue authority tends to provide the
public goods more eﬃciently than classical centralization, because it avoids the problem
of over-provision due to heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions. Uniform consumption of
the public goods becomes ineﬃcient if the spillover is very positive.
With large positive spillovers, the socially optimal public good supply is large up-
stream and at a constant level downstream. Uniform consumption requires a low down-
stream public good supply when spillovers are high. However, such a low level of the
downstream public good is ineﬃcient. This is why proposition 5.4 suggests classical
decentralization, instead of a centralized single issue authority, as the superior federal
organization when there are large positive spillovers.
Partial centralization
Figure 5.6 shows that part of the problem of centralized decision making stems from
ineﬃcient downstream public good provision. Downstream public good provision is,
however, a purely local public good and therefore the second strategy to improve the
performance of centralization is to decentralize downstream public good provision and
to centralize the upstream supply.
With classical centralization this reduces the centralized voting problem to one is-
sue. Voting on upstream public good provision takes place in the same way as above.
Downstream public good provision is determined decentrally, which yields the following
public good supply for partial centralization, denoted with the superscript `c, p':
(gc,p1 , g
c,p
2 ) =

(κ2 2λ2, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 < 0
(0, λ2) for 1− α ≥ 12 .
(5.24)
In a similar way, the outcome of partial centralization with a central single issue
authority is given by
(gcs,p1 , g
cs,p
2 ) =

(2αλ1, αλ2) for an upstream majority
(κ22αλ2, α λ2) for a down. majority and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, α λ2) for a down. majority and κ2 < 0 .
(5.25)
With this public good provision the comparison of the four possible federal organiza-
tions yields the following proposition.
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Proposition 5.5 Assume simple majority voting, unidirectional spillovers and regions
with heterogeneous beneﬁts. Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 hold. The comparison of the four
federal organizationsclassical decentralization, decentralized single issue authorities,
partial centralization (centralized voting on g1 and decentralized voting on g2), and partial
centralization through a single issue authorityleads to the following results:
With positive spillovers there is a critical level of spillovers, κcrit2 =
1
2
. Below this
level, decentralized and above this level, partially centralized voting leads to the highest
surplus. Single issue authorities yield the highest surplus unless the high-beneﬁt share is
large. For a partially centralized single issue authority to be superior, it must hold that
α < αcrit(κ2) =
1+κ22
1+κ2
. For decentralized single issue authorities to be superior, it must
hold that α < αcrit(κ2) = 11+κ .
With negative spillovers, decentralized single issue authorities are superior with an
upstream majority. With a downstream majority there is a critical level of spillovers,
κcrit2 = −12 . For larger spillovers, decentralized single issue authorities are superior,
and for lower spillovers a partial centralized single issue authority is the best federal
organization.
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supply for partial centralization, denoted with the superscript c, p:
(gc,p1 , g
c,p
2 ) =

(κ2 2λ2, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 < 0
(0, λ2) for 1− α ≥ 12 .
(4.23)
In a similar the outcome of partial centralization with a central single issue authority is
given by
(gcs,p1 , g
cs,p
2 ) =

(2αλ1, αλ2) for a upstream majority
(κ22αλ2, α λ2) for a downstream majority and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, α λ2) for a downstream majority and κ2 < 0 .
(4.24)
With this public good provision the comparison of the four possible federal organization
yields to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6 Assume unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous populations. Assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold. The comparis n of the four federal organizations decentralization, de-
centralized single issue authorities, partial centralization (centralized voting on g1 and decen-
tral zed vot ng on g2) and partial centralization through a single issue authority l ad to the
following results:
With positive spillovers there is a critical level f spill vers κcrit2 =
1
2 . Below this level
decentralized and above that level partially centralized voting leads to the highest surplus.
Single issue authorities yield to the highest surplus unless the high preference share is large.
With negative spillovers decentralized single issue authorities are surplus superior with a
upstream majority. With a downstream majority there is a critical level of spillover κcrit2 =
−12 . For smaller spillovers level decentralized single issue a thorities are surplus superior and
for lower spillovers a partial centralized single issue authority is the best federal organization.
(a)
(b)
Proves of the proposition are given in the appendix to this chapter. Figure 4.9 illustrates
proposition 4.6. Public good provision through partial centralization improves the outcome
of centralized voting and can be the best possibility of public good provision if spillovers are
large enough (positive or negative). This in in contrast to proposition 4.4, which stated that
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supply for partial centralization, denoted with the superscript c, p:
(gc,p1 , g
c,p
2 ) =

(κ2 2λ2, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, λ2) for α > 12 and κ2 < 0
(0, λ2) for 1− α ≥ 12 .
(4.23)
In a similar the outcome of partial centralization with a central single issue authority is
given by
(gcs,p1 , g
cs,p
2 ) =

(2αλ1, αλ2) for a upstream majority
(κ22αλ2, α λ2) for a downstream majority and κ2 ≥ 0
(0, α λ2) for a downstream majority and κ2 < 0 .
(4.24)
With this public good provision the comparison of the four possible federal organization
yields to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6 Assume unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous populations. Assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold. The comparison of the four federal organizations decentralization, de-
centralized single issue authorities, partial centralization (centralized voting on g1 and decen-
tralized voting on g2) and pa tial centralization through a single issue authority lead to the
following results:
With positive spillovers there is a critical level of spillovers κcrit2 =
1
2 . Below this level
decentralized and above hat level partially centralized voting leads to the highest surplus.
Single issue authorities yield to the highest surplus unless the high preference share is large.
With egative spillovers decentralized single issue authorities are surplus superior with a
upstream majority. With a downstream majority there is a critical level of spillover κcrit2 =
−12 . For smaller spillovers level decentralized single issue authorities are surplus superior and
for lower spillovers a partial centralized single issue authority is the best federal organization.
(a)
(b)
Proves of the proposition are given in the appendix to this chapter. Figure 4.9 illustrates
proposition 4.6. Public good provision through partial centralization improves the outcome
of centralized voting and can be the best possibility of public good provision if spillovers are
large enough (positive or negative). This in in contrast to proposition 4.4, which stated thatalpha
k2 k2
alpha
surplus advantage
for classical
decentralization
surplus advantage for
a decentralized single
issue authority
surplus advantage
for classical
centralization
surplus advantage for a
centralized single issue
authority
surplus advantage for
decentralization
surplus advantage for
a decentralized single
issue authority
surplus advantage for
centralization
surplus advantage for a
centralized single issue
authority
Figure 5.7: Surplus optimal federal organizations with partial centralized voting and
unidirectional spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts within regions. (a) up-
stream majority, (b) downstream majority.
All critical parameter constellations for which two diﬀerent federal organizations yield
the same public good surplus are given in the appendix to this chapter. In addition,
the appendix speciﬁes the parameter constellations where one federal organization is
superior to all other federal organizations. Figure 5.7 illustrates proposition 5.5. Public
good provision through partial centralization improves the outcome of centralized voting
and can be the best option for public good provision if spillovers are large enough
(positive or negative). This is in contrast to proposition 5.3, which stated that centralized
voting on public good provision is never superior to decentralized voting. Single issue
authorities are the best federal organization unless the high-beneﬁt share is large and
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the no-beneﬁt minority is fairly small. With this constellation in combination with
positive spillovers, classical federal organizations yield a higher surplus than single issue
authorities. The exploitation of the minority brings the supply of public goods closer to
the social optimum than voting in single issue authorities.
Proposition 5.5 also states that with negative spillovers it depends on the political
majority constellations if centralized or decentralized voting is superior. A downstream
majority votes for no upstream public good, which is good if spillovers are very negative.
A upstream majority favors a high upstream public good level, which is very ineﬃcient.
As in the previous propositions that assumed unidirectional spillovers, heterogeneous
beneﬁts within a jurisdiction have no positive eﬀect when spillovers are negative. A
minority without public good beneﬁts has no positive eﬀect, since it increases public
good provision. Heterogeneous beneﬁts in decentralized jurisdictions increase public
good provision, which makes classical decentralization ineﬃcient when spillovers are
negative. With a high-beneﬁt minority and negative spillovers, there is no public good
provision in a decentralized or partially centralized jurisdiction. However, there are single
issue authorities that provide the public good and lead to a positive surplus compared
to a zero surplus without public good provision.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter analyzed diﬀerent jurisdictional organizations of public good provision. In
search of a good federal organization for ﬂood defense, the ﬁrst aim was to understand
the diﬃculties arising from unidirectional spillovers and spatially heterogeneous public
good beneﬁts. A political-economy approach, with voting on public good provision, was
found suitable to analyze the fundamental conﬂict of interests between upstream and
downstream riparians as well as the spatial heterogeneity of beneﬁts.
In contrast to a common view in the literature on upstream-downstream water is-
sues, it was found that not only the international level but also a federal system within
a country may be seriously challenged by unidirectional spillovers. As on the inter-
national level, decentralized jurisdictions neglect transfrontier spillovers and over- or
under-provide the public goods. Centralized jurisdictions suﬀer from the dominance of
the majority. Unlike the ﬁrst conjecture, it is not so much the upstream public good
that is ﬂawed with centralized voting, but primarily the downstream public good that
causes large ineﬃciencies. The downstream public good is either extremely over- or
under-provided.
Ineﬃciencies resulting from an uneven distribution of beneﬁts may call for single is-
sue authorities. Ineﬃciencies in classical jurisdictions are particularly large when the
majority and the minority group of a population are of similar size. But also a small
minority causes ineﬃciencies when spillovers are absent. If spillovers are present, single
issue authorities are not the general recommendation. The ﬁrst case where jurisdictions
with heterogeneous beneﬁts are good is a small minority without beneﬁts from public
good provision and large positive spillovers. The no-beneﬁt minority drives public good
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provision up, which is good, given the positive spillovers. The second case where het-
erogeneous beneﬁts are good is a negative spillover and a high-beneﬁt minority. With
this constellation there is no public good provision, which is particularly good if there
are large negative spillovers.
It was a second aim of this chapter to identify jurisdictional organizations that avoid
the shortcomings of the four basic federal settings. Central standards that require a uni-
form supply or a uniform consumption level of public goods where found to have very
diﬀerent consequences. Whereas uniform public good supply does not make central-
ized voting superior to decentralized voting, given unidirectional spillovers, a uniform
consumption requirement can make centralized jurisdictions superior to decentralized
ones.
Instead of relying on an exogenous uniformity restriction for centralized voting, cen-
tralization can be improved by focusing on the public good with spillovers. Since the
downstream public good is purely local, partial centralization through centralized voting
on upstream public good provision only makes central jurisdictions superior to decen-
tralized jurisdictions if spillovers are large enough. However, with negative spillovers
partially centralized voting is favorable, whether or not depends crucially on which re-
gion has the majority. This is because an upstream majority prefers an ineﬃciently high
level of public good provision, whereas a downstream majority favors no supply, which
is more eﬃcient.
The analyses assumed linear utility in public goods. This was an easy way to consider
positive as well as negative spillovers. With non-linear utility in public goods, the
analysis becomes more complex, as the reaction functions in a decentralized setting
may no longer imply dominant strategies. Crémer and Palfrey (2003) analyze such a
decentralized setting with concave utility and positive spillovers and ﬁnd that voting
preferences depend on spillovers and that they may not be single peaked if a central
standard is introduced.
In analyzing diﬀerent federal organizations, this chapter focused on the aggregated
public good surplus of the economy. As it became apparent, voting on public good
provision determines not only the allocation of resources, but also has distributional
implications. Since the median voter belonging to the majority (or median preference)
group always maximizes his own utility, this may lead to very unevenly distributed
beneﬁts across regions. With such diﬀerences the preceding analysis may not be very
accurate since individuals may have the option of relocation. This possibility will be
considered in the next chapter.
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5.5 Appendix
To proposition 5.3
Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, κ1 = 0, and κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] hold in proposition 5.3. To distinguish
between the diﬀerent majority constellations, ni denotes the population size of region i.
Surplus for decentralized single issue authorities
Sds = α2λ21
1
2
+ α2λ22
1
2
+ α2κ2λ1λ2 . (5.26)
Surplus for decentralization
Sd =
{
(2α− 1)λ21 12 + (2α− 1)λ22 12 + ακ2λ1λ2 for α > 12
0 for α ≤ 1
2
.
(5.27)
Surplus for centralization
Sc =
{
2λ22κ
2
2 (α − 1) + 2αλ1 λ2 κ2 for κ2 > 0
0 for κ2 ≤ 0 or α ≤ 12 .
(5.28)
Surplus for a centralized single issue authority and median-voters from region 1 (n1 > n2)
or region 2 (n1 < n2)
Scs =

2κ2 α2λ2 λ1 for n1 > n2
2κ2 α2λ2 λ1 for n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
0 for n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0 .
(5.29)
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Comparing the public good surplus of the diﬀerent federal organizations for the para-
meter range κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1) leads to
Sds = Sd ⇔ κcrit212 = κcrit22 = 1−αα α > 12
κcrit222 = −1 α ≤ 12
Sds = Sc ⇔ not possible κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit222 κ2 < 0
Sds = Scs ⇔ κcrit232 = 1 κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit222 n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
not possible n1 > n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
Sd = Sc ⇔ κcrit242 = α±
√
8−24α+17α2
4(1−α) α >
1
2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit252 =
1−2α
α α >
1
2 ∧ κ2 < 0
∀κ2 α ≤ 12
Sd = Scs ⇔ κcrit262 = 1α α > 12 ∧ n1 > n2
κcrit262 α >
1
2 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit252 α >
1
2 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
κcrit272 = 0 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 > n2
κcrit272 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
∀κ2 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
Sc = Scs ⇔ κcrit282 = α α > 12 ∧ κ2 > 0
∀κ2 α > 12 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≤ 0
κcrit272 α >
1
2 ∧ n1 > n2 ∧ κ2 ≤ 0
κcrit272 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 > n2
κcrit272 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
∀κ2 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0 .
(5.30)
Sds is superior to Sd, Sc and Scs if
α > 1
2
∧ κ2(α) < κcrit212 (α) . (5.31)
Sd is superior to Sds, Sc and Scs if
α > 1
2
∧ κ2(α) > κcrit212 (α) . (5.32)
To proposition 5.4
Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, and κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] hold in proposition 5.4. Public good surplusses
for decentralized jurisdictions are the same as for proposition 5.3. Denoting the identical
high beneﬁts of both regions with λα, public good surplus for centralization with uniform
public good supply and uniform public good consumption is given by
Surplus for centralization:
Sc,us =

λ2α(2α− 1 + ακ2) with α > 12 and κ2 ≥ 0
λ2α(1 + κ2)(2α− 1− (1− α)κ2) with α > 12 and κ2 < 0
0 with α ≤ 1
2
.
(5.33)
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Sc,uc =
{
2 (2α−1)λ2α
2−(2−κ2)κ2 with α >
1
2
0 with α ≤ 1
2
.
(5.34)
Surplus for a centralized single issue authority:
Scs,us = α2λ2α(1 + κ2) (5.35)
Scs,uc =
2α2λ2α
2− (2− κ2)κ2 . (5.36)
Comparing the public good surplus of the diﬀerent federal organizations for the para-
meter range κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1) leads to
Sds = Sd ⇔ αcrit31 = 11+κ2 α > 12
not possible α ≤ 12 ∧ −1 < κ2 ≤ 1
∀α α ≤ 12 ∧ κ2 = −1
Sds = Sc,us ⇔ αcrit32 = 11+κ2 α > 12 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
αcrit33 = 1 + κ2 α > 12 ∧ κ2 < 0
not possible α ≤ 12
Sds = Sc,uc ⇔ αcrit34 = 1
1±
r
κ22−κ32
2
α > 12
not possible α ≤ 12
Sds = Scs,us ⇔ ∀ (κ2, α)
Sds = Scs,uc ⇔ not possible −1≤κ2<0∨ 0<κ2<1
∀α κ2 = 0 ∨ κ2 = 1
Sd = Sc,us ⇔ ∀ (κ2, α) α > 12 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
not possible α > 12 ∧ κ2 < 0
∀ (κ2, α) α ≤ 12
Sd = Sc,uc ⇔ αcrit35 = 2−κ2
2−κ22
α > 12 ∧ κ2 > 0
∀α α > 12 ∧ κ2 = 0
∀ (κ2, α) α ≤ 12
Sd = Scs,us ⇔ Sd = Sds
Sd = Scs,uc ⇔ αcrit36 = 1
4
(4+κ32+κ2(−2±√
κ2(8−4κ2+κ32)−4 )) α > 12
not possible α ≤ 12
Sc,us = Scs,us ⇔ Sc,us = Sds
Sc,uc = Scs,us ⇔ Sc,uc = Sds
Sc,uc = Scs,uc ⇔ not possible.
(5.37)
Sds is superior to Sd, Sc,us, Sc,uc, Scs,us and Scs,uc if
κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] ∧ α(κ2) < αcrit36−(κ2) ∨ α(κ2) > αcrit36+(κ2). (5.38)
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Scs,uc is superior to Sds, Sd, Sc,us, Sc,uc, and Scs,us if
κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] ∧ αcrit56−(κ2) < α(κ2) < αcrit56+(κ2), (5.39)
where αcrit36+(κ2) denotes the branch with the positive square root of αcrit36(κ2).
With the critical parameter values of α and κ2 derived above, Sd, Sc,us, Sc,uc, and
Scs,us never lead to the highest public good surplus in comparison to the other federal
organizations.
To proposition 5.5
Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, and κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] hold in the proposition. Public good surplus for
decentralized jurisdictions are the same as for proposition 5.3. Denoting the identical
high beneﬁts of both regions with λα, the outcome for partially centralized jurisdictions
is given by
Surplus for partial centralization:
Sc,p =

1
2
λ2α(2α− 1 + 4κ2(α− (1− α)κ2)) with κ2 ≥ 0 and α > 12
1
2
(2α− 1)λ2α with κ2 < 0 and α > 12
0 with α ≤ 1
2
.
(5.40)
Surplus for a partially centralized single issue authority and the median-voter from region
1 (n1 > n2) or region 2 (n1 < n2):
Scs,p =

1
2 α
2λ2α(1 + 4κ2) n1 > n2
1
2 α
2λ2α(1 + 4κ2) n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
α2λ2α
2 n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0.
(5.41)
Comparing the public good surplus of the diﬀerent federal organizations for the para-
meter range κ2 ∈ [−1, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1) leads to
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Sds = Sd ⇔ κcrit412 = 1−αα α > 12
κcrit422 = −1 α ≤ 12
Sds = Sc,p ⇔ κcrit432 = α(2−α)4(1−α)±√
−4+α(12−α(2−α)(6+α))
4(1−α) α >
1
2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit442 =
2α−2α2−1
2α2
α > 12 ∧ κ2 < 0
κ2 = κcrit422 α ≤ 12
Sds = Scs,p ⇔ κcrit452 = 12 κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit462 = −12 n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
not possible n1 > n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
Sd = Sc,p ⇔ κcrit47;482 = 12−2α − 1 and 12 α > 12 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit492 =
1
2α − 1 α > 12 ∧ κ2 < 0
∀κ2 α ≤ 12
Sd = Scs,p ⇔ κcrit4102 = 2−4α+α
2
2α−4α2 α >
1
2 ∧ n1 > n2
κ2 = κcrit4102 α >
1
2 ∧
n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit4112 =
2−4α+α2
2α α >
1
2∧
n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 < 0
κcrit4122 = −14 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 > n2
not possible α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 < n2
Sc,p = Scs,p ⇔ κcrit4132 = α±
√
α2+α−1
2 α >
1
2 ∧ κ2 ≥ 0
κcrit4142 = − (1−α)
2
4α2
α > 12 ∧
n1 > n2 ∧ κ2 ≤ 0
not possible α > 12 ∧
n1 < n2 ∧ κ2 ≤ 0
κ2 = κcrit4122 α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 > n2
not possible α ≤ 12 ∧ n1 < n2 .
(5.42)
With regard to proposition 5.5 it holds that αcrit = 1
1+κ2
⇔ κcrit412 = 1−αα and αcrit =
1+κ22
1+κ2
⇔ κcrit4132 = α±
√
α2+α−1
2
.
Sds is superior to Sd, Sc,p and Scs,p if
α ∈ (0, 1) ∧ κ2(α) < min{κcrit412 (α), κcrit452 } ∧ n1 > n2 ∨
α ∈ (0, 1) ∧ κcrit462 < κ2 < min{κcrit412 (α), κcrit452 } ∧ n1 < n2 .
(5.43)
Sd is superior to Sds, Sc,p, and Scs,p if
α > 1
2
∧ κcrit412 (α) < κ2(α) < κcrit422 (α) . (5.44)
Sc,p is superior to Sds, Sd, and Scs,p if
α > 1
2
∧ κcrit422 (α) < κ2(α) < κcrit413+2 (α), (5.45)
where κcrit413+2 (α) denotes the branch with the positive square root of κ
crit413
2 (α).
Scs,p is superior to Sds, Sd, and Sc,p if
α ∈ (0, 1) ∧ κ2(α) > max{κcrit413+2 (α), κcrit452 (α)}∨
α ∈ (0, 1) ∧ κ2 < κcrit462 ∧ n1 < n2.
(5.46)
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Migration and myopic voting
In the previous chapter the population size of the regions was assumed to be given.
It is obvious that this assumption does not always hold since individuals can move
from one region to another. Some authors even see the possibility of migration as the
crucial diﬀerence between the theory of public goods and the theory of local public
goods (Stiglitz 1977, 274). With free migration the locational choices of individuals
do not only depend on the income opportunities but also on the beneﬁts from local
public goods in diﬀerent regions. Flood defense is a good example of this. A ﬂood-
prone area with a high level of public ﬂood protection favors human encroachment much
more than unprotected areas. Smith (2001) critically sees this interdependency as a
circular link where locational choices are biased by central government involvement (see
section 3.3.3). Wellisch (1994) gives the example of water pollution, where upstream
sewage treatment has a positive eﬀect on downstream cities. Public schooling is another
example of a public good that can trigger locational choices. In order to develop a model
that captures the basic characteristics of these interdependencies, the possibility of free
migration will be introduced in the following two chapters.
This approach to local public goods and free migration builds on Boadway (1982),
Boadway and Flatters (1982), Wellisch (1994; 1993) and others. The widespread ap-
proach in the literature is a two regions model with a private and a public good. Public
good provision is made by a social planner who considers the welfare of its jurisdic-
tion. Production is tied to the region through a region-speciﬁc factor (usually land) and
needs labor as an additional input. Whereas Boadway (1982) and Boadway and Flat-
ters (1982) do not incorporate spillovers, more recent contributions of Wellisch (1994;
1993) do consider inter-regional spillovers from public goods. It is a common approach
in the literature to focus on decentralized solutions and consider mechanisms by which
the social optimum can be reached under free migration. If inter-regional transfers are
possible the ﬁrst-best is usually attainable. In focusing on ﬁrst-best outcomes, issues
of ﬁscal federalism are hardly discussed in the literature. Another strand of literature
rather focuses on equilibria and their existence in more general local public economies
that also allow for voting on public goods. For an overview see Konishi (1996). Due
to fundamental existence problems in these models, the federal structure is kept sim-
ple. A need to also consider the classical issue of ﬁscal federalismdecentralization or
centralizationis pointed out by Besley and Coate (2003, 2614). One contribution with
free migration and with local as well as federal jurisdictions is Nechyba (1997). However,
he also does not address the issue of the appropriate vertical federal structure.
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The following chapters consider a local public good economy with free migration in
a second-best setting. This leads again to the question if public ﬂood defense should
be provided decentralized or centralized. In addition the question arises if single issue
authorities should provide ﬂood defense. To focus on the fundamental arguments, both
questions will be analyzed independently from each other. As in the last chapter the
modeling approach is the basic political-economy setting with simple majority voting
on public goods. Public good provision and migration decisions are seen as a two stage
game, with voting on public goods at the ﬁrst stage and locational choices at the second
stage. This chapter focuses on the case where voters are unaware of migration and
therefore vote myopically. The following chapter (chapter 7) relaxes this assumption by
considering non-myopic voters.
6.1 The model
The set up of the economy is similar to the basic model in chapter 5. For reasons
of notational convenience the formulation is slightly more general. Two regions (or
communities) i ∈ {1, 2} are considered. A public good can be provided in both regions.
The quantity of the public good in region i is gi, with gi ∈ R+. Beside the public goods
there is a private good that is produced within the economy. The public good can be
produced by using the private good. Using the private good as a numéraire, the convex
cost function of the public good in region i can be expressed by ci(gi), with c′i(gi) > 0
and c′′i (gi) > 0.
As it is common in the literature on migration, preferences are assumed to be the
same for all citizens. However, public good beneﬁts may be diﬀerent depending on the
region of residency. To focus on the fundamental role of spillovers it will be assumed that
utility is linear in private as well as public good consumption. Utility of a representative
individual of region i depends on the private and the public goods: yi + ui(gi, gj). yi is
the amount of private good that is consumed in region i.
The public good of the foreign region enters the utility function in case of spillovers.
Spillovers can be positive, uigj > 0, or negative, u
i
gj < 0. The second order derivatives
are zero, ugigi = 0. Spillovers are seen as spatial spillovers and it is assumed that they
are unidirectional, so that the public good of one region aﬀects utility of the other region
but not the other way around. This allows the interpretation that the location of one
region is upstream (denoted as region 1) and the other region is downstream (denoted as
region 2), thus, u1g2 is always zero. Due to the linearity assumption the cross derivatives
in public good consumptions are zero, uigigj = 0.
The total population of the economy is given by n¯. Individuals can migrate between
regions and mobility is assumed to be costless. The following concept for a migration
equilibrium will be considered.
Deﬁnition 6.1 A migration equilibrium is reached if nobody has an incentive to move
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to another region.1
With the later assumptions on income distribution and taxation, a necessary condition
for an interior migration equilibrium is equal utility in both regions, yi + ui(gi, gj) =
yj + u
j(gj, gi). Hence, free migration imposes a strong restriction on the economy, as it
exclude any utility diﬀerentials between regions in the equilibrium allocation. As soon
as utility in one region is higher than in the other region, citizens face the incentive to
live in the region with higher utility.
What prevents individuals from all moving to the same region? With free and costless
migration in the model of chapter 5, all individuals would want to live in the same region.
With complete concentration individuals have the highest utility since cost from public
goods can be shared within the entire population. Therefore a force is needed that favors
a population distribution without complete concentration.
This approach follows the main strand of the literature on local public goods and
migration in assuming that there is a spatially ﬁxed factor of production. This factor
will be interpreted as land. A spatially ﬁxed factor is only productive at a speciﬁc
location, which is the crucial characteristic of land. If other factors of production, such
as labor, exhibit decreasing returns to scalewhich is usually assumedit is eﬃcient to
produce at diﬀerent locations.2 Each region produces a private good with the production
function f i(ni, x¯). There are two inputs to production, labor and the ﬁxed factor land.
The corresponding quantities are denoted by ni and x¯, respectively. The production
function is concave in both factors, therefore f in, f
i
x¯ > 0 and f
i
nn, f
i
x¯x¯ < 0, where partial
derivatives are denoted by subscripts. As is common in much of the literature on local
public economies, labor supply is assumed to be ﬁxed and normalized to one unit of
labor per worker. Therefore ni also represents the population size of region i. For
reasons of convenience the population size is approximated as a continues variable, thus
ni ∈ R+. To concentrate on spillovers, symmetry assumptions hold with respect to the
production function and the land endowment, thus x¯ = x¯i = x¯j and f i(ni, x¯) = f j(nj, x¯)
for ni = nj. Note that the chapters on migration assume homogeneous beneﬁts from
public goods within each region. With respect to the previous chapters this implies that
the high-beneﬁt share of the population is one, α = 1.
1Thus, this equilibrium concept considers the incentives for unilateral actions. For other equilibrium
concepts in local public economies and also in club economies see Scotchmer (2002). Alternative
equilibrium concepts also allow coordinated deviation, but they are usually not well suited for the
analysis of a spatial context with migration between jurisdictions.
2Other assumptions that avoid the concentration of the population in one region are (1) congestion
and (2) preferences that attach individuals to a region. To (1): Many public goods are impure so
that there are crowding eﬀects. Additional individuals consuming a public good reduce the utility
of other individuals who consume the same public good. Boadway and Flatters (1982), for example,
assume a utility function of the form ui( gi
nδi
). With δ = 0 the public good is a pure public good.
With δ < 1 public good utility depends on the number of individuals who consume the public good.
δ = 1 represents the case of complete rivalry which is characteristic for pure private goods. To (2):
The preference to live in a speciﬁc region or state can be based on cultural factors such as languages
or social attachment (Wellisch 1994). With a preference to live in a certain region there must be a
utility diﬀerential across regions to create migration incentives.
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6.2 Social optimum
6.2.1 Two regions with unidirectional spillovers
The analysis of diﬀerent federal organizations needs to be based on a welfare function
that allows the comparison of diﬀerent federal settings. Furthermore it is desirable
to know the ﬁrst-best allocation of that welfare function as a benchmark. It is well
known that diﬀerent welfare functions may yield diﬀerent optimal allocations. Since the
following analysis allows free and costless migration, it is desirable that also the social
optimum is compatible with free migration. The only welfare function compatible with
free and costless migration is a Rawlsian welfare function.3 The maximum of a Rawlsian
welfare function yields a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation that is compatible with free mobility.
Other welfare functions may ﬁnd other optimal allocations, however, these allocations
will generally involve diﬀerent utility levels of individuals, which contradicts the free
migration restriction. A Rawlsian welfare function gives the appropriate benchmark if
it is assumed that a social planner cannot directly control locational choices.
With a Rawlsian welfare function and the feasibility constraints of the economy, the
optimization problem of the social planner is given by
maxgi,gj ,yi,yj ,ni,nj∈R+ yi + u
i(gi, gj)
s.t. yi + ui(gi, gj) = yj + uj(gi, gj)
f i(ni, x¯) + f
j(nj, x¯)− niyi − njyj
−ci(gi)− cj(gj) = 0
n¯− ni − nj = 0.
(6.1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for interior solutions are as follows
niu
i
gi + nju
j
gi − c′i(gi) = 0 for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j
(f in − yi)− (f jn − yj) = 0.
(6.2)
The ﬁrst condition states that the socially optimal supply with public goods follows
the Samuelson rule. The sum of the marginal beneﬁts of all individuals has to equal
the marginal cost of public good provision. The second condition deﬁnes the optimal
location of individuals in the economy. Locational eﬃciency does not imply equalization
of marginal labor productivity across regions. It requires that the marginal productivity
minus private consumption of an immigrant has to be the same for both regions. This
term can be seen as the social net-beneﬁt of an additional individual to a region. Without
locational eﬃciency, welfare and individual utility can be increased by migration.
3See Stiglitz (1977), Wellisch (1993), and Quaas (2005) for similar approaches.
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The second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum as an interior solution
require the bordered Hessian matrix to be negative deﬁnite.With the three ﬁrst-order
conditions, the free migration restriction, and the feasibility constraints the critical con-
dition is
|H¯5| = 1n¯ [c′′1(u2g2)2 + c′′2(c′′1(f 1nn + f 2nn) + (u1g1 − u2g1)2)] < 0 . (6.3)
For high marginal beneﬁts from public goods this condition may be violated. The
marginal beneﬁt from the domestic public good, uigi, is positive and constant. In the
downstream region, the marginal public good beneﬁt from the upstream public good,
u2g1, has the same sign as the spillover. The second-order derivatives of the concave
production function, fnn, are negative. Increasing marginal costs of public goods are
reﬂected in a positive c′′i . Spilloverswhich can vary in a range of negative to positive
values aﬀect the size of some of these partial derivatives. This is obvious for u2g1,
whose magnitude is proportional to the size of the spillover. In addition spillovers may
inﬂuence the population distribution, which aﬀects the second-order derivatives of the
production and cost functions. Assuming that the later two impacts are not too strong,
positive spillovers make it easier for the second-order suﬃcient conditions to be met and
small or negative spillovers make it harder. The other bordered principal minors of the
bordered Hessian are given in the appendix to this chapter.
Assumption 6.1 The analysis is restricted to production, costs and utility functions
that satisfy the condition of equation 6.3.
Assuming that the ﬁrst-order conditions determine the single optimal solution, the
comparative static analysis reveals the impact of spillovers on the amount of public good
provision and the population distribution across regions. The unilateral spillover from
the upstream region 1 to the downstream region 2 can be positive or negative and it is
denoted by κ2. The allocation of the socially optimal migration equilibrium depends on
spillovers as follows
dg1
dκ2
=
c′′2u
2
κ2(u
1
g1−u2g1)+n2u2g1κ2[(u2g2)2+c′′2 (f1nn+f2nn)]
n¯ |H¯5|
dg2
dκ2
= u2g2
n2u2g1κ2(u
1
g1−u2g1)−c′′1u2κ2
n¯ |H¯5|
dn1
dκ2
= −c′′2 n2u
2
g1κ2(u
1
g1−u2g1)−c′′1u2κ2
n¯ |H¯5| .
(6.4)
With assumption 6.1, the second-order conditions are met and the denominator of
the three equations is negative. Beside the partial derivatives in |H¯5| there are two
additional derivatives. An increase in spillovers increases the downstream utility. This
direct eﬀect holds for positive as well as negative spillovers, which implies u2κ2 > 0. A
marginal change in spillovers aﬀects the marginal beneﬁt from the upstream public good
in the downstream region, u2g1κ2. This eﬀect is positive and does not depend on the level
of spillovers.
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Since the comparative statics are generally ambiguous, it is helpful to understand
how the diﬀerent derivatives depend on spillovers. Downstream, the marginal beneﬁt
from the upstream public good, u2g1, is proportional to the spillover. In the comparative
statics the derivative is part of the term u1g1− u2g1. This term decreases in spillovers but
remains positive unless spillovers are strongly positive or the marginal beneﬁt from the
downstream public good is suﬃciently large compared to the marginal beneﬁt upstream.
Another partial derivative that is inﬂuenced by spillovers is the marginal increase of
downstream utility in spillovers, u2κ2. It depends on the level of the upstream public
good and is large for a high supply with the public good. In addition, spillovers may
inﬂuence the population distribution, which aﬀects the second-order derivatives of the
production and cost functions. Assumingas before that the two last impacts are not
too strong, one can state the following:
- The impact of spillovers on the optimal amount of the upstream public good tends
to be positive. For suﬃciently small marginal beneﬁts from public goods, f 1nn +
f 2nn dominates the other terms of the enumerator. If this is the case the impact
of spillovers on the upstream public good is positive since both the enumerator
and the denominator are negative. In the enumerator both partial derivatives
that strongly depend on spillovers are multiplied, u2κ2(u
1
g1 − u2g1). This product
is zero either when spillovers are so negative that there is no upstream public
good provision, u2κ2 = 0, or if spillovers are so large that the marginal eﬀects on
the utility in both regions cancel out, u1g1 − u2g1 = 0. For intermediate values
of spillovers, the product is positive, which reduces the impact of spillovers on
the upstream public good. The absolute value of the denominator tends to be
small for very negative spillovers and large for very positive spillovers. Thus, for
strongly positive spillovers a small absolute value of the enumerator coincides with
a large value of the denominator, which implies a large impact of spillovers on the
optimal amount of the upstream public good. As long as the upstream public good
increases in spillovers, the downstream utility change in response to spillovers, u2κ2,
depends positively on the spillover level.
- The impact of spillovers on the optimal supply of the downstream public good is
qualitatively the opposite of that on the upstream population size. This is not
surprising since the ﬁrst-order conditions state that the downstream public good
is proportional to the population size downstream. As long as spillovers have
a positive impact on the upstream public good, u2κ2 grows in spillovers. u
1
g1 −
u2g1 decreases in spillovers. Thus, for suﬃciently low spillovers the downstream
public good decreases because u1g1−u2g1 dominates. As spillovers grow u2κ2 becomes
dominant and the amount of the downstream public good depends positively on
spillovers.
- The optimal upstream population size may increase or decrease in spillovers, de-
pending if the positive impact of u1g1−u2g1 or the negative impact of−u2κ2 dominates.
Having in mind the above discussion on the role of the spillover level, there is mi-
gration to the upstream region in response to a marginal increase in spillovers if
spillovers are suﬃciently small and there is migration to the downstream region if
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spillovers are suﬃciently large. This implies a U-shape of the downstream popu-
lation size in spillovers, unless one of the two terms of the enumerator dominates
for all spillover levels.
The impact of spillovers on socially optimal welfare (the equilibrium utility level) is
given by
dui
dκ2
= n2uk2
n¯
> 0 , (6.5)
which is positive for all levels of spillovers. The change is large for big amounts of the
upstream public good and for a large downstream population size. Both tend to be the
case for large positive spillovers.
The impact of spillovers on welfare and the utility level helps to understand the U-
shaped downstream population size in spillovers. A locationally eﬃcient migration equi-
librium implies that marginal labor productivity and public good utility are equalized
across regions: f 1n+u
1(g1) = f
2
n+u
2(g1, g2). Since a marginal change in the unidirectional
spillovers causes asymmetric utility changes in the upstream and downstream region, a
relocation of some individuals is required. If a marginal increase of spillovers favors
the downstream regionwhich tends to be the case for positive spilloversindividuals
need to migrate to the downstream region, which reduces the marginal labor produc-
tivity and neutralizes utility diﬀerentials. The opposite holds if higher spillovers over-
proportionally increase upstream public good utility. This can be equalized by migration
to the upstream region, which decreases upstream and increases downstream labor pro-
ductivity. Migration to the upstream region tends to be the optimal response to higher
spillovers for negative (or small positive) spillovers.
6.2.2 An illustrative example of the social optimum
An example with a functional speciﬁcation can illustrate the socially optimal allocation.
Similar to chapter 5, the utility of a representative individual of region i is given by
yi + λ(gi + κigj). Marginal beneﬁts from public good consumption are given by the
parameter λ, which is assumed to be the same in both regions. Consumption of the
public good stems from the domestic and, if spillovers are present, from the foreign
public good. Spillovers are unilateral from the upstream to the downstream region, they
are restricted to the interval κ2 ∈ [−1, 1].
To generate explicit solutions the private good is produced with a quadratic pro-
duction function with input labor and the spatially ﬁxed factor land. The respective
quantities are denoted ni and x¯. The production function of region i is assumed to take
the quadratic form f i(ni, x¯) = ni− n
2
i
2x¯
.4 Due to the speciﬁc form of the production func-
tion there may be negative marginal output in labor for large levels of labor input. To
4Quadratic functions are frequently used in economics. List and Mason (2001), for example, use a
quadratic payoﬀ function in a transboundary pollution setting.
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facilitate a straightforward economic interpretation and to avoid degenerated outcomes,
the following analysis will focus on the increasing part of f i. Thus, also in the case of
complete concentration of individuals in one region, there is a positive marginal output
of labor, n¯ < x¯. For the case without beneﬁts from public goods this implies that utility
in the migration equilibrium is positive. The cost function of the public good is assumed
to be the same in both regions and it is given by c(gi) =
g2i
2
.
In the following it will be analyzed how the migration equilibrium is inﬂuenced by
spillovers and marginal beneﬁts from the public goods. Given linear utility it is not
surprising that corner solutions may occur for some parameter values of κ2 and λ. Large
spillovers or high marginal public good beneﬁts favor corner solutions. Conditions for
corner solutions can be diﬀerent for the socially optimal allocation and the federal or-
ganizations discussed below. The following corner solutions may occur:
- gi = 0. If negative spillovers are suﬃciently large the ﬁrst-order conditions for inte-
rior solutions require negative upstream public good provision. The non-negativity
constraint then holds. High marginal beneﬁts from public goods favor this situa-
tion. A corner solution with no downstream public good provision is possible when
the whole population lives upstream.
- yi = 0. Marginal beneﬁts from public goods may be so large that consumption of
the private good would become negative without the non-negativity constraint.
- ni = 0. If marginal public good beneﬁts are high, complete concentration may
result. Also large spillover may lead to the complete depopulation of an entire
region.
0
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-2
0
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Figure 6.1: |H¯5| of the social optimum for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
The explicit interior solutions for the adopted functional forms are given in in the
appendix to this chapter. These solutions are only optimal if the second-order conditions
are met. This is not always the case, particularly when the marginal beneﬁt of the public
goods is large. Figure 6.1 shows that negative spillovers make it harder for the second-
order conditions to be met. For the illustration the range of marginal beneﬁts is chosen
in a way that the second-order conditions are met if no spillovers are present. For
negative spillovers and large marginal public good beneﬁts the second-order conditions
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are violated if |H¯5| = λ
2− 2
x¯
+λ2(1−κ2)2
n¯
> 0. For positive spillovers the marginal beneﬁts
could be higher than the illustrated range.
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Figure 6.2: Social optimal equilibrium allocation for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
Figure 6.2 illustrates the socially optimal allocation for interior solutions. Not all il-
lustrated allocations are optimal because either the second-order suﬃcient conditions are
violated (see above) or because corner solutions occur when non-negativity restrictions
are binding. If non-negativity restrictions are binding, the corresponding allocations are
not feasible. As apparent in ﬁgure 6.2, non-feasible allocations are possible for large
marginal public good beneﬁts in combination with negative spillovers. Some allocations
in the very front right corner of the four diagrams do not violate the non-negativity
constraints. However, they are not optimal since the second-order suﬃcient conditions
are not met. Thus, the non-negativity restrictions as well as the second-order conditions
are violated for similar parameter values.
As ﬁgure 6.2 shows, eﬃcient upstream public good provision increases in spillovers.
The amount of the downstream public good is U-shaped in spillovers. For suﬃciently
large marginal beneﬁts from public goods the U-shape is not present due to corner
solutions in case of negative spillovers. The amount of the downstream public good
increases as spillovers become stronger. This reﬂects the changing size of the regions.
Due to the strong symmetry assumptions, the upstream and downstream region have
the same population size when spillovers are absent. The upstream regions depopulates
as spillovers become more extreme, regardless of whether they are positive or negative.
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Corner solutions are possible if spillovers or marginal beneﬁts from public goods are
suﬃciently strong.
Figure 6.2 shows that utility increases monotonically in spillovers. Utility increases at
the same time as upstream public good provision increases and the eﬃcient population
size in the downstream region is U-shaped in spillovers. The impact of spillovers is
bigger for positive than for negative spillovers. With positive unidirectional spillovers,
a marginal increase in spillover has a large impact on the utility level since the optimal
quantity of the upstream public good is large. With negative spillovers the optimal
amount of the upstream supply is low and therefore marginal changes in spillovers have
a moderate inﬂuence on the overall utility level.
6.3 Sequence of the game and the federal
organization
With voting decisions on the supply of public goods and locational decisions of individ-
uals, the sequence of events is assumed to be as follows:
. There is an initial population distribution. This distribution is denoted by n˜i. All
individuals live either in region i or j.
. There is a given scheme of land ownership.
. In a given federal setting, all citizens vote on the supply of public goods. With
decentralized jurisdictions the voting decision is simultaneous, whereas in a cen-
tralized jurisdiction there is sequential voting.
. After voting citizens can migrate.
. There is production of the private good at the ﬁnal location of citizens.
. Wages are paid to workers and rents to land owners or residents.
. Voters pay taxes and public goods are provided according to the previous voting
decisions.
. Consumption of the public and the private good.
This sequence of events is based on the following considerations. There is a status
quo with an initial location of citizens and given land ownership. Given their location,
citizens vote on the supply of public goods within a given federal setting. Under central-
ization there is only one jurisdiction, where citizens vote sequentially on the supply with
public goods. Public goods are ﬁnanced by head taxes and the individual cost-share is
given by ci(gi)+cj(gj)
n¯
. Under decentralization two jurisdictions decide simultaneously and
independently on public good provision. Each jurisdiction comprises the citizens that
live in that region. Voting takes place by a simple majority rule and the action of the
other region is taken as given. Public goods are ﬁnanced by head taxes on residents of
the jurisdiction. With decentralized jurisdictions the cost-share of a resident is given by
ci(gi)
ni
.
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After voting citizens decide on their location. This decision anticipates the outcome
of the remaining events. Migration is assumed to be free and costless. The following
analysis considers migration equilibria according to deﬁnition 6.1. Hence, if nobody has
an incentive to live in another region, a migration equilibrium is reached.
At the ﬁnal location, citizens inelastically oﬀer their labor on perfectly competitive
labor markets. This leads to a wage income of f in since the labor supply per person is
normalized to one unit. In addition individuals receive a rent income. The total rent of
region i is given by ri = f i− nif in. Rents accrue to the ﬁxed factor of production. Thus
the distribution of rent income within the economy depends on land ownership and the
way land rents are distributed. Two common assumptions are used in the literature:
- Rents are distributed to the ﬁnal residents of a region. For a region with the pop-
ulation size ni this leads to an income before taxes of
f i(ni,x¯)
ni
= f in+
ri
ni
. Examples
for this rent distribution scheme are Stiglitz (1977) and Wellisch (1994). This rent
distribution scheme is plausible if land is owned by the regional government. Al-
ternatively if a regional government is able to collect all land rents by rent taxes,
land rents can be shifted from non-residents to residents. See also Quaas (2004,
224) or Wellisch (1994, 174).
- Rents are distributed to land owners and land is owned by all citizens by equal
property shares. With this assumption each citizen receives rents from both
regions and gross income (income before taxes) is given by f in +
ri+rj
n¯
= f in +
f i(ni,x¯)−nif in+fj(nj ,x¯)−njfjn
n¯
. Equal property shares are assumed by Boadway (1982),
Wellisch (1993; 2000) and others.
Since the two rents distribution schemes are used in the literature, they are both con-
sidered in the following analysis. After production and income distribution, citizen pay
head taxes and the public good is provided according to the previous voting decisions.
Alternatively one could assume that voters pay taxes at their initial location and that
public goods are also provided before migration. Given the timing of events, this al-
ternative would be only feasible if citizens are not credit restricted, because production
takes place at the ﬁnal location. The example of ﬂood defense shows that there are
plausible reasons why the public good can be provided before or after migration.
- Many measures for ﬂood protection involve large ﬁx costs, these costs have to be
carried as soon as the measures are undertaken. With this assumption public good
costs do no inﬂuence the later migration decision.
- Flood defense is provided after production and migration. With this alternative
locational choices are not only inﬂuenced by public good beneﬁts, but also by its
costs. Also if ﬂood defense would be provided earlier, a substantial part of ﬂood
defense costs arise through the maintenance of infrastructure or because long-lived
projects are ﬁnanced by credits, which shifts the costs to the ﬁnal residents of a
region.
Both alternatives only lead to diﬀerent results under decentralization, since migration
has no inﬂuences on taxes under centralization. Following the lead of the literature the
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following analysis assumes that taxes are paid by the ﬁnal residents of a jurisdiction.
The sequence of events and the discussion lead to the following structure of the game:
. At stage one all citizens vote on the supply of public goods at their initial location.
. At stage two individuals decide on their location with the given supply of public
goods from the ﬁrst stage.
6.4 Unidirectional spillovers
6.4.1 Decentralization
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, citizens vote on public goods at their initial location.
Migration responses to public good provision at the second stage of the game are not
taken into account, which implies that voters take the initial population size as given
with n˜1 and n˜2. In voting on public goods the level of the foreign public good is taken as
given. With the two rent sharing alternatives the optimization problem of the median
voter in region i is given by
maxgi∈R+ yi + u
i(gi, gj) s.t. yi ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j
with yi =

f i(n˜i,x¯)−ci(gi)
n˜i
with rents to residents
f in +
ri+rj
n¯
− ci(gi)
n˜i
with equal property shares.
(6.6)
Since all voters of a region have the same marginal beneﬁts from public goods, the
optimization problem of the median voters of both jurisdictions lead to the ﬁrst-order
conditions for the upstream and downstream public good:
n˜iu
i
gi − c′i(gi) ≤ 0 gi ≥ 0 and gi ∂(yi+u
i)
∂gi
= 0 for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (6.7)
Given the linear utility functions and myopic voting, optimal choices for the provi-
sion of public goods are dominant strategies, with reaction functions independent of
the foreign public good. Thus the Nash-equilibrium can be easily determined. Pub-
lic good provision is independent of spillovers, but is sensitive to the initial population
distribution. Regarding the initial population distribution there is an under-supply of
the upstream public good compared to the Samuelson rule when spillovers are positive.
With negative spillovers there is an over-supply. Downstream public good provision is
eﬃcient for the given initial population distribution.
The Hessian determinants indicate if the second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local
maximum as an interior solution are met. The determinants, which are independent
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of spillovers, are always met since marginal costs of public goods are increasing. The
second-order conditions for a maximum require the Hessian determinants for public good
supply in region i, |H i1|, to be negative:
|H i1| = − c
′′
i
n˜i
< 0 for i = 1, 2 . (6.8)
After voting on public goods individuals can migrate at the second stage of the game.
They will do so if they can improve their utility. Let gdi = g
d
i (n˜i) denote the supply of
public goods from the ﬁrst stage. Inserting gdi and g
d
j into the utility function yields
the indirect utility function that depends on the population distribution. With the
assumption that taxes for the public goods are paid by the ﬁnal residents of a jurisdiction,
the indirect utility function is given by
vi(ni) =

f i(ni,x¯)−ci(gdi )
ni
+ ui(gdi , g
d
j ) with rents to residents
f in +
ri+rj
n¯
− ci(gdi )
ni
+ ui(gdi , g
d
j ) with equal property shares.
(6.9)
Whereas the supply of public goods depends solely on the initial population distri-
bution, the indirect utility also depends on the population distribution resulting from
the migration decisions of individuals. For the initial population distribution and after
voting on public goods, individuals in the upstream region face one of the following
migration incentives
- Utility in the upstream region is the same as in the downstream region. Despite
equal utilitya necessary condition for a migration equilibriuman individual
from the upstream region may improve his utility by moving to the downstream
region. With such migration incentives, there is no migration equilibrium despite
equal utility. The suﬃcient conditions for a migration equilibrium are given below.
- Utility in the upstream region is higher than in the downstream region. This utility
diﬀerential creates migration incentives to the upstream region.
- Utility in the upstream region is lower than in the downstream region, what creates
an incentive to migrate to the downstream region.
With two regions under consideration, the migration incentives in the downstream
region are the opposite than in the upstream region. As mentioned above, equal utility
in both regions is not a suﬃcient condition for a migration equilibrium. The necessary
condition `equal utility' indicates a migration equilibrium, if nobody can improves his
utility by migration, thus ∂(v
i−vj)
∂ni
must be negative:
∂(vi−vj)
∂ni
=

ci(n˜i)
n2i
+
cj(n˜j)
n2j
+
f in− f
i
ni
ni
+
fjn− f
j
nj
nj
< 0 with rents to residents
ci(n˜i)
n2i
+
cj(n˜j)
n2j
+ f inn + f
j
nn < 0 with equal prop. shares.
(6.10)
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If an immigrant to region i is worse oﬀ after migration, the marginal change in the
utility diﬀerence is negative and a migration equilibrium is given, if the utility diﬀerence
is zero. If the utility diﬀerence increases, a migrant can improve his utility and there
is no migration equilibrium. Without a migration equilibrium, the utility diﬀerence is
typically not zero and the utility diﬀerence between regions can increase or decrease in
response to migration.
Looking at changes of the utility level of a single region in response to an immigrant is
the ﬁrst step in describing how the utility diﬀerential changes in response to migration.
An individual moving to a region has a positive as well as a negative eﬀect on the utility
in that region. The eﬀects are given by
∂vi
∂ni
=
 ci(n˜i)n2i +
f in− f
i
ni
ni
with rents to residents
ci(n˜i)
n2i
+
nj
n¯
(f inn + f
j
nn) with equal property shares.
(6.11)
An immigrant to a region increases utility because the cost-share (ﬁrst term) becomes
smaller. An immigrant decreases utility, because the gross income (second term) falls.
With rents going to residents, an immigrant increases the output of a region since the
marginal output is positive. At the same time output per capita decreases since the
production function is concave. In combination, the marginal output minus the average
output is clearly negative, f in− fini < 0. Thus, the change in gross income in response to
an immigrant to a region is negative,
f in− f
i
ni
ni
< 0. With the equal endowment assumption,
higher output through an additional individual increases the total rent in the immigrant
region and decreases the rent of the emigrant region. The eﬀect on wages is contrary,
they fall in the immigrant region and rise in the emigrant region. The wage eﬀect is
stronger than the rent eﬀect so that the gross income of the immigrant region falls.5
With equal property shares, gross income depends on output of both regions, whereas
with residency-based rent distribution, it depends on the regional output only.
If cost-shares for public goods are not too large, utility in region i will fall in response
to an immigrant, ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0. Large cost-shares can be the consequence of high marginal
beneﬁts from public goods that induce high levels of public good supply at the ﬁrst
stage (see equation 6.7). With large cost-shares an immigrant can increase the utility
in the immigration region. The literature usually assumes that an interior migration
equilibrium exists and refers to this case as an over-populated federation. See, for
example, Stiglitz (1977), Boadway and Flatters (1982) or Wellisch (1993).6 In an over-
populated federation it holds that ∂(v
i−vj)
∂ni
< 0. A similar assumption is also made
here.
5With gross income of region i of f in +
fi(n˜i,x¯)−nifin+fj(n˜j ,x¯)−njfjn
n¯ , it is apparent that for concave
production functions, a marginal increase of the population has a negative eﬀect on gross income
since the derivative given by ∂(•)∂ni =
nj
n¯ (f
i
nn + f
j
nn), which is negative.
6The literature sometimes characterizes a migration equilibrium as stable. Instability arises if equal
utility coincides with migration incentives, ∂(v
i−vj)
∂ni
> 0. To avoid confusion, the terms stable and
unstable migration equilibria are not used here.
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In the subsequent analysis a slightly diﬀerent assumption is made by focusing on suf-
ﬁciently small marginal beneﬁts from public goods so that each region is over-populated
in the sense that ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0. With this assumption the migration equilibrium exists.
Assumption 6.2 In the economy under consideration a migration equilibrium exists
that is characterized by ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0.
With a utility diﬀerential between regions, citizens will migrate to the high-utility
region. In extreme cases this can lead to the concentration of the whole population in
one region.7 Assuming over-populated regions and neglecting cases where one region
has higher utility for all population distributions, utility diﬀerentials between regions
are eliminated by migration and an interior migration equilibrium is reached. With
residency-based rent distribution, this process depends on global characteristics of the
production function, since the average output is part of ∂v
i
∂ni
. With equal property shares,
changes of the regional utility level in response to migration are only caused by local
properties of both production functions. Thus the two rent distribution schemes can
lead to diﬀerent equilibrium distributions of the population.
Specifying a functional form for the production and cost functions illustrates the role
of spillovers for the equilibrium allocation. To focus on the role of spillovers, symmetry
assumptions are made with respect to public good beneﬁts, cost functions, the initial
population distribution, and the endowment with the ﬁxed factor land. As for the social
optimum, the production function is f i(ni, x¯) = ni +
n2i
2 x¯
and the cost function for the
public goods are ci(gi) =
g2i
2
. Figure 6.3 shows the indirect utility function of both
regions for a positive and a negative spillover. Assuming that rents are distributed to
residents, the indirect utility is given by
v1(n1) = 1 + n˜1λ
2 − n˜1λ2
2n1
− n1
2x¯
v2(n1) = 1 + κ2n˜1λ
2 + n˜2λ
2(1− n˜2
2(n¯−n1))− n¯−n12x¯ .
(6.12)
Indirect utility has a peak in the regional population as ﬁgure 6.3 conﬁrms. For a
given supply with public goods the cost-share is very large if the population is small.
In extreme cases this would lead to negative utility, because citizens have to pay more
for public goods than they earn, which is not feasible. As the population grows, the
cost-share falls and the decreasing productivity of a region becomes dominant. For
over-populated regions, marginal public good beneﬁts must be suﬃciently small, so that
the cost sharing argument is dominated by the decreasing productivity in that region.
Figure 6.3 shows a positive and a negative spillover (κ2 = −12 , 12). Spillovers only aﬀect
7With full concentration the model is inconsistent, because nobody pays for the public good in the
unpopulated region. Another inconsistency can arise if emigration leads to high cost-shares of
individuals that violate the budget constraints of the remaining citizens. However, these extreme
cases are omitted in the subsequent analysis by neglecting strong asymmetries of land endowment
and the initial distribution of the population.
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cost-shares an immigrant can increase the utility in the region of immigration. The literature usually
assumes that a stable migration equilibrium can be reached and refers to this case as an over-populated
federation. See for example Stiglitz (1977), Boadway and Flatters (1982) or Wellisch (1993). In an
over-populated region it holds that ∂(v
i−vj)
∂ni
< 0. A similar assumption is also made here.
Assumption 6.1 In the economy under consideration a migration equilibrium is reached on the sec-
ond stage that is characterized by ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0.
With this assumption both regions are over-populated and the migration equilibrium is stable. For
the assumption to hold the marginal public good benefits must be sufficiently small.
With utility differential between regions citizens will migrate to the high-utility region. In ex-
treme cases this might lead to the concentration of the whole population in one region.5 Assuming
over-populated regions and neglecting cases where one region has higher utility for all population
distributions, utility differentials between regions are eliminated by migration and stable migration
equilibria are reached. With residency based rent distribution this process depends on global char-
acteristics of the production function, since the average output is part of ∂v
i
∂ni
. With equal property
shares changes of the regional utility level in response to migration are only caused by local properties
of both production functions. Thus the two rent distribution schemes can lead to different equilibrium
distributions of the population.
Specifying a functional form for the production and cost functions illustrates the role of spillovers
for the equilibrium allocation.6 To focus on the role of spillovers, symmetry assumptions are made
with respect to public good benefits, cost functions, and the endowment with the fixed factor land.
As for the social optimum the production function is f i(ni, x¯) = ni+
n2i
2 x¯ and the cost function for the
public goods ci(gi) =
g2i
2 . Figure 6.3 shows the indirect utility functions of both regions for a positive
and a negative spillover. Assuming that rents are distributed to residents, the indirect utility is given
by ...
v1(n1)
v2(n1;κ2 = 0.5)
v2(n1;κ2 = −0.5)
v1, v2
n1
5With full concentration the model is inconsistent, because nobody pays for the public good in the unpopu-
lated region. Another inconsistency can arise if emigration leads to high cost-shares of individuals that violate
the budget constraints of the remaining citizens. However, this extreme cases are omitted in the subsequent
analysis by neglecting strong asymmetries of land endowment and the initial distribution of the population.
6Ich gehe hier davon aus, dass die Rolle der Anfangsverteilung, der rent distributions schemes etc. schon fu¨r
den einfacheren Fall erla¨utert worden ist. Trotzdem wa¨re es vielleicht gut nochmal kurz darauf zu verweisen?
Dann mu¨sste auch u¨berlegen, ob die letzte FN in der Form no¨tig ist.
Figure 6.3: Indirect utility from decentralization for a positive and a negative spillover
for n˜1 = 0.5, λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1
the downstream region and the utility level is higher for the positive tha for the egative
spillover. The positive spillover leads to a smaller equilibrium upstream population than
the negative spillover. The migration equilibrium is represented by the middle crossing
point of the indirect utility functions, where ∂(v
1−v2)
∂n1
< 0 holds (the slope of v1 is smaller
than of v2). With the symmetric initial population distribution there will be migration
to the downstream region in case of the positive spillover and migration to the upstream
region given the negative spillover.
For general production and cost functions the impact of spillovers on the equilibrium
population distribution is derived by total diﬀerentiation of the free migration restriction.
dn1
dκ2
=
u2κ2
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
with Ai =
 f in −
f i−ci(n˜i)
ni
with rents to residents
ci(n˜i)
ni
+
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(6.13)
For over-populated regions (assumption 6.2) the denominator is negative. This holds
for both rent-sharing schemes because ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0 implies Ai
ni
= ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0. The enumera-
tor consists only of the marginal change in downstream utility in response to spillover
changes. This change is positive. Thus, the impact of spillovers on the upstream popu-
lation size is always negative. This is in contrast to the social optimum, where there are
additional eﬀects so that the upstream population size may also increase in spillovers.
This diﬀerence is particularly relevant for negative spillover levels. The socially eﬃcient
allocation implies a small amount of the upstream public good with negative spillovers.
This favors a large downstream population. In contrast, with decentralized public good
provision, spillovers are neglected and downstream citizens try to avoid the negative
spillovers by migrating to the upstream region. Another diﬀerence is the magnitude of
u2κ2. Since the supply of the upstream public good does not depend on spillovers, an
increase in spillovers always has the same eﬀect on downstream utility, no matter if the
initial spillover level is small or large.
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With myopic voters and decentralized responsibilities, there are no comparative static
eﬀects of spillovers on public goods. It is only the initial population distribution that
determines the the supply level of public goods.
With respect to the social optimum, the concept of locational eﬃciency was discussed
above. Locational eﬃciency requires that the social net-beneﬁts of an immigrant to a
region are equalized, f in − yi = f jn − yj. With decentralized voting it is fortuitous if the
resulting migration equilibrium is locationally eﬃcient since there is no mechanism that
ensures that the social net-beneﬁts of an immigrant are equalized across regions. The
two rent-sharing assumptions have diﬀerent implications regarding locational eﬃciency.
In the special case of an economy without public goods, the migration equilibrium is
locationally eﬃcient with equal property shares (v1 = v2 ⇔ f 1n = f 2n), whereas this is not
generally the case with rent distribution to residents (v1 = v2 ⇔ f1
n1
= f
2
n2
6= f 1n = f 2n).
Thus, in a local public good economy with fairly small marginal public good beneﬁts,
the resulting migration equilibrium is almost locationally eﬃcient, if the equal property
share condition holds. With rent distribution to residents this is not necessarily the
case, especially when regions are asymmetric. However, independent of the rent-sharing
scheme, the migration equilibrium is ineﬃcient with respect to public goods.
With migration ﬂows at the second stage, public good supply will not reﬂect the
voting preferences of the ﬁnal residents in the migration equilibrium. With migration
to the upstream region, the supply of public goods will be lower than favored by the
ﬁnal residents of the region. The opposite holds for the downstream region, where public
good provision is too large. Thus, if there would be another vote on public ﬂood defense,
the outcome would be diﬀerent and new migration ﬂows would be induced. Therefore
the outcome depends decisively on the initial population distribution.
One can ask if a deviation of the initial and the ﬁnal locational pattern of individuals
has a negative impact on the equilibrium utility level? Using the free migration restric-
tion and the ﬁrst-order conditions for public goods, the impact of the initial upstream
population size on the ﬁnal utility is given by
∂vi
∂n˜1
=
(n1−n˜1)[
A1(u
2
g2)
2
c′′2
+
A2(u
1
g1)
2
c′′1
]+
n2A1u
1
g1u
2
g1
c′′1
A1n2+A2n1
. (6.14)
Without spillovers the question can be answered by yes, since utility is increasing in
n˜1 as long as the initial upstream population size is smaller than the ﬁnal population
size, thus ∂v
i
∂n˜1
is positive. The opposite holds for n˜1 > n1. Thus, the equilibrium
utility level has a peak in the initial population size and the peak is at n˜1 = n1 if
spillovers are absent. With positive spillovers the highest utility is reached when the
initial upstream population is larger than ﬁnal population size. With negative spillovers
the initial upstream population must be smaller than the ﬁnal population.
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6.4.2 Centralization
Public goods are provided at the ﬁrst stage of the game. In a centralized jurisdiction two
public goods need to be determined by voting. As in chapter 5 it is assumed that there
are sequential votes on the supply of the upstream and the downstream public good.
Citizens vote at their initial location and the sizes of the regions are given by n˜i. With
myopic voting, migration responses at the second stage of the game are not taken into
account and the initial population distribution is perceived as ﬁnal. The median voter
from region m, which can be either the upstream or downstream region, m ∈ {1, 2},
has the utility function ym + um(gi, gj) and faces the following optimization problem in
voting on the supply of the public good in region i:
maxgi∈R+ ym + u
m(gi, gj) s.t. yi, yj ≥ 0 for i, j,m ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j
ym =

fm(n˜m,x¯)
n˜m
− ci(gi)+cj(gj)
n¯
with rents to residents
fmn +
ri+rj
n¯
− ci(gi)+cj(gj)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(6.15)
This leads to the ﬁrst-order conditions for the supply of the upstream and downstream
public good
n¯umgi − c′i(gi) ≤ 0 gi ≥ 0 and gi ∂(ym+u
m)
∂gi
= 0
for i, j,m ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j.
(6.16)
Due to the linear form of the utility function, the preferred amounts of the public
goods are dominant strategies, and the sequence of voting has no inﬂuence on the voting
outcome8. With two regions under consideration, the median voter is a representative
individual from the majority region. To avoid ambiguity, the further analysis neglects
equally populated regions (n˜i = n˜j) as the initial population distribution. With a
centralized jurisdiction there can be either an upstream or a downstream majority. For
an upstream majority the median voter lives upstream and there will only be public
good provision upstream. For a median voter from the downstream region there is an
interior solution for positive spillovers with positive quantities of the upstream as well as
the downstream public good. For negative spillovers only the downstream public good
is supplied because the median voter has no interest in the upstream public good. Since
the cost-shares are the same in both regions, public good provision does not depend on
the initial population distribution as long as the majority constellations do not change.
The second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum as an interior solution are
always met. For an upstream and a downstream majority they are given by the Hessian
determinants for public good supply in region i, |Hi1| : 9
8In a setting where the sequence of voting is important it would be necessary to approach the model
as a three stage game with voting at the ﬁrst two stages and migration at the third stage.
9The term interior solution is not quite accurate, since the equilibrium majority can vote for no public
good provision without a non-negativity constraint being binding.
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|H11 | = − c
′′
1
n¯
< 0 for n˜1 > n˜2
|H11 | = − c
′′
1
n¯
< 0 |H21 | = − c
′′
2
n¯
< 0 for n˜1 < n˜2, and κ2 ≥ 0
|H21 | = − c
′′
2
n¯
< 0 for n˜1 < n˜2, and κ2 < 0.
(6.17)
After voting at the ﬁrst stage, individuals can migrate at the second stage. Let
gci = gi(n˜i) denote the supply of public goods from the ﬁrst stage. Inserting g
c
i and g
c
j into
the utility function yields the indirect utility function that depends on the population
distribution:
vi(ni) =

f i(ni,x¯)
ni
− ci(gci )+ci(gcj )
n¯
+ ui(gci , g
c
j) rents to residents
f in +
ri+rj
n¯
− ci(gci )+ci(gcj )
n¯
+ ui(gci , g
c
j) with eq. prop. shares.
(6.18)
As under decentralization, citizens will migrate to the region with the higher utility.
An inner migration equilibrium is reached when utility is the same in both regions,
vi(ni) = v
j(nj) and if the utility diﬀerence of a migrant is negative,
∂(vi−vj)
∂ni
< 0. For
centralization this leads to
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=

f in− f
i
ni
ni
+
fjn− f
j
nj
nj
< 0 with rents to residents
f inn + f
j
nn < 0 with equal property shares.
(6.19)
With concave production functions, there is always a migration equilibrium for both rent
distribution schemes. Unlike under decentralization, the existence of the equilibrium
does not depend on the cost-shares of the public good.
The consequences of migration can be also considered with respect to the utility level
in a region. The eﬀects of an immigrant to a region is given by
∂vi
∂ni
=

f in− f
i
ni
ni
with rents to residents
nj
n¯
(f inn + f
j
nn) with equal property shares.
(6.20)
An immigrant to a region decreases utility because the gross income falls. Since the
public goods are ﬁnanced through the general budget, citizens cannot avoid taxes by
migrating to the other region. To ensure over-populated regions it is suﬃcient to assume
concave production functions, since beneﬁts from public goods are irrelevant.
Total diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order conditions and of the free migration restriction
leads to changes of the the equilibrium population distribution in response to marginal
changes in spillovers. For an upstream majority the unilateral spillover κ2 inﬂuences the
optimal supply of the upstream and downstream public good as follows:
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dg1
dκ2
= 0
dg2
dκ2
= 0
dn1
dκ2
=
u2κ2
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
< 0
with Ai =
 f in −
fn
ni
with rents to residents
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(6.21)
With an upstream majority, public goods do not depend on spillovers. Despite a constant
level of public good provision the population distribution is inﬂuenced by spillovers.
With concave production functions the denominator is negative for both rent sharing
schemes. Thus, increasing spillovers make the downstream region more attractive which
induces migration to the downstream region.
For a downstream majority a positive unidirectional spillover inﬂuences the upstream
and downstream public good as follows:
dg1
dκ2
=
n¯u2g1κ2
c′′1
> 0 for κ2 ≥ 0
dg2
dκ2
= 0 for κ2 ≥ 0
dn1
dκ2
=
u2κ2
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
− n¯(u1g1−u2g1)u2g1κ2
(
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
)c′′1
for κ2 ≥ 0 .
(6.22)
The upstream public good increases in positive spillovers, whereas the downstream pub-
lic good remains constant. There are both direct and indirects eﬀects of spillovers
on the downstream population. Higher spillovers increase downstream utility directly
(u2κ2 > 0), inducing migration to the downstream region. In addition there is an indirect
eﬀect since upstream public good provision increases in spillovers (u2g1 > 0 for κ2 > 0).
Assuming that the impact of other indirect eﬀects of spillovers on the partial derivatives
are suﬃciently small, one ﬁnds an opposing impact of u2κ2 and u
2
g1. As the direct eﬀect
depends on the amount of the upstream public good, the eﬀect is very small for small
spillovers. Thus, the second term may dominate and the upstream population grows
(the denominators are negative). The partial derivative u2g1 grows in spillovers, and for
suﬃciently large spillovers, the ﬁrst term dominates so that the upstream population
decreases in spillovers. For a downstream majority and negative spillovers, there is no
upstream public good provision. Therefore a marginal change in spillovers has no inﬂu-
ence on the upstream or the downstream public good and the population distribution
does not change.
The comparative static results and the consequences of majority voting can be illus-
trated by specifying a functional form for the production and cost functions. The same
functional speciﬁcation is used as for decentralized jurisdictions. With rents distributed
to residents, the indirect utility functions, which depend on the population size of the
regions, are given by
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v1(n1) =

1 + n¯λ
2
2
− n1
2x¯
with n˜1 > n˜2
1− n¯λ2(1−κ2)2
2
− n1
2x¯
with n˜1 < n˜2 and κ2 ≥ 0
1− n¯λ2
2
− n1
2x¯
with n˜1 < n˜2 and κ2 < 0
v2(n1) =

1− n¯λ2(1−2κ2)
2
− n¯−n1
2x¯
with n˜1 > n˜2
1 +
n¯λ2(1+κ22)
2
− n¯−n1
2x¯
with n˜1 < n˜2 and κ2 ≥ 0
1 + n¯λ
2
2
− n¯−n1
2x¯
with n˜1 < n˜2 and κ2 < 0 .
(6.23)
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tion (the tax share is the same in both regions), it is only the supply of public goods and the income
opportunities that determine the population distribution. With an over-supply of the upstream public
good and no downstream public good the population distribution is distorted in favor of a large up-
stream population size. The equilibrium upstream population decreases monotonically in spillovers.
Migration flows on the second stage may change the majorities compared to the initial population
distribution. However, this does not influence public good provision since a sequential timing of events
is assumed in the game.
v1(n1;κ2 = −0.5), v2(n1;κ2 = −0.5)
v1(n1;κ2 = 0.5), v2(n1;κ2 = 0.5)
A downstream majority (right part of figure 6.4) over-supplies the downstream public good and
under-supplies the upstream public good. Taking the symmetrical social optimal population distri-
bution as a benchmark and considering the case without spillovers, a downstream majority leads to
the same locational pattern as a upstream majority, only the location of the majority is reversed. For
positive spillovers the effect of spillovers on the upstream population size is ambiguous as apparent in
equation 6.21. As the direct effect grows in the level of upstream public good provision, it is plausible
that the upstream population grows in spillovers for small positive spillover levels (the indirect effect
dominates) and it decreases for higher spillover levels (the direct effect dominates). Thus the size
of the downstream majority decreases for low spillover levels and increases for larger spillovers. For
negative spillovers the comparative static indicates that the population distribution does not change
with a downstream majority.
One can conclude that the initial population distribution has less significance for the migration
equilibrium in a centralized setting than it has for decentralized jurisdictions. With centralized voting
only the majority constellation has an impact on the outcome, whereas with decentralized voting there
is a different outcome for each possible initial locational pattern. The following section gives a more
detailed comparison of both federal organizations.
6.5.3 Decentralization or centralization?
Neither decentralization nor centralization lead to a socially efficient allocation when spillovers are
present and voter are not aware of migration. This raises the classical question of fiscal federalism
which is the best federal organization. A comparison of the two federal settings cannot only rely on
the first-order conditions and the comparative static properties of the different migration equilibria,
but it must also consider the absolute utility level of the migration equilibrium. This is possible with
a functional specification of the model. The same assumptions are made than for the social optimum
(see section 6.2.2) and the utility is given by yi + λ(gi + κigj), the regional production function by
ni − n
2
i
2x¯ , and the cost functions of the public goods by
g2i
2 . As apparent symmetry assumptions are
made with respect to public good benefits and costs, and the endowment with the fixed factor land.
The previous sections showed that the initial population distribution has an important impact
on the final migration equilibrium. This influence is also likely to drive the results of a comparison
between the two federal settings. In what follows special initial locational patterns will be assumed.
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dominates) and it decreases for higher spillover levels (the direct effect dominates). Thus the size
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One can conclude that the initial population distribution has less significance for the migration
equilibrium in a centralized setting than it has for decentralized jurisdictions. With centralized voting
only the majority constellation has an impact on the outcome, whereas with decentralized voting there
is a different outcome for each possible initial locational pattern. The following section gives a more
detailed comparison of both federal organizations.
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Neither decentralization nor centralization lead to a socially efficient allocation when spillovers are
present and voter are not aware of migration. This raises the classical question of fiscal federalism
which is the best federal organization. A comparison of the two federal settings cannot only rely on
the first-order conditions and the comparative static properties of the different migration equilibria,
but it must also consider the absolute utility level of the migration equilibrium. This is possible with
a functional specification of the model. The same assumptions are made than for the social optimum
(see section 6.2.2) and the utility is given by yi + λ(gi + κigj), the regional production function by
ni − n
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2x¯ , and the cost functions of the public goods by
g2i
2 . As apparent symmetry assumptions are
made with respect to public good benefits and costs, and the endowment with the fixed factor land.
The previous sections showed that the initial population distribution has an important impact
on the final migration equilibrium. This influence is also likely to drive the results of a comparison
between the two federal settings. In what follows special initial locational patterns will be assumed.
Figure 6.4: Indirect utility fr m centralization with an upstream majority (left) and a
downstream majority (right) for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1. v1 i increasing
and v2 is decreasing in n1.
Figure 6.4 shows the utility levels i the upstream nd downstream region that may
result from migration decisions at t e second stage of the game. In both regions uti ity
decreases in the population size. An upstream majori y (left p rt of ﬁgure 6.4) favors
the upstream region and neglects the downstream region in public good provision. Since
migration does not depend on taxation under centralization (the tax share is the same
in both regions), it is only the supply of public goods and the i come opportunities
that determine the population distribution. With a large s pply of the ups ream public
good and no downstream public good, the population distribution is distorted in favor
of a large upstream population size. As the comparative statics showed, the equilibrium
upstream population size decreases monotonically in spillovers. A negative and a positive
spillover level is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.4. A migration equilibrium is given where both
indirect utility functions cross. Migration ﬂows on the second stage may change the
majorities compared to the initial population distribution. A change of majorities is
more likely for positiv than for n gative spillovers. However, this does not inﬂuence
public good provision since a sequential timing of events is assumed in the game.
A downstream majority (right part of ﬁgure 6.4) over-supplies the dow stream pub-
lic good and under-supplies the upstream public good. Again two spillover levels are
illustrated. Positive spillovers lead to higher utility in both regions compared to the
case of negative spillovers. Because both regions beneﬁt it is not generally clear how the
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equilibrium population distribution is aﬀected by spillovers. This was also the results
found in the comparative static analysis. In ﬁgure 6.4 the positive spillover level leads
to a clearly larger upstream population than the negative spillover. Thus, depending
on the political majorities, positive spillovers can lead to a smaller or larger upstream
population size compared to negative spillovers.
Migration at the second stage leads to a population distribution that is characterized
by v1 = v2. With equal property shares the migration equilibrium is generally location-
ally eﬃcient since f 1n−y1 = f 2n−y2 ⇔ f 1n−(f 1n+ r1+r2n¯ − c1+c2n¯ ) = f 2n−(f 2n+ r1+r2n¯ − c1+c2n¯ )⇔
f 1n = f
2
n. This tends not to be the case for residency-based rent distribution, since it
does not generally hold that f 1n − ( f
1
n1
− c1+c2
n¯
) = f 2n − ( f
2
n2
− c1+c2
n¯
).
With centralized voting one ﬁnds that the initial population distribution has less
signiﬁcance for the migration equilibrium than it has for decentralized jurisdictions.
With centralized voting it is only the majority constellation that has an impact on the
outcome, whereas with decentralized voting there is a diﬀerent outcome for each possible
initial locational pattern. The following section gives a more detailed comparison of both
federal organizations.
6.4.3 Decentralization or centralization?
Neither decentralization nor centralization lead to a socially eﬃcient allocation when
spillovers are present and voters are not aware of migration. This raises the classical
question of ﬁscal federalism: Which is the best federal organization? A comparison of
the two federal settings cannot only rely on the ﬁrst-order conditions and the compar-
ative static properties of the diﬀerent migration equilibria, but it must also consider
the absolute utility level reached in the migration equilibrium. This is possible with a
functional speciﬁcation of the model. The same assumptions are made as for the social
optimum (see section 6.2.2), and the utility is given by yi + λ(gi + κigj), the regional
production function by ni− n
2
i
2x¯
, and the cost functions of the public goods by g
2
i
2
. As ap-
parent, symmetry assumptions are made with respect to marginal public good beneﬁts
and costs, and the endowment with the ﬁxed factor land.
The previous sections showed that the initial population distribution has an important
impact on the ﬁnal migration equilibrium. Since this impact also inﬂuences the federal
comparison, a special initial locational patterns will be assumed.
Assumption 6.3 The initial population is the same under both federal settings. Under
decentralization it holds that the initial population distribution is the same as in the ﬁnal
migration equilibrium, thus n˜i = ndi .
With this assumption, nobody has an incentive for migration after voting if public
goods are provided decentralized. Under centralization there is generally migration at
the second stage. Assumption 6.3 ensures that a hypothetical vote of the ﬁnal residents
of a region would lead to the same supply pattern of public goods than the actual
vote. Under decentralization and interior solutions, there is only one initial population
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distribution where a hypothetical vote of the ﬁnal residents leads to the same outcome.
This is diﬀerent under centralization, since the voting outcome depends only on the
location of the majority population but not on the exact size of the majority.
The previous analysis showed that the supply of public goods is not inﬂuenced by
the rent sharing scheme. With the focus on the interdependency between spillovers
and public goods, the following discussion focuses on rent distribution to residents. The
explicit solutions of the migration equilibrium for decentralization and centralization are
given in the appendix of this chapter. The appendix also contains graphical illustrations
of the allocations that not only show the impact of spillovers but also the inﬂuence of
the marginal beneﬁts from public goods. The appendix also shows the parameter values
for which corner solutions are relevant.
Conditions for the existence of interior migration equilibria were given in the pre-
ceding sections. It was argued that over-populated regions ensure the existence of an
interior migration equilibrium. A region is over-populated if ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0. With the adopted
functional form, the conditions can be speciﬁed for decentralized migration equilibria:
∂vi
∂ni
=
n˜2iλ
2
2n2i
− 1
2x¯
< 0 for i = 1, 2 . (6.24)
For both regions those conditions do not depend on spillovers. Since the provision
of public goods is not changed through migration, the marginal change of utility in
response to an immigrant is not inﬂuenced by the spillover level. With assumption 6.3,
the initial population distribution is the same as in the migration equilibrium (under
decentralization) and, since regions are over-populated, an interior migration equilibrium
requires x¯λ2 < 1. High marginal beneﬁts from public goods or a large land endowment
can imply that there is no migration equilibrium under decentralization. Assuming,
for the following analysis, that the total land endowment of each region is x¯ = 1, the
relevant range of marginal public good beneﬁts is λ ∈ (0, 1). For centralized public
good provision there is no such restriction on the marginal beneﬁts from public goods,
since concavity of the production functions is suﬃcient for the existence of an interior
migration equilibrium.
With the speciﬁed functional forms, the migration equilibria are illustrated with re-
spect to public goods, the population distribution, and the resulting utility levels.
Upstream public good provision is ineﬃcient for both federal settings for most spillover
levels. With decentralized supply the amount of the upstream public good decreases in
spillovers. This reﬂects the negative impact of spillovers on the upstream population
size (see ﬁgure 6.6). Under centralization, public goods depend on the voting majority.
It follows from assumption 6.3 that there is an upstream majority for negative spillovers
and a downstream majority for positive spillovers. An upstream majority disregards
spillovers and votes for a high level of the public good upstream (the upper curve of
centralized provision of g1 in ﬁgure 6.5). Since a downstream majority only considers
spillovers, the upstream public good is proportional to positive spillovers (the lower curve
of centralized provision of g1 in ﬁgure 6.5). With the parameter values assumed in ﬁgure
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of public good provision with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1,
and x¯ = 1
The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for social optimal
provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers have a larger impact on the
the population size for both federal settings than for the social optimum, since the range between the
respective maximum and minimum upstream population size is larger.
Utility increases in spillovers. This characterizes the social optimum as well as decentralization
and centralization. There is only a very small deviation from the social optimum for centralization,
whereas decentralized public good provision falls short of the social optimum for positive spillovers,
particularly if they are large.
After this brief overview both federal organizations are described in more detail below. The
main drawback of decentralization is the low upstream supply with the public good when spillovers
are positive. This reflects the missing opportunity of downstream citizens to pay for the upstream
provision. With negative spillovers decentralized provision is close to the social optimum. Thus,
there is an asymmetry between positive and negative spillovers. Whereas it is very inefficient for the
upstream voters to increase the provision for positive spillovers, it is possible to decrease the supply
for negative spillover without accepting a large deviation from the social optimal utility level. For
very negative spillovers decentralized provision leads to a corner solution without upstream provision.
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Figure 6.5: Compa ison of public good provision with myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1,
and x¯ = 1.
6.5, the social optimum has corner solutions for very negative spillovers. In this case it
is eﬃcient to have no upstream public good provision. Decentralized provision of the
downstream public good is fairly close to he social optimum unless spillovers a e very
negative. This is much in contrast to centralized provision, which is much too low or
much too high, depending on an upstream or downstream majority.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of the population distribution with myopic voting for λ = 0.5,
n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1. There are two curves for centralized supply since two
voting majorities are possible.
The population distributions correspond to the ineﬃciencies in public good supply.
A high level of public good consumption attracts a large population with detrimental
eﬀects on regional wages and rents. The combination of these eﬀects can st ll lead to
equal utility as required by an interior migration equilibrium. Decentralized jurisdic-
tions neglect spillovers, which results in an over-provision upstream whe spillovers are
negative. This induces migration to the upstream region because downstre m citizens
want to avoid the negative spillovers. This mechanism is in sharp contrast to the social
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optimum, where there is only a low level of the upstream public good and a large share
of the population lives downstream. With positive spillovers there is an under-provision
of the upstream public good. This is detrimental for both regions so that there is no
clear bias of locational choices. Even though spillovers are disregarded, the downstream
population grows in spillovers with decentralization as well as with the socially eﬃcient
provision of public goods. Under centralization the population distribution is inﬂuenced
by spillovers as well by the political-economy, since the majority regions attract a large
population share. Therefore, for a given level of spillovers the ﬁnal upstream population
is relatively large with an initial upstream majority and it is small with an initial down-
stream majority. The population of the upstream region is either larger or smaller than
in the social optimum or under decentralization. In principle there is no mechanism that
ensures that the location of the initial majority is the same as the ﬁnal majority constel-
lation. However, with the current assumptions on spillovers and public good beneﬁts,
there is no switch in the majority after migration as ﬁgures 6.12 and 6.13 in the appendix
show. Note that a switching majority has no eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome, since
voting only takes place at the ﬁrst stage and not later on.
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Figure 6.7: Comparison of utility with myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1.
There are two curves for centralized supply and negative spillovers since two
voting majorities are possible.
The utility levels of the federal organizations are inﬂuenced by ineﬃciencies in public
good provision and locational choices. Free and costless migration leads to the same
utility level of all citizens. The equilibrium utility levels are shown in ﬁgure 6.7. They
strictly increase in spillovers for decentralization and centralization. The comparison of
decentralization and centralization leads to a critical spillover level where both federal
organizations produce the same utility. Equating v1(gd1 , n
d
1) = v
1(gc1, g
c
2, n
c
1) can be solved
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for κ2:10
κcrit2 = 12 +
√
1+4 x¯λ2(1−x¯λ2)−1
4 x¯λ2
for κ2 ≥ 0 (6.25)
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1 Assume simple majority voting with myopic voters that receive land
rents based on their region of residency. Assume, in addition, interior solutions, and
equal marginal public good beneﬁts, equal regional production functions and land endow-
ments, and that assumptions 6.2 and 6.3 hold.
By equation 6.25 there is a critical level of positive spillovers, κcrit2 . Below this level
decentralization and above this level centralization lead to higher equilibrium utility levels.
For negative spillovers centralization is never superior to decentralization.
Given the assumptions, there is no mechanism that ensures locational eﬃciency in
the migration equilibrium.
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Figure 6.8: Utility depending on spillovers and on public good beneﬁts with myopic
voting for n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1. Without mesh: decentralization, with mesh:
centralization. Left: assumption 6.3 applies. Right: downstream majority
under centralization, same initial and ﬁnal location under decentralization.
Without spillovers decentralization leads to the socially optimal utility. In contrast
centralization clearly results in a lower utility because it suﬀers from the dominance of
the voting majority. Utility from centralization increases in positive spillovers at a higher
rate than utility from decentralization and if spillovers are large enough centralization
is superior to decentralization. With negative spillovers there is a upstream majority
under centralization and decentralization is always superior to centralization.
The critical level of spillovers, where decentralization and centralization produce the
same utility, depends on the size of the marginal beneﬁts from public goods. This in-
ﬂuence, together with the impact of spillovers, is illustrated on the left part of ﬁgure
10The critical values are derived by using the explicit solutions given in the appendix. The solution
with the negative square root of solving v1 = v1 for κ2 does not yield relevant critical spillover levels
in κ2 ∈ (1, 0) for λ2x¯ < 1 (condition from equation 6.24).
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6.8, which conﬁrms proposition 6.1. Note that for large negative spillovers in combi-
nation with high marginal public good beneﬁts, the plotted utility for decentralization
is not economically feasible since the non-negativity restriction for public goods is vi-
olated (see also ﬁgure 6.11 in the appendix of this chapter). With suﬃciently positive
spillovers, centralization is superior. The spillover range where centralization is superior
to decentralization growths in the marginal beneﬁt from public goods. For negative
spillovers and an upstream majority, decentralization is superior to centralization for
interior solutions.
The last part of proposition 6.1 states what was found already above (see the sections
on decentralization and centralization). With rent distribution to residents, there is no
mechanism that ensures locational eﬃciency in the migration equilibrium.
The above comparison of federal organizations relies crucially on the assumption that
the initial location is the same under both federal settings and that there is no real
migration under decentralization (assumption 6.3). This assumption can be relaxed.
First, if all possible initial locations are allowed under centralization but not under
decentralization, some of the above results remain valid. Under centralization, the mi-
gration equilibrium is only sensitive toward the location of the voting majority, but not to
the exact size of the initial population in each region. Therefore, as long as the location
of the initial majority does not change, the above results remain valid. If there is, how-
ever, a downstream (upstream) majority for negative (positive) spillovers, the outcome
is diﬀerent. A diﬀerent voting majority leads to a diﬀerent supply of public goods and
to diﬀerent locational patterns (see ﬁgures 6.12 and 6.13 in the appendix). Interestingly,
the resulting equilibrium utility is the same when spillovers are positive (see equation
6.33 in the appendix). Hence, even though the supply of public goods follows the myopic
interests of the majority region, the resulting utility level is the same for both majorities
and positive spillovers. In contrast, a downstream majority and negative spillovers lead
to a diﬀerent utility level than an upstream majority. With negative and also without
any spillovers, a downstream majority does not provide the upstream public good. The
downstream supply is at a constant high level independent of spillovers. The utility level
with a downstream majority is the same with negative and without spillovers. Thus, a
downstream majority leads to better outcomes than a upstream majority when spillovers
are negative. This yields the result that centralization is better than decentralization
for suﬃciently negative spillovers (see the right part of ﬁgure 6.8).
Second, if deviations between the initial and the ﬁnal population distributions are
allowed under decentralization, proposition 6.1 does not hold any longer. For small
deviations of the initial and the ﬁnal population distribution, equation 6.14 holds, which
states that the performance of decentralization can improve under certain conditions.
This would strengthens the case of decentralization. Large deviations, however, are
likely to decrease the equilibrium utility level under decentralization, which strengthens
the case for centralization.
Third, if there are no restrictions on the initial population, proposition 6.1 does not
hold. The comparison of both federal settings will than depend on the location of the
majority region and on the deviation of the initial and the ﬁnal locations under decen-
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tralizations. Qualitatively, the same basic considerations apply which were discussed in
the above two paragraphs.
The discussion on the federal settings focused on rent distribution to residents. With
the alternative assumption of equal property shares the above discussion is qualitatively
the same.
6.5 Flood-prone areas
The two region model is not only suitable for the analysis of upstream-downstream
spillovers, but also for the analysis of ﬂood-prone areas and the question if single issue
authorities shall be responsible for public ﬂood defense. Instead of an upstream and a
downstream region, the model now studies the relation between a ﬂood-prone community
and an adjacent community not exposed to ﬂood risk. The alternative to a single issue
authority is a large jurisdiction that comprises both communities, creating heterogeneous
voting preferences within this jurisdiction. The analogy of a single issue authority and
the above decentralized jurisdictions is evident. The same applies to a large jurisdiction
and centralization. Assuming that region 2 is the region not exposed to ﬂood risk, it
follows that u2g2 as well as u
2
g1 are zero. With this modiﬁcation the formal analysis of
two regions can be easily adapted to the issue of ﬂood defense and its implications on
human encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas.
The issue of the best federal organization is likely to be inﬂuenced by the beneﬁt
level of public goods. The two alternative federal setting are a single issue authority
(denoted by `sia') and a largeor status quojurisdiction with heterogeneous public
good beneﬁts (denoted by `lj'). Assuming that the ﬁrst-order condition for the supply
of public goods in region 1 determines the optimal solution, the impact of the marginal
public good beneﬁt can be determined by a comparative static analysis. The marginal
public good beneﬁts in region 1 inﬂuence the equilibrium allocation as follows
dvi
dλ1
∣∣∣
sia
=
A2n1c′′1u
1
λ1+A2(n1−n˜1)n˜1u1g1u1g1λ1
(A1n2+A2n1)c′′1
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 f in −
f i−ci(n˜i)
ni
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ci(n˜i)
ni
+
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(6.26)
dvi
dλ1
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=

A2n1c′′1u
1
λ1−A1n2n¯ u1g1u1g1λ1
(A1n2+A2n1)c′′1
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with Ai =
 f in −
fn
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ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(6.27)
The partial derivatives u1λ1 and u
1
g1λ1 are both positive. u
1
λ1 indicates the increase in
utility when the marginal public good beneﬁts grow. This partial derivative depends
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on the level of ﬂood defense. An increase in the marginal public good beneﬁts can be
interpreted as a better ﬂood defense technology, since a given level of spending translates
into a higher utility level and higher marginal beneﬁts. u1g1λ1 is constant, given the linear
utility in public goods.
If, in a single issue authority, the initial location is the same as in the migration
equilibrium, higher marginal beneﬁts clearly increase utility. This also holds as long
as the initial population in the high-beneﬁt region is not too large. Without a single
issue authority, the marginal beneﬁts have no impact on the utility when a majority
of voters live outside ﬂood-prone areas, because no ﬂood defense is provided. With a
majority of voters in ﬂood-prone areas, the marginal beneﬁts can increase or decrease the
equilibrium utility level. With the functional speciﬁcation used previously (see chapter
6.2.2) and rent distribution to residents, the impact is zero for symmetric regions, since
dvi
dλ1
= n¯λ1(x¯1−x¯2)
x¯1+x¯2
= 0 if x¯1 = x¯2. Thus, whereas a single issue authority promotes a
higher utility level in response to higher marginal beneﬁts under a fairly wide range
of conditions, this is not the case in a large jurisdiction. With heterogeneous beneﬁts,
majority voting leads to extreme supply levels of the public good and may lead to a
utility level that is the same with and without the public good (when dv
i
dλ1
= 0). As
already became clear in the earlier discussion, extreme supply levels of public goods
correspond to extreme locational patterns, since the majority region attracts a large
population share. Thus, ﬂood defense in a heterogeneous beneﬁt jurisdiction may foster
human encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas without a positive eﬀect on the overall utility
level.
Explicit solutions of the migration equilibrium are given in the appendix to this
chapter. Given the same functional speciﬁcation as used before, a single issue authority
yields the socially optimal outcome if the initial and the ﬁnal location of citizens is the
same. A large jurisdiction fails to achieve the social optimum.
It is a typical question in ﬂood management, if a ﬂood plain should be protected by
public ﬂood defense. As ﬁgure 6.9 shows, the answer to this question depends on the
federal setting, the scarcity of land outside the ﬂood plain, and the marginal beneﬁt
from ﬂood defense. The left illustrations of ﬁgure 6.9 show the allocation (location and
utility) of a single issue authority under the assumption that the initial and the ﬁnal
location of individuals is the same. The right two illustrations show a large jurisdiction
with an initial majority of voters living in the ﬂood plain.
Both federal settings lead to the same outcome, if ﬂood defense is not beneﬁcial,
λ = 0. For this special case the amount of land outside the ﬂood plain, x¯2, has a
positive inﬂuence on welfare and a negative impact on human encroachment on ﬂood-
prone areas. If ﬂood defense is beneﬁcial, λ > 0, the outcome of both federal settings
is not the same. The case λ = 0 can be interpreted as the status quo without ﬂood
defense. The equilibrium allocations can be compared to the status quo, yielding insight
into the question of how much ﬂood defense inﬂuences the equilibrium population sizes
of regions and the equilibrium utility level.
If ﬂood defense is provided by a single issue authority, both the level of the marginal
public good beneﬁt and the scarcity of land outside the ﬂood plain have a positive
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Figure 6.9: Utility depending on land outside the ﬂood plain with myopic voting for
n¯ = 1, x¯1 = 1, and residency based rent distribution. Left: Single issue
authority. Right: Large jurisdiction.
eﬀect on utility (see the lower left part of ﬁgure 6.9). Human encroachment on ﬂood-
prone areas is increasing in the level of the marginal beneﬁts of ﬂood defense. A large
quantity of land outside the ﬂood plain coincides with little human encroachment of
ﬂood-prone areas. For suﬃciently large marginal public good beneﬁts, the ﬁnal location
of all citizens is in the ﬂood plain. The case of complete concentration arises because
the force that favors the complete concentration (the public good beneﬁts) dominates
the force that scatters citizens over both regions (land scarcity). For the case λ1 = 1,
the quantity of land has no impact on the equilibrium utility level and the population
distribution. It can be summarized: In situations of extreme land scarcity outside the
ﬂood plain, ﬂood defense has a large positive impact on welfare and a small impact on
human encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas, compared to the status quo without ﬂood
defense. With abundant land outside the ﬂood plain, the impact of ﬂood defense on
welfare is positive but small and the impact on human encroachment on ﬂood-prone
areas is large. Since the allocations are the same for the adopted functional forms, this
result does not only hold for single issue authorities but also for the social optimum.
Flood defense provided by a large jurisdiction can decrease or increase utility (see
the lower right part of ﬁgure 6.9). Flood defense is only provided if the initial majority
of the population is living in the ﬂood plain. With a large quantity of land outside
the ﬂood plain, ﬂood defense decreases utility. The higher the marginal beneﬁts from
ﬂood defense, the larger the negative eﬀect on the equilibrium utility. If land outside
the ﬂood plain is scarce (small values of x¯2), ﬂood defense increases utility. With the
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same land endowment in and outside the ﬂood plain (x¯1 = x¯2 = 1), public ﬂood defense
does not change utility. This is the above case of dv
i
dλ1
= 0. Human encroachment on
ﬂood-prone areas is increasing in the level of the marginal beneﬁts of ﬂood defense.
For suﬃciently large marginal beneﬁts, all citizens will live in the ﬂood plain in the
migration equilibrium. As ﬁgure 6.9 shows, the full concentration of the population is
reached for a marginal public good beneﬁt that is independent of the land endowment
outside the ﬂood plain. With a large jurisdiction the complete regional concentration
of citizens is reached for lower marginal public good beneﬁts than with a single issue
authority. Together with the arguments made with respect to the case of λ1 = 0, one
can state, for a large jurisdiction and an initial majority of citizens living in the ﬂood
plain: In situations of extreme land scarcity outside the ﬂood plain, ﬂood defense has a
positive impact on welfare and a small impact on human encroachment on ﬂood-prone
areas, compared to the status quo without ﬂood defense. With abundant land outside
the ﬂood plain, the impact of ﬂood defense on welfare is negative and the impact on
human encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas is large.
One can conclude that ﬂood defense tends to have a large impact on the population
distribution when the potential welfare gains are low. The larger the marginal public
good beneﬁts, the less important the inﬂuence of land size outside the ﬂood plain on the
equilibrium utility level. Given the assumption regarding the initial location of voters
and the functional speciﬁcation, a single issue authority leads to higher welfare than a
large jurisdiction, since it reaches the social optimum.
6.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter introduced migration as a possible response of citizens to the supply of
public goods. Symmetry assumptions with respect to the preference and production side
of the economy were made in order to concentrate on unidirectional spillovers and their
impact on the migration equilibrium under diﬀerent federal organizations. As voters
were assumed to be myopic with respect to migration, the provision of public goods
followed the established pattern of the last chapter. With the assumption that the
initial population distribution is the same as the equilibrium population distribution,
a comparison of decentralized and centralized supply showed that decentralization is
superior for most spillover levels, since centralization suﬀers from an ineﬃcient, majority
preferred, supply pattern of public goods. Political-economy conditions and the federal
organization also drive the spatial distribution of the population. With decentralized
supply that neglects spillovers, the population size of the upstream region decreases in
spillovers. This pattern also holds for centralization with an upstream majority, but is
not a general property for a downstream majority. Under centralization the majority
regions attract a large population share, which tends to be a stronger inﬂuence on the
locational pattern than spillovers.
With the set up of the game the initial population distribution has a large impact on
the ﬁnal migration equilibrium. Under decentralization this impact is gradual, whereas
under centralization it is only the location of the majority that depends on the initial
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locational pattern.
With the two region model it was possible to investigate single issue authorities as
a federal organization that avoids heterogeneous beneﬁts within a jurisdiction. This
interpretation of the model allows to analyze human encroachment of ﬂood-prone areas.
With the adopted functional form and symmetry assumptions it turned out that single
issue authorities are the superior federal organization, because they have a positive
welfare eﬀect compared to a status quo without ﬂood defense. Negative welfare eﬀects
can arise when ﬂood defense is provided by a large jurisdiction that comprises areas
with and without public good beneﬁts. This leads to the conclusion that ﬂood defense
provided by jurisdictions with heterogeneous beneﬁts may just change the locational
pattern without having positive welfare eﬀects.
The allocation in the migration equilibrium is sensitive toward the tax scheme. The
preceding analysis focused on head taxes. Possible alternatives are income or rent taxes.
However, relying on other than head taxes does not entirely change the pattern of public
good supply, since upstream voters still neglect spillovers and over-provision still occurs
if non-beneﬁciaries can be taxed.
The above speciﬁcation of the model assumed myopic voters that were unaware of
potential migration at the second stage of the game. It is this assumption that will be
relaxed in the following chapter.
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Social optimum
The second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum require alternating signs
of the bordered principal minors of the bordered Hessian. This leads to the following
conditions that are always met for |H¯2|, |H¯3|, and |H¯4|. The case of |H¯5| was already
discussed earlier in chapter 6.
|H¯2| = n¯2(u1g1)2(u2g2)2 > 0
|H¯3| = −n¯(c′′1(u2g2)2 + c′′2(u2g1)2) < 0
|H¯4| = c′′1c′′2 > 0
|H¯5| = 1n¯ [c′′1(u2g2)2 + c′′2(c′′1(f 1nn + f 2nn) + (u1g1 − u2g1)2)] < 0
(6.28)
Total diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order conditions yields

−c′′1 0 0 0 u1g1 − u2g1
0 −c′′2 0 0 −u2g2
0 0 −1 1 f1nn + f2nn
u1g1 − u2g1 −u2g2 1 −1 0
−n1u1g1−n2u2g1 −n2u2g2 −n1 −n2 0


dg1
dg2
dy1
dy2
dn1
 =

n2u
2
g1k2 dκ2
0
0
−u2k2 dκ2
0
 . (6.29)
Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for the speciﬁed functional form yields the explicit
solutions for public good provision as well as the population size of the regions. The
eﬃcient allocation for an interior solution is given by
g∗1 =
n¯λ(1−λ2x¯−κ2)
2−λ2x¯B
g∗2 =
n¯λ(1−λ2x¯(1−κ2))
2−λ2x¯B
y∗1 = 1− n¯(1−λ
2x¯(λ2x¯−κ2(2−κ2)))
2x¯(2−λ2x¯B)
y∗2 = 1− n¯(1−λ
2x¯(λ2x¯−κ2(2+κ2)))
2x¯(2−λ2x¯B)
n∗1 =
n¯(1−λ2x¯(1−(1−κ2)κ2)
2−λ2x¯B
with B ≡ 2− (2− κ2)κ2 .
(6.30)
B is non-negative for all relevant spillovers (B > 0∀κ ∈ [−1, 1]). This yields the indirect
utility function
v∗1 = v
∗
2 = y
∗
1 + λg
∗
1 = y
∗
2 + λ(g
∗
2 + κ2g
∗
1) = 1− n¯(1+λ
2x¯(λ2x¯−(2+κ22)))
2x¯(2−λ2x¯B) . (6.31)
The plots of public goods, the population distribution and the utility level were given
in the main part of this chapter. Consumption of the private goods is illustrated in
ﬁgure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Social optimal consumption of the private goods for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
Decentralization and unidirectional spillovers
The equilibrium allocation for the adopted functional form and residency-based rent
distribution is given by
gd1 =
n¯λ(λ2x¯−1)
2(λ2x¯(1−κ2)−1)
gd2 =
n¯λ(λ2x¯(1−2κ2)−1)
2(λ2x¯(1−κ2)−1)
yd1 = 1− n¯(λ
4x¯2−1)
4 x¯(λ2x¯(1−κ2)−1)
yd2 = 1− n¯(λ
2x¯+1)(λ2x¯(1−2κ2)−1)
4 x¯(λ2x¯(1−κ2)−1)
nd1 =
n¯(λ2x¯−1)
2(λ2x¯(1−κ2)−1)
vdi = 1 +
n¯(λ2x¯−1)2
4 x¯(λ2x¯(1−κ2)−1) .
(6.32)
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Figure 6.11: Decentralized equilibrium allocation with myopic voting for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
A corner solution of the population or one of the public or private goods implies that
all corresponding combinations of spillovers and marginal beneﬁts lead to allocations that
are either not feasible or not optimal. For the graphical illustrations, corner solutions
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occur for high marginal beneﬁts and negative spillovers (front corners of the allocation).
However, the second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum are met for all
parameter values since they neither depend on marginal beneﬁts from public goods nor
on spillovers. A migration equilibrium exists for λ < 1.
Centralization and unidirectional spillovers
The equilibrium allocation for the adopted functional form and residency-based rent
distribution is given by
region 1 majority region 2 majority, κ2 ≥ 0
gc1 = n¯λ n¯λκ2
gc2 = 0 n¯λ
yc1 = 1− n¯(1+2λ
2x¯(2−κ2))
4x¯
1− n¯(1+2λ2x¯ κ2)
4x¯
yc2 = 1− n¯(1+2λ
2x¯ κ2)
4x¯
1− n¯(1+2λ2x¯(2−κ2+2κ22))
4x¯
nc1 =
n¯(1+2λ2x¯(1−κ2))
2
n¯(1−2λ2x¯(1−κ2+κ22))
2
vci = 1− n¯(1−2λ
2x¯ κ2)
4x¯
1− n¯(1−2λ2x¯ κ2)
4x¯
.
(6.33)
The allocation for a downstream majority with negative spillovers can be derived by
setting κ2 = 0 in the allocation of a downstream majority and positive spillovers.
A corner solution of the population or one of the public or private goods implies that
all corresponding combinations of spillovers and marginal beneﬁts lead to allocations that
are either not feasible or not optimal. For the graphical illustrations, corner solutions
occur for high marginal beneﬁts and negative spillovers (front corners of the allocation).
However, the second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum are met for all
parameter values since they neither depend on marginal beneﬁts from public goods nor
on spillovers.
Flood-prone areas
The equilibrium allocation for the functional form used before, the same initial and ﬁnal
location of voters in a single issue authority, and residency-based rent distribution is
given by
social optimum and large jurisdiction, n˜1 > n¯2
single issue authority
g1 =
n¯λ1x¯1
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯1x¯2 n¯λ1
n1 =
n¯x¯1
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯1x¯2 n¯ x¯1
1+2λ21x¯2
x¯1+x¯2
vi = 1− n¯ 1−λ
2
1x¯1
2(x¯1+x¯2)−2λ21x¯1x¯2 1 + n¯
λ21(x¯1−x¯2)
2(x¯1+x¯2)
.
(6.34)
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Figure 6.12: Centralized equilibrium allocation with myopic voting and an upstream
majority for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
For a region 2-majority in a large jurisdiction, the allocation is the same as with a
region 1-majority, only that λ1 must be set to zero.
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Figure 6.13: Centralized equilibrium allocation with myopic voting and a downstream
majority for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
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Chapter 7
Migration and non-myopic voting
The previous chapter showed how public goods inﬂuence migration decisions. By as-
sumption, voters neglected this inﬂuence, since they took the initial population distri-
bution as the ﬁnal population distribution. This assumption may not be very realistic,
since in most cases migration ﬂows lead to a diﬀerent equilibrium utility level than the
one aimed at in the voting decision. If, for example, the voting majority under cen-
tralization realizes that it is not able to achieve a high utility level through high public
good supply because this induces immigration, it may choose a diﬀerent supply pattern
with public goods to achieve a better population distribution with a higher utility. Such
considerations seem not unrealistic in the case of ﬂood defense. The majority may re-
alize that no public goods downstream will have an eﬀect on the locational choices of
downstream citizens. The awareness of interdependent utility levels may be particularly
pronounced when spillovers are present.
In this chapter, non-myopic voters who take potential migration at the second stage
of the game into account are assumed. Even though much of the literature assumes
myopic voters, it is well established that migration responses can be taken into account.
Examples are Stiglitz (1977), Boadway (1982), and Wellisch (1993; 1994). With non-
myopic voters the supply of public goods can be expected to be diﬀerent, which leads
to the question whether non-myopic voting produces better results than myopic voting
and how this inﬂuences the comparison between decentralized and centralized decision
making.
This chapter uses the same model as introduced in the previous chapter. Also the
set up of the game is the same as described in section 6.3. Now it is only assumed that
potential migration at the second stage of the game is anticipated at the ﬁrst stage when
citizens vote on public goods. The implications of this assumption will be described in
detail for decentralized and centralized voting.
7.1 Unidirectional spillovers
7.1.1 Decentralization
Under decentralization, each region decides independently on public goods at the ﬁrst
stage. The cost of public good provision is shared within the jurisdiction. At the second
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stage individuals decide on migration. Solving the game by backward induction yields
the equilibrium allocation.
At the second stage individuals choose their location. As before, a migration equi-
librium requires that nobody has an incentive for relocation. Given the set up of the
economy, an equilibrium distribution of individuals, without complete concentration
of the population in one region, requires that all individuals have the same utility,
no matter where they reside. As before, the free migration restriction is therefore
yi + u
i(gi, gj) = yj + u
j(gi, gj). With taxes paid at the second stage of the game, the
consumption of the private good in region i diﬀers for the two rent distribution schemes
yi =

f i(ni,x¯)−ci(gi)
ni
with rents to residents
f in +
ri+rj
n¯
− ci(gi)
ni
with equal property shares.
(7.1)
Changes in public good provision induce migration. Total diﬀerentiation of the free
migration restriction yields migration response functions, denoted by ni = ni(gi, gj), that
capture changes in the population size of a region in response to changes in public good
provision. Migration responses are not only relevant for an optimal supply of public
goods, but also for any migration equilibrium without complete concentration. Thus,
the population size of a region can be seen as a function of public goods. By the implicit
function theorem, the derivatives of the migration response function of the upstream
population size are given by
dn1
dg1
=
c′1
n1
−u1g1+u2g1
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
dn1
dg2
= −
c′2
n2
−u2g2
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
with Ai =
 f in − yi with rents to residentsci(gi)
ni
+
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(7.2)
With the whole economy comprising two regions, the downstream population responds
in the opposite way than indicated by the upstream migration responses. What are
the signs of the migration responses to changes in the supply of public goods? The
denominators of the migration responses are the sum of marginal changes of utility in
response to an immigrant to a region. If regions are over-populated so that assumption
6.2 of the last chapter holds ( ∂v
i
∂ni
< 0 for both regions), this sum is negative and the
denominators have a negative sign.
The sign of the enumerators depend on the level of public good provision. The easier
case is the enumerator of the downstream public good. It can be positive or negative.
With a small amount of the downstream public good, a marginal expansion of supply
increases the downstream utility because the marginal utility is higher than the marginal
cost. This leads to a negative enumerator and a negative sign of the total expression.
Thus, a marginal increase of the public good downstream increases downstream utility
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and induces migration to the downstream region, which reduces the upstream population
size, dn1
dg2
< 0. Migration takes the opposite direction for high supply levels of the
downstream public good, because utility decreases in the amount of g2.
For the upstream public good there is an additional eﬀect through spillovers. A
marginal increase of the upstream public good increases the downstream utility when
spillovers are positive. For negative spillovers it decreases utility downstream. This
eﬀect may be dominant if the marginal upstream beneﬁts and costs have a similar size.
Therefore negative spillovers in combination with a low level of the upstream public
good favor an increase of the upstream population because a higher upstream public
good does not only increase upstream utility, but also decreases the downstream utility
due to the negative spillovers. Positive spillovers, in combination with a high level of the
upstream public good, favor a negative migration response toward a marginal increase
of the upstream public good, because this induces migration to the downstream region.
At the ﬁrst stage there is voting on public goods. Individuals vote at their initial
location. Since voters are aware of migration they consider potential migration ﬂows
as determined by the migration response functions ni(gi, gj). It is assumed that voters
anticipate the correct migration responses as determined by equation 7.2.1 Voters take
public good provision of the other region as given. The optimization problem of the
median voter in region i is therefore given by
maxgi∈R+ yi + u
i(gi, gj)
with ni = ni(gi, gj); yi, yj ≥ 0; i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
(7.3)
This leads to the ﬁrst-order conditions for public good provision
− c′i(gi)
ni
+ uigi +
Ai
ni
dni
dgi
≤ 0 gi ≥ 0 and gi ∂(yi+ui)∂gi = 0; i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (7.4)
In his decision on the public good, the median voter in each region considers his
cost and beneﬁt. Public good costs are shared only among individuals living in that
region, even if spillovers to other regions prevail. In addition to his cost and beneﬁt,
the median voter also considers potential migration responses. He is aware that his
public good decision has an impact on the locational decisions of other individuals.
Therefore it is not the initial population distribution that is relevant for the voting
decision, but the anticipated ﬁnal population distribution. In taking the migration
responses into account, the median voter may favor more or less public good provision
than by just considering his own cost and beneﬁt for the given initial population size.
After inserting the migration responses and by concentrating on interior solutions, the
ﬁrst-order conditions reduce to the following equations
niu
i
gi +
Ai
Aj
nju
j
gi = c
′
i(gi) for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j . (7.5)
1A similar assumption is made with respect to the social planer in a decentralized setting by Wellisch
(1993) and others.
151
Chapter 7 Migration and non-myopic voting
By considering migration responses, upstream voters take spillovers into account. For an
(anticipated) population distribution of ni and nj, the upstream public good is expanded
in comparison to myopic voting for positive and reduced for negative spillovers. Despite
this consideration the amount of the upstream public good is not generally eﬃcient.
Only if the fraction A1
A2
is unity or if spillovers are absent, the upstream good is provided
according to the Samuelson rule. Downstream voters provide the public good eﬃciently
since their ﬁrst-order condition is not aﬀected by spillovers.
Second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum require the Hessian matrix to
be negative deﬁnite. The optimization problems of the representative voters in the two
jurisdictions yield two Hessian determinants. For residency-based rent distribution this
restricts the Hessian determinants for public good supply in region i, |H i1| to
|H11 | = −c′′1 + n2u
2
g1[2A
2
2u
1
g1+u
2
g1(n2(A2f
1
nn+A1f
2
nn)−2A1A2)]
A32
< 0
|H21 | = −c′′2 < 0.
(7.6)
For equal property shares the Hessian determinants are restricted to
|H11 | = −c′′1 +
n2u2g1[(1+n1)A
2
2u
1
g1+u
2
g1(n2(
∂A1
∂n1
A2+
∂A2
∂n1
A1)−(1−n2)A1A2)]
A32
< 0
|H21 | = −c′′2 < 0
with ∂Ai
∂ni
= − ci
n2i
+ (n¯−2ni)(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
+
ninj(f
i
nnn−fjnnn)
n¯
.
(7.7)
Without spillovers, the second-order suﬃcient conditions are always met since the Hessian
determinants only depend on the cost functions. With spillovers, marginal beneﬁts from
public goods must be suﬃciently small for the second-order suﬃcient conditions to hold.
The inﬂuence of spillovers on the Hessian determinants is not straight forward. The
Hessians are not only inﬂuenced by spillovers, but also by the production function and
the resulting (in-) eﬃcient population distribution.
Unlike the case with myopic voting, voters have no dominant strategy for the provision
of public goods with non-myopic voting. In focusing on the Nash-equilibrium in pure
strategies, it is assumed that voters of one region take the action of voters of the other
region as given. Since all voters have identical preferences and the budget restrictions
are the same within both regions, it is again possible to consider representative voters
of region i and j. The slopes of the reaction functions, gi = Ri(gj), are given by
∂R1
∂g2
=
A1n2u2g1u
2
g2
|H11 |A22
∂R2
∂g1
= −n2u2g1u2g2|H21 |A2 .
(7.8)
Depending on the sign of the spillover the slope is either positive or negative. If the
second-order conditions are met and regions are over-populated (assumption 6.2 holds),
positive spillovers imply that public good provision in the upstream and the downstream
region are strategic complements since ∂
2(yi+u
i)
∂gi∂gj
> 0. With negative spillovers, public
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goods are strategic substitutes, ∂
2(yi+u
i)
∂gi∂gj
< 0. Remember that with non-myopic behavior
the net-income yi depends in both cases on the migration response functions ni(gi, gj)
so that it generally holds that ∂
2(yi+u
i)
∂gi∂gj
6= 0. The Nash-equilibrium is characterized by
gd1 = R1(g
d
2) and g
d
2 = R2(g
d
1).
After voting on the supply of public goods, citizens can migrate at the second stage
of the game. Since the supply of public goods at the ﬁrst stage is optimized with
respect to the anticipated ﬁnal population distribution, migration takes place if the ﬁnal
population distribution deviates from the initial population size of the regions. With
the assumption of over-populated regions (assumption 6.2), utility diﬀerentials between
regions are eliminated by migration and an interior migration equilibrium is reached. A
migration equilibrium exists if marginal beneﬁts from the public goods are suﬃciently
small. The formal condition for existence is very similar to the last chapter (see equation
6.10), only that public goods do not depend on the initial population distribution but
on the anticipated ﬁnal locational pattern.
∂(vi−vj)
∂ni
=

ci(ni)
n2i
+
cj(nj)
n2j
+
f in− f
i
ni
ni
+
fjn− f
j
nj
nj
< 0 with rents to residents
ci(ni)
n2i
+
cj(nj)
n2j
+ f inn + f
j
nn < 0 with eq. prop. shares.
(7.9)
Assuming that the above ﬁrst and second-order conditions determine a global op-
timum, the economic interpretation of the decentralized migration equilibrium is as
follows. With non-myopic voting, citizens are aware of the free migration restriction and
know that the ﬁnal migration equilibrium is characterized by the same utility level for
the whole population. Therefore, in maximizing individual utility, voters maximize the
welfare of the whole economy. However, because of decentralized ﬁnancing the socially
optimal solution cannot be reached. The migration equilibrium is generally not only
characterized by ineﬃciencies in public good provision, but also by an ineﬃcient loca-
tional pattern. If spillovers are present, these two ineﬃciencies are closely linked, since
locational ineﬃciency implies that Ai 6= Aj, which distorts the supply of the upstream
public good. This interrelation follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions for public good
provision. Thus, a rule where the public goods are provided according to the Samuelson
rule, with decentralized voting, leads to a migration equilibrium with lower utility than
a migration equilibrium where the locational pattern and the public good provision is
distorted. Note that a deviation from the Samuelson rule is only beneﬁcial if spillovers
are present. For downstream voters a deviation from the Samuelson rule always reduces
their utility. This holds for an over-provision as well as an under-provision.
The population distribution is socially ineﬃcient if the social net-beneﬁt of an immi-
grant to a region, f in − yi, deviates between the upstream and the downstream region.
With rent distribution to residents and Ai deﬁned as above, it is clear that locational
ineﬃciency directly leads to ineﬃcient public good supply, because A1
A2
6= 1. For rent
distribution to land owners, locational ineﬃciency implies that c1
n1
6= c2
n2
, since f in − yi =
f in−(f in+ ri+rjn¯ − cini ). With c1n1 6= c2n2 it follows that A1A2 6= 1 since Ai =
ci(gi)
ni
+
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
.
153
Chapter 7 Migration and non-myopic voting
In a two region setting there are two possibilities for locational ineﬃciency. The ﬁrst
one is a larger social net-beneﬁt of an immigrant in the upstream than in the downstream
region, f 1n − y1 > f2n − y2. In this case it is socially eﬃcient that more people reside in
the upstream region, but with the given institutional setting there are no such migration
incentives. Thus, the population of the upstream region will be too small and that of
the downstream region too large. The second possibility of locational ineﬃciency is a
larger net-beneﬁts in the downstream region, which result in a downstream population
that is too small.2
With a locationally ineﬃcient migration equilibrium, whether the upstream public
good is over- or under-supplied compared to the Samuelson rule depends on the quo-
tient A1
A2
. With over-populated regions, as implied by assumption 6.2, the fraction A1
A2
is
positive, since Ai as well as
Ai
ni
have the same (negative) sign for both regions. There-
fore locational ineﬃciency is accompanied by the following distortions in public good
provision.
- A1
A2
< 1 and κ2 > 0: The net-beneﬁt of an immigrant to the upstream region is
larger than to the downstream region. With regard to the Samuelson rule, this
induces an under-supply of the upstream public good. The under-supply has a
positive eﬀect on the equilibrium population size of the upstream region.3
- A1
A2
< 1 and κ2 < 0: There is a larger net-beneﬁt in the upstream region and
the upstream public good is over-supplied. With negative spillovers the deviation
from the Samuelson rule favors the upstream population. For a given population
distribution there is a positive eﬀect on the upstream utility and a negative eﬀect
on the downstream utility. This has a positive eﬀect on the upstream population
size in the migration equilibrium.
- A1
A2
> 1 and κ2 > 0: There is a larger net-beneﬁt in the downstream region. Given
the positive spillovers there is an over-supply of the upstream public good. This
has a positive eﬀect on the downstream population size compared to decentralized
public good provision according to the Samuelson rule.
- A1
A2
> 1 and κ2 < 0: There is a larger net-beneﬁt in the downstream region. With
the negative spillover there is an under-supply of the upstream public good. The
under-supply has a positive eﬀect on the downstream population size.
It can be summarized that a larger net-beneﬁt in the upstream region, A1
A2
< 1, leads
to a deviation from the Samuelson rule that favors the upstream region, whereas the
opposite holds for a larger net-beneﬁt in the downstream region.
2As Wellisch (1993; 1994) and also Boadway and Flatters (1982) show, it is possible to solve this
problem by inter-regional transfers. Such transfers can equalize the social net-beneﬁt of an immigrant
across regions and promote the eﬃcient supply with public goods. A migration equilibrium with
f1n − y1 > f2n − y2 requires a net-transfer from region 2 to region 1 since the later has the higher
social net-beneﬁt of an immigrant.
3The eﬀect is positive since inserting the ﬁrst-order condition into the migration response yields ∂n1∂g1 =
n1u
1
g1+
A1
A2
n2u
2
g1
n1
−u1g1+u2g1
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
= n2u
2
g1
A2
, which is negative for positive spillovers.
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The comparative static eﬀects of a marginal increase of spillovers on the allocation in
the migration equilibrium are not as easily determined as with myopic voting. Spillovers,
denoted with the parameter κ2, do not only aﬀect migration at the second stage but
also the public good provision at the ﬁrst stage. Under decentralization the eﬀect on the
equilibrium level of the upstream and downstream public goods for interior solutions is
given by:
dg1
dκ2
= n2
u2κ2 [
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
A22n1c
′′
2u
1
g1−u2g1
?︷ ︸︸ ︷
(c′′2C−A1n1n2(u2g2)2) ]+
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
A1A2(A1n2+A2n1)c′′2u
2
g1κ2
|J |A22(A1n2+A2n1)
dg2
dκ2
= n2u
2
g2
u2κ2[−A22n1c′′1+A2n1n2u1g1u2g1+A1n22(u2g1)2]−A1n2(A1n2+A2n1)u2g1u2g1κ2
|J |A22(A1n2+A2n1)
(7.10)
with C =
 A1A2[n¯+ n1 − n2
n1f1nn
A1
− n1 n2f2nnA2 ] with rents to residents
A1A2[n1 − n2
n1
∂A1
∂n1
A1
− n1
n2
∂A2
∂n2
A2
] with equal property shares
|J | = −c′′2|H11 | − A1n
2
2(u
2
g1)
2(u2g2)
2
A32
.
Total diﬀerentiation of the free migration restriction and inserting comparative static
results for dg1
dκ2
and dg2
dκ2
yields the impact of spillovers on the population size of the regions
dn1
dκ2
= −n2c′′2 u
2
κ2[−A22n1c′′1+A2n1n2u1g1u2g1+A1n22(u2g1)2]−A1n2(A1n2+A2n1)u2g1u2g1κ2
|J |A22(A1n2+A2n1) .
(7.11)
The sign of the denominators is negative if |J | = −c′′2|H11 | − A1n
2
2(u
2
g1)
2(u2g2)
2
A32
> 0. This
condition restricts marginal beneﬁts from public goods to suﬃciently small levels. As in
the social optimum, a number of partial derivatives are part of the comparative statics.
In addition, the marginal changes in utility towards an immigrant to a region play a
prominent role since these changes are given by Ai = ni ∂v
i
∂ni
. Thus, for the current
level of generality the interplay of the diﬀerent eﬀects is complicated. However, a few
characteristics can be found.
- The impact of spillovers on the amount of the upstream public good is ambiguous.
As indicated by the brackets, the diﬀerent terms of the enumerator do not have
the same sign. It is also not straightforward to use the impact of spillovers on u2κ2
and u2g1 to ﬁnd ranges of spillovers with unambiguous comparative static eﬀects.
- Downstream public good provision is eﬃcient for a given size of the population.
The impact of spillovers depends, therefore, solely on the size of the population of
the regions and the sign of dg2
dκ2
is always the opposite of dn1
dκ2
.
- For positive spillovers the enumerator is clearly negative, which leads to a negative
impact of spillovers on the upstream population size if |J | > 0. For suﬃciently
negative spillovers this impact may become positive. Thus, the upstream popula-
tion size may have an inverted U-shape, in spillovers. With an inverted U-shape
the maximum size of the downstream population is reached for negative spillovers.
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The results of decentralized non-myopic voting can be summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.1 A decentralized political-economy approach under the assumption that
voters are aware of the correct migration responses does not generally lead to socially
eﬃcient public good provision and a socially eﬃcient locations pattern of individuals in
the migration equilibrium. This result does not depend on the rent distribution scheme.
7.1.2 Centralization
Under centralization there is a single jurisdiction in charge of public good provision in
both regions. With the political-economy approach, there is majority voting on upstream
as well as downstream public good provision at the ﬁrst stage of the game. Costs of
public good provision are shared within the jurisdiction on an equal per capita basis.
With the two alternative rent distribution schemes, income in region i is given by
yi =

f i(ni,x¯)
ni
− ci(gi)+cj(gj)
n¯
with rents to residents
f in +
ri+rj
n¯
− ci(gi)+cj(gj)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(7.12)
At the second stage, individuals decide on their location. Solving the game by back-
ward induction yields the equilibrium allocation.
At the second stage, an equilibrium distribution of individuals, without complete
concentration of the population in one region, requires that all individuals have the same
utility, yi + ui(gi, gj) = yj + uj(gi, gj), and that nobody has an incentive for relocation.
Changes in public good provision induce migration. Total diﬀerentiation of the free
migration restriction yields migration response functions, denoted by ni = ni(gi, gj), that
capture changes in the population size of a region in response to changes in public good
provision. These migration responses hold for any given supply level of public goods, as
long as no complete concentration of individuals in one region occurs. By the implicit
function theorem, the derivatives of the upstream population size are given by
dn1
dg1
= −u1g1−u2g1A1
n1
+
A2
n2
dn1
dg2
=
u2g2
A1
n1
+
A2
n2
with Ai =
 f in −
f i
ni
with rents to residents
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(7.13)
In a two region economy, the downstream population size responds in the opposite way
to the upstream population size. The denominator of the migration responses is the sum
of marginal changes in utility in response to an immigrant to a region. If regions are
over-populated so that assumption 6.2 of the last chapter holds, this sum is negative and
the denominator has a negative sign. The sign of the enumerator does not depend on the
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level of public goods as with decentralized provision. With centralized provision, public
goods are ﬁnanced by a common budget and taxes do not appear in the enumerator.
An increase of the downstream public good increases the downstream utility, implying
that the sign of the enumerator is positive. With centralized provision, the cost of the
public goods are shared equally among all voters. Therefore it is only the additional
downstream utility that inﬂuences the utility diﬀerential between the two regions. This
would be diﬀerent if utility where not linear in the private good that ﬁnances the public
goods. A utility diﬀerential in favor of the downstream region induces migration to the
downstream region and the sign of dn1
dg2
is negative.
The upstream public good has a positive eﬀect on upstream utility and, depending
on spillovers, either a positive or negative eﬀect downstream. If the upstream marginal
public good beneﬁt is larger upstream than downstream, which might be violated in
cases of very large positive spillovers, upstream utility increases more than downstream
utility and the enumerator is positive. This leads to migration to the upstream region,
dn1
dg1
> 0. The migration response depends on the spillovers; it is large for very negative
spillovers and small for positive spillovers.
At the ﬁrst stage citizens vote on public goods. Proposals are adopted by a simple
majority rule. Individuals vote at their initial location and take potential migration
at the second stage into account. Therefore voters see the population distribution as
a function of the supply of public goods, ni = ni(gi, gj). The function ni(.) is the
correctly anticipated migration response, whose derivatives are given by equation 7.13.
In a centralized jurisdiction, two public goods need to be determined by voting. As in
the previous chapters it is assumed that there are sequential votes on the supply of the
upstream and downstream public good. It is assumed that the ﬁrst vote is on the public
good in region i and the second on the public good in region j. Since migration responses
from the second stage are considered, the voting decisions are not dominant strategies as
with myopic voting, and therefore the sequence of voting may be important. Solving the
game by backward induction, the second vote, on the public good in region j considers
migration responses and takes the public good in region i as given. The median voter
from region m, which can be either the upstream or downstream region, has the utility
function ym + um(gi, gj) and faces the following optimization problem in voting on the
supply of the public good in region j:
maxgj∈R+ ym + u
m(gi, gj)
with nm = nm(gi, gj); yi, yj ≥ 0; i, j,m ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j.
(7.14)
The resulting ﬁrst-order condition for gcj is given by
− c′j(gj)
n¯
+ umgj +
Am
nm
dnm
dgj
≤ 0 gj ≥ 0 and gj ∂(ym+um)∂gj = 0;
i, j,m ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j.
(7.15)
Inserting the migration responses as derived from the free migration restriction, the
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ﬁrst-order condition for gcj turns out to be independent from the location of the median
voter (the location of the majority region). It reads as:
nju
j
gj +
Aj
Ai
ni u
i
gj = c
′
j(gj)
nj+ni
Aj
Ai
n¯
; i, j ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j . (7.16)
The above ﬁrst-order condition determines a reaction function, gj = Rj(gi), that cap-
tures how the second voting decision depends on the outcome of the ﬁrst vote. Total
diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order condition of gj yields the slope of the reaction function
∂Rj
∂gi
=

ninjDu
i
gi(u
j
gj−uigj)
− c
′′
j
n¯
(niAj+njAi)3+ninjD(u
j
gj−uigj)2
with rents to residents
uigi(u
j
gj−uigj)
c′′j (f inn+f
j
nn)+(u
j
gj−uigj)2
with equal property shares
with D = A1A2(n2
n1f1nn
A1
+ n1
n2f2nn
A2
− 2n¯).
(7.17)
With equal property shares, the sign of the reaction function is positive for suﬃciently
small (negative) spillovers. A positive sign indicates that the public goods are strategic
complements. For suﬃciently large spillovers the derivative is negative and the public
goods are strategic substitutes. The same also holds for residency-based rent distribution
with a negative D. The term D may become positive if f i is very concave so that f inn is
very negative and f inn  1ni (f in −
f i
ni
).
The ﬁrst vote on gi takes the second vote and the migration responses into account.
The optimization problem and the ﬁrst-order condition for gi are therefore given by
maxgi∈R+ ym + u
m(gi, gj)
with nm = nm(gi, gj); gj = Rj(gi); yi, yj ≥ 0; i, j,m ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j,
(7.18)
− c
′
i(gi)+c
′
j(gi)
∂Rj
∂gi
n¯
+ umgi + u
m
gj
∂Rj
∂gi
+ Am
nm
(dnm
dgi
+ dnm
dgj
∂Rj
∂gi
) ≤ 0
gi ≥ 0 and gi ∂(ym+um)∂gi = 0 , i, j,m ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j.
(7.19)
Assuming that the median voter anticipates the correct migration responses and the
correct slope of the reaction function, the ﬁrst-order condition for public good provision
in region i simpliﬁes to:
niu
i
gi +
Ai
Aj
nj u
j
gi = c
′
i(gi)
ni+nj
Ai
Aj
n¯
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}; i 6= j . (7.20)
As in the vote for gj, the ﬁrst-order condition for gi turns out to be the same no matter
where the median voter is located. Also the sequence of voting has no inﬂuence on the
voting outcome. Thus the assumption of sequential voting is not crucial in the present
context, since the most preferred allocation of public goods is the same for all voters and
voting cycles do not occur. Note that the initial population distribution has no inﬂuence
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on the voting outcome, since the median voters are representative voters with respect
to preferences and their ability to anticipate the correct migration responses.
With the assumption of the same property shares of land of all citizens, Ai equals Aj,
since ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
=
njni(f
j
nn+f
i
nn)
n¯
. Therefore the fraction Ai
Aj
is unity and the public goods
are provided according to the Samuelson rule. In addition the migration equilibrium is
locationally eﬃcient, since the net-beneﬁt of an immigrant to a region (f in − yi) is the
same in both regions because f in − (f in + ri+rjn¯ − ci+cjn¯ ) = f jn − (f jn + ri+rjn¯ − ci+cjn¯ ). Thus
the outcome is the same as in the social optimum. This is not the case with residency-
based rent distribution, since Ai does not generally equal Aj and the upstream and the
downstream supply of the public goods are ineﬃcient as is the locational pattern.
The second-order conditions can be derived for the optimization problem of a repre-
sentative voter for the ﬁrst and second vote on gi and gj, respectively. A local maximum
as an interior solution requires a negative deﬁnite Hessian matrix. For the two one-
dimensional optimization problems and residency-based rent distribution this leads to
|H i1| = − c
′′
i
n¯
− c′′j (uigi−u
j
gi)
2ninjD
n¯|Hj1 |(Ainj+Ajni)3
< 0
|Hj1 | = −
c′′j
n¯
+
(ujgj−uigj)2njniD
(Ajni+Ainj)3
< 0
with D = AiAj(nj
nif
i
nn
Ai
+ ni
njf
j
nn
Aj
− 2n¯).
(7.21)
D is negative unless f i is very concave so that f inn is very negative and f
i
nn  1ni (f in −
f i
ni
). With a negative D, the second-order suﬃcient conditions may be violated for
high marginal beneﬁts from the public goods or for negative or small positive values of
spillovers. Thus, the combination of low marginal public good beneﬁts and large positive
spillovers makes it more likely that the second-order suﬃcient conditions are met.
For equal property shares the second-order suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum
lead to the following requirements for the ﬁrst and second vote on gi and gj. The
condition |H i1| < 0 is in fact the same requirement as |H¯5| < 0, which was the crucial
condition for the social optimum (see equation 6.3).
|H i1| = −c′′i −
c′′j (u
i
gi−ujgi)2
−|Hj1 |(f inn+fjnn)
< 0
|Hj1 | = −c′′j −
(ujgj−uigj)2
fjnn+f inn
< 0 .
(7.22)
After voting on the supply of public goods, citizens can migrate at the second stage
of the game. Since the supply of public goods at the ﬁrst stage is optimized with
respect to the anticipated ﬁnal population distribution, migration takes place if the ﬁnal
population distribution deviates from the initial population size of the regions. With
the assumption of over-populated regions (assumption 6.2), utility diﬀerentials between
regions are eliminated by migration and an interior migration equilibrium is reached.
This leads to the following conditions that hold for concave production functions (see
also the explanation of equation 6.19).
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∂(vi−vj)
∂ni
=
f in− f
i
ni
ni
+
fjn− f
j
nj
nj
< 0 with rents to residents
∂(vi−vj)
∂ni
= f inn + f
j
nn < 0 with equal property shares.
(7.23)
Assuming that the above ﬁrst and second-order conditions determine a global opti-
mum, the centralized migration equilibrium has the following characteristics. Due to the
free migration restriction the utility of every individual is the same. Since non-myopic
voters are aware of this restriction, they are not only maximizing their own utility but
also the welfare of the whole economy. With equal property shares, the migration equilib-
rium is socially eﬃcient, since the fraction Ai
Aj
is unity which ensures that the Samuelson
rule holds for public goods and indicates that the social net-beneﬁts of an immigrant
are equalized across regions.
With residency-based rent distribution, the migration equilibrium may not be eﬃ-
cient. The ﬁrst-order conditions for public good provision (see equation 7.20) show that
locational ineﬃciency is accompanied by an ineﬃcient supply of public goods. In the
migration equilibrium there will be an over- or under-supply of public goods with regard
to the Samuelson rule. Since Ai = f in − f
i
ni
is always negative for concave production
functions, the quotient A1
A2
is always positive.
- A1
A2
< 1: For negative and suﬃciently small positive spillovers this distortion causes
an over-supply of the upstream public good and an under-supply of the downstream
public good. Since public goods are ﬁnanced by all individuals, the combination of
an over- and under-supply clearly increases the upstream population and decreases
the downstream population. For very large positive spillovers there may not be an
over-supply of the upstream public good anymore. However, the under-supply of
the downstream public good is independent of the spillover level.
- A1
A2
> 1: For negative and suﬃciently small positive spillovers this distortion causes
an under-supply of the upstream public good and an over-supply of the downstream
public good. Since public goods are ﬁnanced by all individuals, the combination of
an under- and over-supply clearly decreases the upstream population and increases
the downstream population. For very large positive spillovers there may not be
an under-supply of the upstream public good anymore, but the over-supply of the
downstream public good remains.
The fraction A1
A2
can be seen as a measure of locational ineﬃciency, since the devia-
tion of the fraction from unity is a measure of how large the social net-beneﬁts of an
immigrant to a region deviate between regions. With rent distribution to residents, the
fraction does not directly depend on public goods and spillovers, since A1
A2
= f
1
n−f1/n1
f2n−f2/n2 .
Depending on the type of production function one can ﬁnd that ineﬃcient locational
choices and ineﬃcient public good provision mitigate or amplify each other. For produc-
tion functions with
∂(f in− fini )
∂ni
< 0, the partial derivative of the marginal net-beneﬁt of an
immigrant to a region is negative.4 For this type of production function the deviation
4The derivative is given by
∂(fin− fini )
∂ni
= f inn − 1ni (f in −
fi
ni
).
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from the Samuelson rule in public good provision reduces locational ineﬃciency, since
the diﬀerence in the net-beneﬁts (f in − yi)− (f jn − yj) decreases. With
∂(f in− fini )
∂ni
> 0, the
partial derivative of the marginal net-beneﬁt of an immigrant to a region is positive. In
this case the deviation from the Samuelson rule in public good provision increases the
diﬀerence in the net-beneﬁts (f in − yi) − (f jn − yj). Thus, for this type of production
function ineﬃcient public good supply and locational ineﬃciency exacerbate each other.
Locational ineﬃciency implies that the relocation of an individual can be Pareto-
improving, since the net-beneﬁt of an immigrant to a region is not the same for both
regions. However, for a given locationally ineﬃcient migration equilibrium no individual
can improve his utility by migration. An immigrant to the region with the higher net-
beneﬁt improves aggregated welfare for a given level of public good supply. With the
given tax and rent distribution scheme, the welfare gains from migration are, however,
unevenly distributed, since after migration the population of the origin region is better
oﬀ than the population of the immigration region. Since a migrant does not improve his
utility, there exists a locationally ineﬃcient migration equilibrium. A locationally ineﬃ-
cient migration equilibrium indicates that the tax scheme is imperfect. The population
of the region with the higher marginal net-beneﬁt pays too much for public goods and
the population with the lower net-beneﬁt pays too little.5 To mitigate this drawback of
the tax scheme, the provision of public goods deviates from the Samuelson rule. The
public good is over-supplied in the region that pays too much tax and it is under-supplied
in the region which pays too little tax.
A comparative static analysis shows the impact of spillovers on the equilibrium al-
location under centralization. There are two ﬁrst-order conditions for upstream and
downstream public good provision. Together with the free migration restriction the
comparative static eﬀects can be determined. With equal property shares, the compara-
tive statics are the same as in the social optimum (see equation 6.4 in the last chapter).
For rent distribution to residents and interior solutions, the unidirectional spillover κ2
inﬂuences upstream and downstream public good provision as follows:
dg1
dκ2
= n2
−n1c′′2u2κ2(u1g1−u2g1)(A1n2+A2n1)D+u2g1κ2A1[c′′2 (A1n2+A2n1)3−n¯n1n2(u2g2)2D]
|J |n¯(A1n2+A2n1)4
dg2
dκ2
=
n2n1u2g2D [c
′′
1u
2
κ2(A1n2+A2n1)−n¯n2u2g1κ2(u1g1−u2g1)A1]
|J |n¯(A1n2+A2n1)4 .
|J | = c′′1 c′′2
n¯2
− [c′′2 (u1g1−u2g1)2+c′′1 (u2g2)2]n1n2D
n¯(A1n2+A2n1)3
(7.24)
Total diﬀerentiation of the free migration restriction and inserting comparative static
results for dg1
dκ2
and dg2
dκ2
yields the impact of spillovers on the size of the upstream region:
dn1
dκ2
=
n1n2c′′2 [c
′′
1u
2
κ2(A1n2+A2n1)−n¯n2 u2g1κ2(u1g1−u2g1)A1]
|J |n¯2(A1n2+A2n1)2 . (7.25)
5As with decentralized public good supply, the problem of locational ineﬃciency could be completely
solved by inter-regional transfers.
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With J > 0 the denominator of all three comparative statics is positive.6 D can be
positive or negative. It is positive if f i is very concave so that f inn is very negative and
f inn  1ni (f in−
f i
ni
). Without further qualiﬁcations to the spillover level, the comparative
statics are ambiguous. As mentioned with respect to the comparative statics of the de-
centralized migration equilibrium, most partial derivatives depend on the spillover level.
Assuming, as for the social optimum, that the second-order derivatives of the production
and cost functions are not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by spillovers, two expressions remain.
u1g1 − u2g1 is decreasing in spillovers since u2g1 is proportional to the spillovers level. The
expression is positive unless spillovers are very large and marginal public good beneﬁts
in the downstream region are large. u2κ2 is positive and depends on the supply level of
the upstream public good. Concentrating on these two eﬀects the inﬂuence of spillover
is as follows.
- With a positive denominator, the sign of the enumerator indicates how the spillover
level inﬂuences g1. If D is zero, the impact of spillovers on the amount of g1 is pos-
itive. If D is suﬃciently positive or negative, the comparative static may become
ambiguous. Large marginal public good beneﬁts and strong negative spillovers
tend to strengthen the impact of D on the comparative static.
- The impact of changing spillovers on downstream public good provision is quali-
tatively the same (the opposite) to that on the upstream population size if D is
positive (negative).
- The ﬁrst term in the square brackets of the enumerator increases in spillovers for
∂g1
∂κ2
> 0. The second term decreases. This is the same pattern as in the social
optimum and may imply an inverted U-shaped form of the upstream population
size in spillovers if the denominator is positive.
Proposition 7.2 Centralized simple majority voting, under the assumption that voters
anticipate the correct migration responses and the correct reaction function, and assump-
tion 6.2, leads to an allocation that is most preferred by all voters independent of their
initial location and the sequence of voting.
i) With equal property shares the migration equilibrium is socially eﬃcient.
ii) With residency-based rent distribution the migration equilibrium is not generally
socially eﬃcient. If the migration equilibrium is locationally eﬃcient without spillovers
and if the downstream population size is U-shaped in spillovers with it's maximum with-
out spillovers, the locational pattern is increasingly ineﬃcient in spillovers as long as
∂(f in−fi)
∂ni
has the same sign for all equilibrium allocations.
Part i) of the proposition states what was found above. With equal land shares owned
by all citizens, the centralized migration equilibrium is socially eﬃcient.
Part ii) of the proposition states that eﬃciency is not always given for residency-based
rent distribution. Ineﬃciencies are present for most spillover levels and under certain
6If there would be simultaneous voting on g1 and g2, the second-order condition would in fact require
J > 0 for an interior maximum.
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conditions it holds that negative as well as positive spillovers increase the locational
ineﬃciency of the migration equilibrium.
With locational ineﬃciency, one of the following inequalities holds: f 1n − y1 ≤≥
f 2n − y2 ⇔ f 1n − f1n1 − c1+c2n¯ ≤≥ f 2n −
f2
n2
− c1+c2
n¯
⇔ f 1n − f1n1 ≤≥ f 2n −
f2
n2
. It is apparent
that locational eﬃciency depends solely on the regional production functions and not on
the cost shares from the public goods. If the term f in − fini is strictly monotone in labor
and has the same sign of the slope for both regional production functions, locational
eﬃciency is possible for exactly one population distribution. All other equilibrium pop-
ulation distributions are locational ineﬃcient. The further the deviation from the one
eﬃcient population distribution, the larger the locational ineﬃciency of the migration
equilibrium. If the downstream population size is U-shaped in spillovers, there is a range
of spillovers where an increase in spillovers increases locational ineﬃciency and another
range where the opposite holds. Assuming that purely local public goods induce a loca-
tionally eﬃcient migration equilibrium that is characterized by the smallest downstream
equilibrium population (the minimum of the U), negative as well as positive spillovers
imply locational ineﬃciency. Therefore larger positive or negative spillovers increase
locational ineﬃciency. With regard to the downstream public good, it was found above
that the extent of locational ineﬃciency determines the deviation from the Samuelson
rule. For the upstream public good, an increase in locational ineﬃciency does not always
increase the deviation from the Samuelson rule.
It is somehow surprising that the ineﬃciencies of centralized supply of public goods
may increase rather than decrease in spillovers. This resultwhich only holds for
residency-based rent distributionis contrary to what was found in the previous chap-
ters and what is established in the literature on ﬁscal federalism. However, one can note
that it is not primarily the spillover that causes the ineﬃciency, but rather the ineﬃcient
population distribution. If there would be a mechanism to ensure locational eﬃciency,
the supply of the public goods would be eﬃcient independent of the level of spillovers.
7.1.3 Decentralization or centralization?
Based on the analysis of decentralized and centralized voting the two federal organiza-
tions can be compared. With rent distribution to land owners, who own land by equal
property shares, the social optimum is reached for centralization. Thus, decentralized
supply of the public goods cannot yield better outcomes than the centralized supply and
centralization is the recommended federal setting. This result shows that it is crucial to
know if voters are aware of migration ﬂows or not. Ignorant votersas assumed in the
previous chapteronly consider their own utility and the political-economy majority
constellation drives the results with centralized voting. Since decentralization avoids
the exploitation of the minority, this federal setting was better for most spillover val-
ues. With non-myopic voting, citizens are aware that the majority cannot exploit the
minority, since migration equalizes the utility within the whole economy.
With residency-based rent distribution the comparison of decentralization and cen-
tralization is less clear. A comparison cannot only rely on the ﬁrst-order conditions and
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the comparative static properties of the diﬀerent migration equilibria, but it must also
consider the absolute utility level of the migration equilibrium. This is possible with a
functional speciﬁcation of the model. The same assumptions are made as for the social
optimum (see section 6.2.2) and the utility is given by yi + λ(gi + κigj), the regional
production functions by ni − n
2
i
2x¯
, and the cost functions of the public goods by g
2
i
2
. The
explicit solutions of the migration equilibria for decentralization and centralization with
rent distribution to residents are given in the appendix to this chapter. The following
discussion illustrates the role of spillovers for a given parameter set of marginal public
good beneﬁts, λ, land endowments, x¯, and the total population size, n¯. In addition, the
appendix also illustrates the inﬂuence of marginal public good beneﬁts on the equilib-
rium allocation.
A decentralized migration equilibrium exists if ∂(v
1(n1)−v2(n1))
∂n1
< 0. Inserting the
equilibrium population size into the derivative yields
∂(v1(n1)−v2(n1))
∂n1
= x¯λ2 − 2 + (x¯λ2+E−1)2
4κ22 λ
2x¯
< 0
with E = [1 + λ2x¯(λ2x¯(1− 4κ2) + 4κ2(1 + κ2)− 2)] 12 .
(7.26)
With high marginal beneﬁts from public goods or a large land endowment there may not
be a migration equilibrium under decentralization. A graphical illustration the existence
condition is given in the appendix (see ﬁgure 7.9). The following comparison of decen-
tralization and centralization is made for parameter values that allow inner solutions.
For these parameter values the decentralized migration equilibria exist. Existence of the
migration equilibrium is given for public good provision under centralization.
The preceding and also the following analysis focuses on interior solutions. The graph-
ical illustration of the equilibrium allocation in the appendix shows the parameter con-
stellations for which corner solutions are relevant. Beside spillovers, diﬀerent marginal
beneﬁts from public goods are considered. Large marginal beneﬁts from public goods
and negative spillovers lead to corner solutions without upstream public good provision.
These corner solutions occur for a range of parameters for decentralized provision and
also for socially optimal provision (see ﬁgure 7.7 and 6.2). However, it is not relevant
for centralized provision, as ﬁgure 7.10 shows. Corner solutions are not only possible
with no upstream public good provision, but also with the complete concentration of
the population in the downstream region.
Below are graphical illustrations of the allocations of both federal settings and the
social optimum and how they depend on the spillover level. All other parameters are
assumed to be constant. For the illustrated parameter range, the second-order condi-
tions for interior solutions are satisﬁed. For decentralization and upstream public good
provision, this is illustrated in ﬁgure 7.8 of the appendix. For downstream public good
provision, the second-order condition is always satisﬁed. With centralized voting the
second-order conditions, as stated by the Hessian determinants, are satisﬁed, since they
reduce to the conditions |Hj1 | = − 1n¯ < 0 and |H i1| = 1n¯2 > 0 because the term D in
equation 7.22 is zero.
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of public good provision with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1,
and x¯ = 1
The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for social optimal
provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers have a larger impact on the
the population size for both federal settings than for the social optimum, since the range between the
respective maximum and minimum upstream population size is larger.
Utility increases in spillovers. This characterizes the social optimum as well as decentralization
and centralization. There is only a very small deviation from the social optimum for centralization,
whereas decentralized public good provision falls short of the social optimum for positive spillovers,
particularly if they are large.
After this brief overview both federal organizations are described in more detail below. The
main drawback of decentralization is the low upstream supply with the public good when spillovers
are positive. This reflects the missing opportunity of downstream citizens to pay for the upstream
provision. With negative spillovers decentralized provision is close to the social optimum. Thus,
there is an asymmetry between positive and negative spillovers. Whereas it is very inefficient for the
upstream voters to increase the provision for positive spillovers, it is possible to decrease the supply
for negative spillover without accepting a large deviation from the social optimal utility level. For
very negative spillovers decentralized provision leads to a corner solution without upstream provision.
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of public good provision with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5,
n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1
Upstream and downstream public good provisio is illu tr ted in ﬁgure 6.5. With-
out spillove s, the decentralized and centralized su p y patt rn is the same as in the
social optimum. If spillovers are present, both federal settings provide larger or smaller
amounts than the socially optimal supply levels. The most obvious deviation occurs
for decentralized provision and positive spillovers. Note that sup-optimal pu lic good
provision does not necessarily imply a deviation from the Samuelson rule, since this rule
can be followed also for very ineﬃcient locational patterns.
As discussed above, a deviation from the Samuelson rule is accompanied by locational
ineﬃciency. An illustration of the magnitude of locational ineﬃci ncy is given in ﬁgure
7.2, which shows the fraction A1
A2
for decentralized and centralized voting. With the
functional speciﬁcation, the fraction A1
A2
is unity for purely local public goods so that both
federal settings are locationally eﬃcient if no spillovers are present. With decentralized
voting, A1
A2
exceeds unity for negative spillovers. Only the corner solution without the
upstream public good (and no spillovers) achieves locational eﬃciency. As argued in
the section on decentralization (7.1.1), this implies that the social net-beneﬁt of an
immigrant to the downstream region is larger than to the upstream region, along with
an under-supply of the upstream public good. For positive spillovers, A1
A2
is below unity,
which also induces an under-supply of the upstream public good. Locational in ﬃc ency
is very large for intermediate negative spillovers or for strong positive spillovers. Under
centralization, the fraction A1
A2
is less than unity if spillovers are present. This implies
(see section 7.1.2) an under-supply of the downstream public good. The upstream public
good is over-supplied as long as spillovers are suﬃciently small. As stated in proposition,
7.2 locational ineﬃciency is large when spillovers are extreme.
The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for
socially optimal provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers
have a larger impact on the population size for both federal settings than for the social
optimum, since the range between the respective maximum and minimum upstream
population size is larger.
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The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for social optimal
provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers have a larger impact on the
the population size for both federal settings than for the social optimum, since the range between the
respective maximum and minimum upstream population size is larger.
Utility increases in spillovers. This characterizes the social optimum as well as decentralization
and centralization. There is only a very small deviation from the social optimum for centralization,
whereas decentralized public good provision falls short of the social optimum for positive spillovers,
particularly if they are large.
After this brief overview both federal organizations are described in more detail below. The
main drawback of decentralization is the low upstream supply with the public good when spillovers
are positive. This reflects the missing opportunity of downstream citizens to pay for the upstream
provision. With negative spillovers decentralized provision is close to the social optimum. Thus,
there is an asymmetry between positive and negative spillovers. Whereas it is very inefficient for the
upstream voters to increase the provision for positive spillovers, it is possible to decrease the supply
for negative spillover without accepting a large deviation from the social optimal utility level. For
very negative spillovers decentralized provision leads to a corner solution without upstream provision.
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Figure 7.3: Comparison of population distribution with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1,
and x¯ = 1
The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for social optimal
provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers have a larger impact on the
the population size for both federal settings than for the social optimum, since the range between the
respective maximum and minimum upstream population size is larger.
Utility increases in spillovers. This characterizes the social optimum as well as decentralization
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Figure 7.3: Comparison of population distribution with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5,
n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1
Utility increases in spillovers. This is the case for the social optimum as well as
decentralization and centralization. There is only a very small deviation from the social
optimum for centralization, whereas decentralized public good provision falls short of
the social optimum for positive spillovers, particularly if they are large.
After this brief overview, both federal orga izations are described in more detail be-
low. The main drawback of decentralization is the low upstream supply with the public
good when spillovers are positive. This reﬂects the missing opportunity of downstream
citizens to pay for the upstream provision. Wi h egative spill vers, centralized pro-
vision is close to the social optimum. Thus, there is an asymmetry between positive and
negative spillovers. Whereas it is very ineﬃcient for the upstream voters to increase the
provision for positive spillovers, it is possible to decrease the supply for negative spillover
without accepting a large deviation from the s cially optimal utili y level. For very neg-
ative spillovers, decentralized provision leads to a corner solution without upstream
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of utility with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1, and x¯ = 1
provision. The corner solution is reached for the same spillover level as in the social
optimum. For this corner solution, decentralization reaches the social optimum, since
the utility level is also the same. With decentralized jurisdictions and interior solutions,
the downstream public good is provided according to the Samuelson rule, therefore the
deviation from the social optimum reﬂects the ineﬃcient population distribution across
regions. The upstream population size ﬁrst rises and then falls in spillovers, and the
maximal size is reached for negative spillovers. The deviation from the socially optimal
upstream population size is particularly large for high positive spillovers. This is not
surprising, since citizens are drawn to the downstream region that receives the positive
spillovers without having to pay for the upstream public good.
With centralized provision of the public goods, the deviation from the social optimum
is relatively large for large positive or negative spillovers. However, the absolute devia-
tion tends to be smaller than with decentralized provision, particularly with respect to
the upstream public good. The deviation is also a deviation from the Samuelson rule, as
ﬁgure 7.1 shows. This is directly apparent for the downstream public good since it does
not change in spillovers at all, despite a changing locational pattern of the population.
Thus, the illustrated allocations show that there is an under-provision of the down-
stream public good for positive as well as negative spillovers. In the preceding section
on centralization (7.1.2) it was argued that distorted public good supply can mitigate
locational ineﬃciency for regional production functions with the property
∂(f in− fini )
∂ni
< 0.
For the production function f i(ni) = ni+
n2i
2x¯
the derivative is given by
∂(f in− fini )
∂ni
= −1
2
< 0,
which implies that the distorted supply of public goods brings the fraction Ai
Aj
closer to
unity. The distorted public good supplyan over-supply for most spillover values up-
stream and an under-supply downstreaminﬂuences locational choices in favor of the
upstream region. Thus, without the distorted public good supply the upstream region
would be even smaller than illustrated in ﬁgure 7.3.
For almost all spillover levels with interior solutions, centralization is superior to de-
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Figure 7.5: Utility diﬀerence between decentralization and centralization with non-
myopic voting for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1. The vertical axis shows the utility
diﬀerence vd− vc. Left: advantage for decentralization if vd− vc > 0. Right:
advantage for centralization if vd − vc < 0. For large λ and negative κ2 cor-
ner solutions are possible, invalidating the comparison between the federal
settings.
centralization. This is in sharp contrast to the previous chapter where voters where
not aware of migration responses. The utility diﬀerence of decentralized and centralized
provision is illustrated in ﬁgure 7.5. This numerical comparison, which is based on a
given total population and a certain land endowment, shows that centralization is supe-
rior to decentralization for most spillovers and marginal beneﬁt levels. If the diﬀerence
vd−vc is negative, centralization is superior and if the diﬀerence is positive the opposite
holds. Decentralization only leads to larger utility levels if there are negative spillovers
and high marginal beneﬁts. Note, however, that, for most of these parameter values,
corner solutions occur for the socially optimal and decentralized allocations (no supply
of the upstream public good). Therefore, for these parameter values, the illustrated
comparison is not valid. In case of a corner solution without the upstream public good,
decentralization leads to the social optimum, since the downstream public good is eﬃ-
ciently provided according to the Samuelson rule. With the corner solution, locational
eﬃciency prevails as ﬁgure 7.2 shows. Thus, the centralized allocation without a cor-
ner solution (see ﬁgure 7.10) cannot be superior to the decentralized allocation for the
relevant parameter values.
The preceding analysis that relied on numerical examples as well as on more general
considerations leads to the following proposition that summarizes the results.
Proposition 7.3 With simple majority voting, under the assumption that voters antic-
ipate the correct migration responses and the correct reaction functions and assumption
6.2, the comparison of decentralization and centralization is independent of the initial
location of voters.
i) With equal land ownership of all individuals, a decentralized political-economy ap-
proach is never superior to a centralized approach since the latter achieves the socially
optimal allocation.
ii) With rent distribution to residents and the adopted functional speciﬁcation of the
168
7.2 Flood-prone areas
production and cost functions, centralization is superior to decentralization if vd−vc < 0,
and decentralization is superior to centralization if vd − vc > 0. Figure 7.5 shows that
centralization is superior to decentralization for all positive spillover levels.
7.2 Flood-prone areas
As with myopic voting, the model can be used to analyze ﬂood-prone areas and the
linkage between public ﬂood defense and migration. Assuming again that region 2 is not
exposed to ﬂood risk, it follows that u2g2 as well as u
2
g1 are zero, since there is only one
purely local public good in the economy.
The public goodﬂood defensecan again be supplied by a single issue authority
or by a large jurisdiction that comprises the high-beneﬁt region and the region without
beneﬁts. The optimization problems for these two settings are analogous to those of
decentralization and centralization. The ﬁrst-order conditions from equation 7.5 and
7.16 can be adapted to the case of only one public good that is provided in region 1.
This leads to
n1u
1
g1 = c
′
1(g1) with a single issue authority
n1u
1
g1 = c
′
1(g1)
n1+n2
A1
A2
n¯
with a large jurisdiction
with Ai =
 f in −
f i)
ni
with rents to residents
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯
with equal property shares.
(7.27)
In a single issue authority the public good is provided according to the Samuelson
rule for both rent sharing schemes. Locational eﬃciency is not generally given, since
no mechanism ensures that f 1n − f
1−c1
n1
= f 2n − f
2
n2
for residency based rent distribution
or that f 1n − (f 1n + r1+r2n¯ − c1n1 ) = f 2n − (f 2n + r1+r2n¯ ) with equal property shares. In a
large jurisdiction with equal property shares, any migration equilibrium is locationally
eﬃcient, since f 1n − (f 1n + r1+r2−c1n¯ ) = f 2n − (f 2n + r1+r2−c1n¯ ). Thus, the fraction A1A2 is unity
and the public good is provided eﬃciently. With residency-based rent distribution this
is not generally the case, since locational eﬃciency requires f 1n − f
1−c1
n¯
= f 2n − f
2−c1
n¯
.
Assuming that the ﬁrst-order condition determines a global optimum, one can con-
clude that single issue authorities do not generally lead to eﬃcient migration equilibria.
Rather, this is possible with a large jurisdiction and equal property shares. Again, eﬃ-
ciency may not be given for residency-based rent distribution. However, whereas with
myopic voting there was a rather general recommendation in favor of a single issue au-
thority, just the opposite may be best with non-myopic voting and equal property shares,
because a large jurisdiction is eﬃcient.
By adopting functional forms, the equilibrium allocation of the two federal settings
can be illustrated. A similar setting is assumed as before and the utility is given by
yi + λigi, the regional production functions by ni − n
2
i
2x¯
, and the cost function for the
public good by g
2
1
2
. The public good is purely local, so that no spillovers are present.
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deviation from the Samuelson rule since this rule can be followed also for very inefficient locational
patterns.
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of public good provision with non-myopic voting for λ = 0.5, n¯ = 1,
and x¯ = 1
The population size of the upstream region has an inverted U-shape in spillovers for social optimal
provision as well as with decentralized or centralized supply. Spillovers have a larger impact on the
the population size for both federal settings than for the social optimum, since the range between the
respective maximum and minimum upstream population size is larger.
Utility increases in spillovers. This characterizes the social optimum as well as decentralization
and centralization. There is only a very small deviation from the social optimum for centralization,
whereas decentralized public good provision falls short of the social optimum for positive spillovers,
particularly if they are large.
After this brief overview both federal organizations are described in more detail below. The
main drawback of decentralization is the low upstream supply with the public good when spillovers
are positive. This reflects the missing opportunity of downstream citizens to pay for the upstream
provision. With negative spillovers decentralized provision is close to the social optimum. Thus,
there is an asymmetry between positive and negative spillovers. Whereas it is very inefficient for the
upstream voters to increase the provision for positive spillovers, it is possible to decrease the supply
for negative spillover without accepting a large deviation from the social optimal utility level. For
very negative spillovers decentralized provision leads to a corner solution without upstream provision.
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The first-order conditions from equation 7.5 and 7.16 can be adapted to the case of
only one public good that is provided in region 1. This leads to
n1u
1
g1 = c
′
1(g1) with a single issue authority
n1u
1
g1 = c
′
1(g1)
n1+n2
A1
A2
n¯ with a large jurisdiction
with Ai =

f in − f
i)
ni
with rents to residents
ninj(f
i
nn+f
j
nn)
n¯ with equal property shares.
(7.27)
Under decentralization public goods are provides according to the Samuelson rule for
both rent sharing schemes. Locational efficiency is not generally given since no mechanism
ensures that f1n − f
1−c1
n1
= f2n − f
2
n2
for residency based rent distribution or that f1n − (f1n +
r1+r2
n¯ − c1n1 ) = f2n−(f2n+ r1+r2n¯ ) with equal property shares. Under centralization and equal
property shares any migration equilibrium is locational efficient since f1n−(f1n+ r1+r2−c1n¯ ) =
f2n − (f2n + r1+r2−c1n¯ ). Thus, the fraction A1A2 is unity and the public good is provided
efficiently. With residency-based rent distribution this is not generally the case since
locational efficiency requires f1n − f
1−c1
n¯ = f
2
n − f
2−c1
n¯ .
Assuming that the first-order conditions determine a global optimum, one can conclude
that single issue authorities do not generally lead to efficient migration equilibria. Con-
trary, this is possible with a large jurisdiction and equal property shares. Again, efficiency
may not be given for residency-based rent distribution. However, whereas with myopic
voting there was a rather general recommendation in favor of a single issue authority, just
the opposite may be best with non-myopic voting and equal property shares, because a
large jurisdiction can achieve the social optimum.
Adopting a functional form it can be shown that a large jurisdiction is may also be
inferior to a single issue authority as it is the case for residency-based rent distribution.
single issue authority
large jurisdiction
Assuming that the necessary and sufficient conditions for a optimum are met and using
the free migration restriction, the benefit level, denoted by λ, influences the population
size of the high benefit region as follows: ...
wh re ∗, sia, and nsia denotes the social optimum, a single issue authority and a large
jurisdiction, respectively. The impact of marginal public good benefits in region 1 on the
equilibrium utility level is given by ...
This leads to the
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Figure 7.6: Flood-prone areas and the migration equilibrium with non- yopic voting
for n¯ = 1, and x¯1 = x¯2 = 1. Left: residency-based rent distribution. Right:
equal property shares. Lambda stands for λ1.
Since there is only one public good, it holds that λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. The explicit
solutions of the migration equilibria for the social optimum, a single issue authority, and
a large jurisdict on are given in the appendix to this chapter.
Figure 7.6 shows the impact of the marginal public good beneﬁt in the high-beneﬁt
region on the migration equilibrium. The outcome is shown for residency-based rent
distribution (left side) and equal property shares (right side). With equal property
shares the allocation is eﬃcient if the public good is provided within a large jurisdiction,
and it is not eﬃcient with a single issue authority. This follows directly from the ﬁrst-
order conditions. A single issue authority provides too little of the public good. With
residency-based rent distribution, the single issue authority is eﬃcient, whereas this is
not the case with a large jurisdiction, because there is too little public good supply. Note
that the eﬃcient outcome with a single issue authority is only given with the speciﬁed
functional form and may not hold for other cases.
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Similar to the discussion in section 6.5, the eﬀects of ﬂood defense can be compared
to a status quo without ﬂood defense. As before, for a federal setting that achieves
the social optimum, the following argument can be made: In situations of extreme land
scarcity outside the ﬂood plain, ﬂood defense has a large positive impact on welfare and
a small impact on human encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas, compared to the status
quo without ﬂood defense. With abundant land outside the ﬂood plain, the impact of
ﬂood defense on welfare is positive but small and the impact on human encroachment on
ﬂood prone-areas is large. As ﬁgure 7.11 in the appendix shows, this argument carries
over to non-myopic voting and federal settings that do not achieve the social optimum.
One can conclude that non-myopic citizens vote for ﬂood defense no matter if they
live in a ﬂood-prone area or not. The comparison of the two federal settings does not
allow a general recommendation as to whether public goods with spatially heterogeneous
beneﬁts shall be provided by a large jurisdiction or a single issue authority. It is, however,
possible to state that single issue authorities ensure an eﬃcient supply of public goods,
whereas they may fail to achieve locational eﬃciency. Large jurisdictions lead to eﬃcient
outcomes, if the rent distribution schemes promotes eﬃcient locational choices. Flood
defense tends to have a large impact on the population distribution when the potential
welfare gains are low. The larger the marginal public good beneﬁts, the less important
the inﬂuence of land size outside the ﬂood plain on the equilibrium utility level.
7.3 Concluding remarks
This chapter analyzed a local economy with free migration and non-myopic voters and
found quite diﬀerent results than the previous chapter with myopic voting (chapter 6).
Non-myopic voters are aware of the free migration restriction and therefore vote for
a supply pattern that approximates the social optimum. However, due to the ﬁnanc-
ing restriction of a federal organization the social optimum is not always attainable.
With unidirectional spillovers and depending on the federal setting the supply of public
goods deviates from the Samuelson rule whenever the migration equilibrium is loca-
tional ineﬃcient. Independent of the federal organizations it turned out that the initial
population distribution (and the resulting political majority under centralization) has
no inﬂuence on the equilibrium allocation. Unlike with myopic voting and also unlike
the basic model without migration the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization
and centralization are not monotone in spillovers implying that one cannot generally rec-
ommend decentralization for small and centralization for large spillover levels. Such a
pattern was suggested in the earlier chapters. Given the right rent distribution scheme
it even turned out that centralization may be generally eﬃcient and that decentralization
increasingly falls short of the socially optimal utility level as spillovers grow.
With non-myopic citizens there is no general recommendation that ﬂood defense shall
be provided by a single issue authority. Even though single issue authorities are eﬃcient
in public good supply, they may trigger ineﬃcient locational choices. In contrast, the
outcome is eﬃcient in a large jurisdiction and equal property shares.
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The two chapters on local public goods and migration made a number of assumptions
that may be relaxed or modiﬁed. First, given the sequence of events it was assumed
that the ﬁnal residents pay for public goods. If it is the initial population of a region
that pays taxes, locational decisions are not inﬂuenced by the cost-shares for public
goods. This weakens the case for the complete concentration of all citizens in one
region because migration is not driven by the promise of lower taxes. The migration
equilibrium is not generally characterized by equal utility of all citizens but only by
equal utility of those citizens with the same initial location. Thus, also with non-myopic
voting the initial population has an inﬂuence on the ﬁnal outcome. Second, the sequence
of voting and migration can be modiﬁed. With a reversed timing of eventsmigration
before votingsome arguments of the previous discussion can be used. With voting at
the second stage it is always beneﬁcial to just consider the individual cost-shares and
beneﬁts and neglect spillovers to other regions, since locational choices are already made.
This will be anticipated at the ﬁrst stage and incentives for relocation are only absent
with one of the equilibrium locational patterns found in the chapter on myopic voting
(chapter 6). These patterns depend on the federal organization. Thus, in a sequential
game with voting at the second stage there is no disciplinary eﬀect of migration on the
supply decisions of public goods. Another variation of the game are simultaneous public
good and locational decisions. However, with a political-economy approach the voting
procedure is not well deﬁned, as it is not clear at what location each citizen is voting. A
third assumption was made regarding ﬂood-prone areas. Beside the possibility of public
ﬂood defense, locations in and outside the ﬂood plain had the same basic characteristics.
In reality citizens living in ﬂood-prone areas suﬀer from (expected) ﬂood damages. At
the same time ﬂood-prone areas might be more productivee.g. more fertile agricultural
landthan land outside the ﬂood plain. Such diﬀerences can easily be incorporated into
the model, leading to more general results. However, the basic eﬀects of public ﬂood
defense and the considerations regarding the federal organizations will remain unchanged
with such extentions.
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Decentralization and unidirectional spillovers
The equilibrium allocation for the adopted functional form and residency-based rent
distribution is given by
gd1 = − 2λn¯(λ
2x¯−1)(λ2x¯+E−1)κ2
(λ2x¯+E−1)2−4κ2 λ2x¯(λ2x¯+E−1)+4κ22 λ2x¯ (1+E)
gd2 =
n¯ λ+4 n¯ κ22 λ
3x¯ (λ2x¯−1)
(λ2x¯+E−1)2−4κ2 λ2x¯(λ2x¯+E−1)+4κ22 λ2x¯ (1+E)
ydi = 1− n
d
i
2x¯
− (gdi )2
2ndi
nd1 = − 4 n¯ κ
2
2 λ
2x¯ (λ2x¯−1)
(λ2x¯+E−1)2−4κ2 λ2x¯(λ2x¯+E−1)+4κ22 λ2x¯ (1+E)
vdi =
n¯(λ2x¯−1)(λ2x¯(3−2κ2)+E−3)+4x¯(λ2x¯(2−κ2(2−κ2))−2)
4x¯(λ2x¯(2−κ2(2−κ2))−2)
with E = [1 + λ2x¯(λ2x¯(1− 4κ2) + 4κ2(1 + κ2)− 2)] 12
(7.28)
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Figure 7.7: Decentralized equilibrium allocation with non-myopic voting for n¯ = 1 and
x¯ = 1
A corner solution of the population or one of the public goods implies that all cor-
responding combinations of spillovers and marginal beneﬁts lead to allocations that are
either not feasible or not optimal. For the graphical illustrations, corner solutions occur
for high marginal beneﬁts and negative spillovers (front corners of the allocation) for the
upstream public good. Figure 7.8 shows the second-order condition for the upstream
public good for the parameter range under consideration. Since H11 is negative for these
values, the ﬁrst-order condition determines a maximum. As found in the main text, the
second-order condition for downstream public good provision is met for all preference
parameters and spillovers.
173
Chapter 7 Migration and non-myopic voting
0
0.5
1
lambda
-0.5
-1
0
0.5
1
k2
0
-4Det H1
Figure 7.8: Second-order condition for g1 for decentralized non-myopic voting for n¯ = 1
and x¯ = 1
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6.3 Appendix
6.3.1 Decentralization
The allocation in the decentralized migration equilibrium:
gd1 = − 2λn¯(λ
2x¯−1)(λ2x¯+E−1)κ2
(λ2x¯+E−1)2−4κ2 λ2x¯(λ2x¯+E−1)+4κ22 λ2x¯ (1+E)
gd2 = n¯ λ+
4 n¯ κ22 λ
3x¯ (λ2x¯−1)
(λ2x¯+E−1)2−4κ2 λ2x¯(λ2x¯+E−1)+4κ22 λ2x¯ (1+E)
yi = 1− n
d
i
2x¯ −
(gdi )
2
2ndi
nd1 = − 4 n¯ κ
2
2 λ
2x¯ (λ2x¯−1)
(λ2x¯+E−1)2−4κ2 λ2x¯(λ2x¯+E−1)+4κ22 λ2x¯ (1+E)
udi =
n¯(λ2x¯−1)(λ2x¯(3−2κ2)+E−3)+4x¯(λ2x¯(2−κ2(2−κ2))−2)
4x¯(λ2x¯(2−κ2(2−κ2))−2)
with E = [1 + λ2x¯(λ2x¯(1− 4κ2) + 4κ2(1 + κ2)− 2)] 12
(6.20)
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Figure 6.5: Decentralized equilibrium allocation with non-myopic voting for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1
A corner solution of the population or one of the public goods implies that all corresponding
combinations of spillovers and marginal benefits lead to allocations that are either not feasible
or not optimal. For the graphical illustrations a corner solutions occur for high marginal
benefits and negative spillovers (front corners of the allocation).
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Figure 7.9: Existence of a decentralized migration equilibrium with non-myopic voting
for n¯ = 1 and x¯ = 1 . If ∂(v
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< 0, there is an interior migration equilib-
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Centralization and unidirectional spillovers
The equilibrium allocation for the adopted functional form and residency-based rent
distribution is given by
gc1 =
n¯λ(1+κ2)
2
gc2 =
n¯λ
2
yc1 = 1− n¯λ
2x¯(2+κ2(2−κ2))+2
8x¯
yc2 = 1− n¯λ
2x¯(2+κ2(2+3κ2))+2
8x¯
nc1 =
n¯(1−κ22λ2x¯)
2
vci = 1 + n¯
λ2x¯(2+κ2(2+κ2))−2
8x¯
.
(7.29)
The allocation is illustrated in ﬁgure 7.10 which shows that no corner solutions occur
for the chosen parameter range.
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Figure 7.10: Centralized equilibrium allocation with non-myopic voting for n¯ = 1 and
x¯ = 1
Flood-prone areas
The equilibrium allocation for the adopted functional form and residency-based rent
distribution is given by
social optimum and large jurisdiction
single issue authority
g1 =
n¯λ1x¯1
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯1x¯2
n¯λ1x¯1
x¯1+x¯2
n1 =
n¯x¯1
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯1x¯2 n¯x¯1
x¯1+x¯2+2λ21x¯1x¯2
(x¯1+x¯2)2
vi = 1− n¯ 1−λ
2
1x¯1
2(x¯1+x¯2)−2λ21x¯1x¯2 1− n¯
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯21
2(x¯1+x¯2)2
.
(7.30)
The equilibrium allocation for the adopted functional form and equal property shares
is given by
single issue authority large jurisdiction
g1 =
n¯2λ1x¯1
2(x¯1+x¯2)−λ21x¯1x¯2
n¯λ1x¯1
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯1x¯2
n1 =
n¯2x¯1
2(x¯1+x¯2)−λ21x¯1x¯2
n¯x¯1
x¯1+x¯2−λ21x¯1x¯2
vi = 1− n¯4x¯2+x¯1(4−4λ
2
1(x¯1+x¯2)+λ
4
1x¯1x¯2)
2(λ21x¯1x¯2−2(x¯1+x¯2))2 1− n¯
1−λ21x¯1
2(x¯1+x¯2)−2λ21x¯1x¯2 .
(7.31)
A large jurisdiction achieves the social optimum if all citizens own the same land share.
The same holds for a single issue authority and rent distribution to residents with the
adopted functional speciﬁcation. The social optimum is illustrated by the upper part of
ﬁgure 6.9.
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Figure 7.11: Utility and population size depending on land outside the ﬂood plain for
non-myopic voting and n¯ = 1, x¯1 = 1. Upper part: single issue authority
and equal property shares. Lower part: Large jurisdiction and resideny
based rent distribution.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Summary of results
Two observations were the starting point of this dissertation. First, despite past eﬀorts
in ﬂood defense, there is no absolute ﬂood protection. Large damaging ﬂoods occurred
in the past and can be expected in the future. In addition, the current understanding
of climate change suggests that weather extremes will become more frequent, with the
likely consequence of more severe ﬂooding in the future.
These observations led to a study of ﬂooding and ﬂood management in Germany
(chapters 2 and 3) that found two spatial characteristics of ﬂood defense that challenge
the federal organization. Firstly, unidirectional spillovers challenge a decentralized pro-
vision of ﬂood defense, because the interests of downstream riparians are neglected by
upstream jurisdictions. Secondly, jurisdictions that extend over areas in and outside the
ﬂood plain are asked to eﬃciently provide public ﬂood defense. This public good is ben-
eﬁcial for one group of citizens and has no direct beneﬁts for the rest of the population.
Both characteristics challenge the federal organization in diﬀerent ways that also depend
on whether there is the possibility of migration or not.
These challenges led to a theoretical analysis of local public goods with unidirectional
spillovers and heterogeneous beneﬁts. Aiming to capture the essence of public ﬂood
defense, the model considered an upstream and a downstream region. Following the lead
of recent contributions to ﬁscal federalism, the supply of public goods was interpreted as
the outcome of voting decisions. By adopting simple majority voting as the decision rule,
this approach focused on the fundamental interest conﬂicts of upstream and downstream
citizens as well as citizens living in and outside of ﬂood-prone areas.
Chapter 5 introduced the model and investigated diﬀerent jurisdictional organiza-
tions of public good provision. Four diﬀerent decision-making structures were compared:
classical decentralization or centralization (based on jurisdictions containing voters both
with and without beneﬁts of the public goods) and decentralized or centralized sin-
gle issue authorities (whose jurisdictions, by deﬁnition, contain only voters with high
beneﬁts). Single issue authorities come into question for providing ﬂood defense, since
eﬃcient ﬂood defense measures and their beneﬁts are located in the natural ﬂood plain.
Decentralized jurisdictions separate upstream and downstream voters, whereas a cen-
tralized jurisdiction comprises both groups.
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The analysis wasat heartthe comparison of second-best settings, since all federal
organizations have their own shortcomings. Decentralized jurisdictions neglect trans-
frontier spillovers and over- or under-provide the public goods. Centralized jurisdictions
suﬀer from the dominance of the majority. Contrary to what one might intuitively think,
it is not so much the upstream public good that is ﬂawed with centralized voting, but
primarily the downstream public good, without spillovers, that causes large ineﬃciencies.
The downstream public good is either extremely over- or under-provided.
Ineﬃciencies resulting from an uneven distribution of beneﬁts within a region may
call for single issue authorities. In general, ineﬃciencies are particularly large when the
majority and the minority group of the population are of similar size. If no upstream-
downstream spillovers are present, it is always the best to establish single issue author-
ities, because they avoid ineﬃcient majority decisions. If spillovers are present, single
issue authorities are not the general recommendation. Jurisdictions with heterogeneous
beneﬁts are good, if there are large positive spillovers and if there is a small minority
without beneﬁts from public goods. The no-beneﬁt minority drives public good provision
up, which is good when spillovers are positive.
The comparison of the four federal settingsunder the assumption of equally popu-
lated upstream and downstream regions and the same preferences for public goodsleads
to the result that centralized jurisdictions are never the ﬁrst choice when unidirectional
spillovers are present. In most cases decentralized single issue authorities are superior,
except when positive spillovers are suﬃciently large or the no-beneﬁt minority is suﬃ-
ciently small. Then classical decentralized jurisdictions are the best federal organization.
Centralized jurisdictions yield better results when central standards are introduced.
Central standards that require a uniform supply or a uniform consumption level of
public goods were found to have very diﬀerent consequences. Whereas uniform public
good supply does not make centralized voting superior to decentralized voting when
spillovers are unidirectional, a uniform consumption requirement can make centralized
jurisdictions superior to decentralized ones. Partial centralization is a second option
for improving centralized voting outcomes. Since the downstream public good is purely
local, partial centralization, through centralized voting on upstream public good provi-
sion, only makes central jurisdictions superior to decentralized jurisdictions if spillovers
are large enough. However, with negative spillovers, it depends on the majority region
if partially centralized voting is favorable. Whereas an upstream majority prefers an
ineﬃciently high level of public goods, a downstream majority favors no supply, which
is more eﬃcient.
The basic model assumed a given location of voters. This can be unrealistic when pub-
lic good beneﬁts are unevenly distributed across regions and migration is not restricted,
as is usually the case within a country. Free and costless migration was introduced in
chapter 6. Symmetry assumptions with respect to the preference and production side
of the economy were made in order to concentrate on unidirectional spillovers and their
impact on the migration equilibrium under diﬀerent federal organizations. In addition,
public goods beneﬁts were assumed to be evenly distributed within a region, reducing
the possible federal settings to (classical) decentralization and centralization. As voters
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were assumed to be myopic with respect to migration, the eﬀect of public goods on loca-
tional choices was neglected and the provision of public goods followed the established
pattern of the basic model. After voting citizens were allowed to relocate.
By specifying functional forms and assuming that the initial and the ﬁnal popula-
tion distribution were the same under decentralization, federal organizations could be
compared for the case of the same initial population distribution. Decentralization is
superior for most spillover levels, since centralization suﬀers from an ineﬃcient, major-
ity preferred, supply pattern of public goods. Centralization is only superior for large
unidirectional spillovers. Political-economy conditions and the federal organization also
drive the spatial distribution of the population. With decentralized supply that ne-
glects spillovers, the population size of the upstream region decreases in spillovers. This
pattern also holds for centralization with an upstream majority, but is not a general
property for a downstream majority. Under centralization, the majority region attracts
a large population share, which tends to be a stronger inﬂuence on the locational pattern
than spillovers. The migration equilibrium is locationally eﬃcient under centralization
if all citizens own the same share of land and rents ﬂow to land owners. Locational
eﬃciency is neither given with residency-based rent distribution and centralization nor
under decentralization under both rent distribution assumptions.
In a two region model, with only one public good, it was possible to investigate
single issue authorities and their implication on human encroachment of ﬂood-prone
areas. The alternative federal setting under consideration was a large jurisdiction that
comprised both high and no beneﬁt voters. With the adopted functional forms and
symmetry assumptions, it turned out that a single issue authority is better than a large
jurisdiction with unevenly distributed public beneﬁts. A single issue authority has a
positive eﬀect on the equilibrium utility. In contrast, a large jurisdiction provides ﬂood
defense ineﬃciently and may just change the locational pattern without having a positive
welfare eﬀect.
Chapter 7 assumed non-myopic voters and found quite diﬀerent results than for my-
opic voting. Non-myopic voters are aware of the free migration restriction and therefore
vote for a supply pattern that approximates the social optimum. However, due to the
ﬁnancing restriction of a federal organization, the social optimum is not always attain-
able. With unidirectional spillovers and depending on the federal setting, the supply of
public goods deviates from the Samuelson rule whenever the migration equilibrium is
locationally ineﬃcient. Independent of the federal organizations, it turned out that the
initial population distribution (and the resulting political majority under centralization)
has no inﬂuence on the equilibrium allocation. Unlike with myopic voting and also unlike
the basic model without migration, the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization
and centralization are not monotone in spillovers. This implies that one cannot generally
recommend decentralization for small and centralization for large spillover levels. Such a
pattern was suggested in the earlier chapters. Given the `right' rent distribution scheme
it even turned out that centralization may be generally eﬃcient and that decentralization
increasingly falls short of the socially optimal welfare as spillovers grow.
With non-myopic citizens there was no general recommendation that ﬂood defense
179
Chapter 8 Conclusions
shall be provided by a single issue authority. Even though single issue authorities are
eﬃcient in public good supply, they may trigger ineﬃcient locational choices. In contrast,
the outcome is eﬃcient in a large jurisdiction with equal property shares.
It lies in the nature of a theoretical analysis that it makes a number of simplifying as-
sumptions to reduce complexity. While some assumptions are standard for an economic
analysis, others can be discussed in more detail.
First, the model was a political-economy approach, which assumed direct voting on
the supply of public goods. Of course this is a heroic assumption when looking at a
particular public good such as ﬂood defense. There are more sophisticated political-
economy approaches to ﬁscal federalism, for example with a representative democracy.
However, the choice of simple majority voting as a social decision rule oﬀers a perspective
that reveals the basic asymmetry of public good supply with unidirectional spillovers.
This perspective was believed to be useful in reconsidering public ﬂood defense. The
reality of public ﬂood defense may seem to suggest a model that captures a weaker
version of the interest conﬂict between upstream and downstream citizens than was the
case in the basic model. Allowing for migration, as an extension to the basic model, led
to more moderate outcomes, where the supply patterns of public goods seemed to serve
voters at their ﬁnal location much better than was the case in the basic model with a
ﬁxed locational pattern. In reality there is another mechanism that is likely to lead to
outcome that do not conform with the clear cut results of the basic model. The existing
public ﬂood defense is not the result of a once and for all decision, but has gradually
developed over time, since most ﬂood defense measures are long-lived investments. Thus,
the status quo is not no ﬂood protection at all, but rather a given level of protection with
the possibility of small and large additional projects that improve the protection level.
As time goes by, political-economy conditions may change, giving new opportunities
for the implementation of projects. However, in such a situation it is likely that local
beneﬁts and costs and the political constellation are the driving forces of the decision in
favor or against an improvement of public ﬂood defense.
Second, the model considered only one public good per region. This simpliﬁes the
analysis since in reality there is a bundle of measures that can be undertaken to improve
ﬂood protection. In the basic model it is easy to integrate this complexity by interpreting
the critical spillover levels as cut-oﬀ levels. All measures that entail smaller spillovers are
then provided by one federal setting (for example decentralization) and measures with
larger spillovers by another (for example centralization). A similar interpretation of the
spillover parameter is made by Lorz and Willmann (2005). Such an interpretation of the
model is not possible in a migration context, since locational choices are driven by the
overall (public good) utility. It would be possible to interpret the public good of a region
as the aggregation of a bundle of public goods. Spillovers and beneﬁts would then be
the average of the bundle. However, unbundling the public goods and supplying public
goods by diﬀerent federal levels would require a more complex modeling approach.
Third, the model was deterministic in nature and did not consider public ﬂood defense
in the context of risk management. The introductory chapter on ﬂood management
(chapter 2) pointed out that public ﬂood defense primarily reduces the probability of a
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ﬂood and is therefore a form of self-protection. In contrast, locational choices determine
the ﬂood loss potential and are therefore a form of self-insurance. The analysis showed
the clear linkage of public ﬂood defense and locational choices: A high level of regional
ﬂood defense tends to increase the population size of that region.
8.2 Policy implications
The theoretical analysis has implications for actual ﬂood management. Before discussing
these policy implications it is useful to point to limitations of the study that go beyond
the ones mentioned above. In the words of Oates (1999, 1145):
While the existing literature in ﬁscal federalism can provide some general guidance
[...], my sense is that most of us working in the ﬁeld feel more than a little uneasy when
proﬀering advice on many of the decisions that must be made on the vertical ﬁscal and
political structure. We have much to learn!
Given the high level of abstraction of the presented theoretical analysis, it is diﬃcult to
disagree with Oates. However, complementary to the theoretical study, this dissertation
also analyzed the institutional organization of ﬂood management in Germany. The
combination of both makes the following discussion possible.
The discussion of ﬂood management in Germany showed that there is very little eﬀec-
tive cooperation between jurisdictions on the same federal level. There are hardly any
economic linkages that would allow one jurisdiction to co-ﬁnance ﬂood defense measures
that are implemented in other jurisdictions, even if a downstream jurisdiction receives
the primary beneﬁts of upstream measures. Therefore the federal organization has an
important inﬂuence on ﬂood defense.
The theoretical analysis of diﬀerent federal organizations comprises alternative ap-
proaches that made diﬀerent assumptions regarding migration. This leads to the ques-
tion: What is the right model? The free migration assumption seems particularly restric-
tive when considering an upstream region, such as the Upper Rhine, and a downstream
region, such as the Lower Rhine, which are located far apart. The model with a given
location of individuals seems therefore more realistic than the free and costless migration
approaches. In the discussion on ﬂood-prone areas, it is realistic to assume high mobility
between ﬂood risk zones. For large cities near rivers, such as Cologne or Mannheim, it
seems realistic to assume a high degree of mobility between parts that are exposed to
ﬂood risk and other parts that are not exposed.
One guiding question of the analysis asked, if ﬂood defense shall be provided through
decentralized or centralized decision making. The theoretical analysis was skeptical with
regard to centralized provision of ﬂood defense, because the downstream public good
was either excessively over- or under-supplied with a given location of voters. Since
there are diﬀerent sized rivers, centralized provision can refer to diﬀerent federal levels.
For large, ﬁrst-order water bodies the central entity is the federal government and the
Bundesländer are the decentral jurisdictions. For smaller, higher order water bodies, the
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respective central level will be, in most cases, a Bundesland whereas the decentralized
jurisdictions would be on the communal level. The political discussion focuses primarily
on the spillovers on ﬁrst-order rivers, such as the Rhine or the Elbe.
The new Flood Protection Act strengthened the role of the federal level, since it
introduced a common ﬂood protection level that shall be reached throughout in Germany
(according to WHG  31d it is now the goal to achieve a uniform ﬂood protection level
against a Q100-ﬂood, see section 3.1). Deﬁning centralization as it was discussed in
the model, such a central standard is not a regime shift toward centralization, since
the ﬁnancing of ﬂood defense still rests on decentral jurisdictions. A central standard
may increase ﬂood defense, however there is little reason to believe that this increase is
eﬃcient. Downstream jurisdictions still only controll downstream ﬂood defense, which is
a purely local public good. If a standard forces an increase in downstream ﬂood defense,
this is ineﬃcient, because the downstream jurisdiction was free to choose its optimal
ﬂood defense level also without a standard. If the upstream jurisdiction increases its
ﬂood protection level, it may or may not be welfare improving. Flood defense measures
with negative spillovers are counter-productive. Higher levees, for example, are beneﬁcial
for the upstream region, but they have negative eﬀects downstream. Retention basins
have positive spillovers, but their local eﬀect is likely to be smaller than higher levees,
which makes them not the measures of choice for an upstream jurisdiction that wants
to improve its own ﬂood protection level. Thus, a central standard with decentralized
ﬁnancing does not promote a desirable expansion of upstream measures with positive
spillovers, and it does not avoid the implementation of measures with negative spillovers.
Finally, a central standard is likely to interfere with downstream ﬂood defense, which is
a purely local public good.
The theoretical analysis suggested another model of central standards. A central
standard combined with a central budget for public good ﬁnancing can be superior to de-
centralization. With shared costs, upstream riparians also consider (negative) spillovers,
because they inﬂuence the costs of downstream public ﬂood defense. The theoretical
results also suggested that a central ﬂood protection standard has its advantages when
spillovers are negative, whereas it ineﬃciently reduces downstream public good supply
when spillovers are very positive. This ineﬃciency of a common standard arises because
of the asymmetrical nature of the problem. Whereas upstream ﬂood protection is only
possible by upstream public ﬂood defense, downstream ﬂood protection can result from
upstream as well as downstream measures. This asymmetry holds for the two region as
well as the multi-region case.
The Flood Protection Act strengthens the legal protection of the remaining ﬂood
plain that is not protected by levees (on WHG  31b.2, see section 3.1). In Germany,
in many cases only a small share of the natural ﬂood outline remains unprotected and
still functions as a ﬂood plain. Therefore, the protection of these scarce areas from
undesirable land-use changes has a high priority, since a further wealth accumulation has
the likely consequence of additional levees and more negative spillovers to downstream
locations. Despite this positive eﬀect, it can be critically noted that the areas behind
existing levees constitute the critical land for an improvement of public ﬂood defense.
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Areas protected by levees form the potential for regulated or unregulated ﬂood basins
with positive spillovers to downstream locations.
In addition to standards, the Flood Protection Act introduced ﬂood protection plans
(according to WHG  31d, see section 3.1), which shall be developed on the basis of the
whole watershed. It may turn out that this cooperation requirement is enough to foster
the implementation of eﬃcient projects. However, since there were no restrictions on
voluntary inter-jurisdictional cooperation in the past, one has to regret that no clear legal
provisions were introduced that induce the optimal location of ﬂood defense measures
along a river.
One may suspect that the federal standards that where introduced by the Flood
Protection Act do not primarily address the problem of spillovers. Since extreme
and rare ﬂoods are the main challenge for ﬂood management, a common, legal ﬂood
protection level may intend to set clear goals for public ﬂood defense, since the federal
government believes that local policy makers underestimate the risk of ﬂooding. It is
well known that the awareness of the ﬂood hazard decreases continuously after a ﬂood
event. It only takes seven years after a ﬂood for the risk estimation to return to the
same low level as before the ﬂood (IKSR 2002, 12). Similar observations with regard
to rare risks are made and discussed by Kunreuther (1996) and Kunreuther and Pauly
(2003).
The theoretical analysis also considered partial centralization, where only the up-
stream public good is provided centrally and the downstream public good is decen-
tralized. Such partial centralization has its advantages if strong positive spillovers are
present, but performs poorly for negative spillovers and an upstream majority. There-
fore, partially centralized provision can be suggested for ﬂood defense measures with
strong positive spillovers. This leads to a situation where a downstream ﬂood defense
measure is ﬁnanced and implemented by the downstream riparians. At the same time
upstream ﬂood defense measures at the beginning of a river involve upstream as well
as downstream riparians in decision making and ﬁnancing. It is only for measures with
negative spillovers and a upstream majority that such a jurisdictional organization leads
to very ineﬃcient outcomes.
There is one part of ﬂood management with a big inﬂuence on upstream-downstream
spillovers that usually is, by and large, neglected in discussions of ﬂood defense. Levee
failure is a well known and also common phenomenon. There are numerous examples
where a levee failure at one place prevented damage at other locations. However, despite
the fact that this linkage is common knowledge, there is no serious discussion if the
decisions thatinescapablyhave to be made, are eﬃcient or not. Is it more eﬃcient to
risk a levee failure at a highly populated urban area, or is it better to intentionally break
a levee at a sparsely populated part of a river? Of course this is a diﬃcult question!
Currently it is the local level that is primarily responsible for emergency measures in
case of ﬂooding. This reﬂects a decentralized federal setting that avoids the excessive
ineﬃciencies that are present under a centralized setting and unidirectional spillovers.
However, the theoretical analysis showed that some centralized decisions can lead to
better outcomes than decentralized solutions.
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A second guiding question of the analysis asked, if ﬂood defense shall be provided by
single issue authorities that separate areas in and outside the ﬂood plain. This question
gained practical importance in recent years, since the insurance industry has established
a risk-zoning system (on the system, ZÜRS, see section 3.3.2) and the Flood Protection
Act requires the responsible authorities to provide public ﬂood risk maps. Thus, the
exposition to ﬂood risk will be much more transparent in the future than it has been in
the past.
The river basin approach is one ﬁrst step to separate high and no beneﬁt groups in
ﬂood defense. The separation of diﬀerent river basins avoids an extreme spatial incon-
gruence of beneﬁts and cost-sharing. The separation of water basins was discussed in
connection with the recent European Water Framework Directive. However, the decision
was not to form new river basin authorities, but rather to strengthen coordination within
the existing federal structure (see section 3.2.2). Since public ﬂood defense and other
water related issues are, by and large, managed by the same authorities, the chance
was missed to reduce the beneﬁt heterogeneity within jurisdictions in charge of ﬂood
defense. In addition, one can note that river basin authorities would also fail to abolish
beneﬁt heterogeneity completely, because they would include the whole catchment area,
not just the ﬂood plain.
With high mobility between the ﬂood plain and adjoining areas, policy implications
can be drawn from the models that capture migration. The model with free and costless
migration found a clear linkage of ﬂood defense and locational decisions. Of course the
precise form of the linkage depends on the federal organization, however, the theoretical
study clariﬁed that better ﬂood protection leads to human encroachment on ﬂood-prone
areas. Whereas such a levee eﬀect is often seen critically in the literature on ﬂood
management (see section 3.3.3), the theoretical analysis does not generally suggest that
the levee eﬀect is ineﬃcient.
According to the theoretical study it is, in fact, rather diﬃcult to specify conditions
when it is beneﬁcial to establish single issue authorities on ﬂood-prone areas. Already
in a simple setting with one ﬂood-prone area and another area outside the ﬂood plain
there are no clear cut results. Depending on the voting behavior, if voters are myopic
or non-myopic, the rent distribution scheme, and the regional production functions, a
jurisdictional separation can be advisable or not. Beside welfare implications, the federal
organization aﬀects locational choices. Flood defense, that is provided and ﬁnanced by
single issue authorities, leads to a smaller population size living in ﬂood-prone areas than
large jurisdictions where people outside of ﬂood-prone areas also pay for ﬂood defense.1
It is this insight from the theoretical analysis that raises serious doubts as to whether
a federal ﬂood protection standard improves ﬂood management. Even worse, one has
to fear that additional ﬂood protection, provided by heterogeneous beneﬁt jurisdictions,
leads to further human encroachment on ﬂood-prone areas. The co-ﬁnancing of ﬂood
defense by people outside the ﬂood plain makes ﬂood prone areas more attractive. This
1Only myopic voting and a no-beneﬁt majority in a large jurisdiction result in fewer people located in
the ﬂood plain than under a single issue authority. However, this would imply that no public ﬂood
defense is provided; a situation not very common in reality.
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leads to further wealth accumulation in high-risk zones and limits the scarce space for
retention basins.
If there is no exogenously required ﬂood protection level, the migration chapters
showed that there are some cases for which the introduction of ﬂood defense has a large
impact on welfare and a small impact on the population distribution, but there are also
other cases for which the opposite holds. This argument relies on a comparison of a
migration equilibrium with ﬂood defense and a status quo without ﬂood defense. With
an extreme scarcity of land that is not exposed to ﬂood risk, ﬂood defense has a high
impact on welfare and a relatively low impact on the population distribution. With a
large endowment of land outside the ﬂood plain, ﬂood defense has a small impact on
welfare but a large impact on settlements in ﬂood-prone areas. In the latter situation
the welfare loss of restricting such settlements is low. Such a policy could be achieved
by having single issue authorities and not large jurisdictions provide ﬂood defense. As
the theoretical analysis suggested, single issue authorities may even be able to achieve
the social optimum in some cases.
There are a number of reasons in favor of some kind of restriction of human en-
croachment on ﬂood-prone areas. First, the beneﬁts of public disaster aid are clearly
concentrated in ﬂood-prone areas, setting incentives for further settlements if such help
is also expected in the future. As long as ﬂood insurance with risk-related premiums
is not wide spread, potential public disaster relief plays an important role and is likely
to bias locational choices.2 Second, wetlands, which are typically located in ﬂood-prone
areas, are public goods with inter-regional spillovers. Human encroachment intensiﬁes
land-use conﬂicts in the ﬂood plain and may lead to a too low valuation of the beneﬁts
of wetlands. However, these arguments refer to a situation that is far from ﬁrst-best. If
these ineﬃciencies can be addressed directly, better outcomes can be expected in many
cases.
A third guiding question of the analysis asked, if the problem of upstream-downstream
spillovers and spatially heterogeneous beneﬁts from ﬂood defense can be seen indepen-
dently from each other or not. In the model without mobility, there was an interdepen-
dency, because heterogeneous beneﬁts within a jurisdiction were good for some spillover
values.
The theoretical analysis relied on a deterministic approach that did not consider
uncertainty. As was pointed out before, public ﬂood defense primarily reduces the
probability of a ﬂood and locational choices determine the ﬂood loss potential. Because
of this better ﬂood defensewhich tends to increase human encroachment on ﬂood-
prone areashas a clear inﬂuence on the risk proﬁle of ﬂooding: Flooding becomes a
low-probability, high-impact event. With this eﬀect, higher public ﬂood defense leads
2Only if disaster relief would aim to achieve locational eﬃciency could one argue that it is eﬃcient.
However, the analysis showed that locational eﬃciency is a rather demanding concept, since it
compares the net-beneﬁts of an immigrant to a region, across regions. It seems more likely that
ﬂood disaster relief is driven by other considerations. Garrett and Sobel (2003) (see section 3.3.2),
for example, provide empirical evidence for the United States that nearly half of the disaster relief
is motivated politically rather than by need.
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to a ﬂood risk proﬁle that is often considered undesirable. For a risk classiﬁcation in a
policy context see, for example, the classiﬁcation of the German Advisory Council on
Global Change (WBGU 2000). Even if one refrains from such a normative statement,
it follows from the analysis that a high ﬂood protection level triggers land-use decisions
that favor high ﬂood losses in extreme ﬂoods, raising the question of who has to carry
these losses.
As a ﬁnal remark one can express hope that some of the policy implications have the
chance to fall on fruitful ground. Of course, it is a general problem that many insights
in the economic literature are of limited use for decision-making, since models are too
abstract and do not fully account for all interdependencies of real life. However, due to
new approaches in water policy in general (the implementation of the Water Framework
Directive), and due to the introduction of the river basin approach to ﬂood defense in
particular, ﬂood management is in a phase of transition with the chance to correct some
of the mistakes made in the past.
8.3 Extensions
In the context of this dissertation some topics can be suggested for future research.
In the course of the analysis it became all too often evident that the empirical basis of
ﬂood management is weak. This is true despite some large scale ﬂood events in the past.
There is some knowledge of the absolute magnitude of ﬂood damage, but there is no
consistent estimation method, nor a uniﬁed method of sectoral or spatial disaggregation,
that allows a comparison in time or space.
Increasing human settlements in ﬂood-prone areas are often seen as a key problem
in ﬂood management. However, since the empirical basis is weak, there is little insight
in whether there are certain regional hot spots, where the phenomenon is particularly
problematic. The dissertation provided some tentative evidence on aggregated land-use
trends in ﬂood plains. However, there is little knowledge on the driving forces of these
changes. It would be an enormous help to know if land-use changes are driven by ﬂood
defense measures, land-scarcity outside the ﬂood plain, the institutional setting, or other
factors.
From an economic perspective it would be desirable if decisions on ﬂood defense
measures could rely on a sound quantitative assessment of costs and beneﬁts. Such an
assessment needs to take spatial spillovers into account. Since ﬂood events are rare,
simulation models play a crucial role in supporting decisions. It will be important to
ﬁnd ways of addressing the uncertainty that is, and most likely will continue to be,
attached to the underlying hydrological models. It is not eﬃcient if the discussion on
the internalization of spillovers stops already at the point where the `right' hydrological
model is chosen.
On the theoretical level, the dissertation aimed to apply recent political-economy
contributions on ﬁscal federalism to the case of ﬂood management. It became evident
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that the focus on the special features of ﬂood defenseunidirectional spillovers and
spatially heterogeneous beneﬁtsrequired a highly stylized model.
To generalize the conclusions, it would be useful to consider the multi-region case,
where there is not just one upstream and one downstream region that is considered, but
multiple regions that are located along a river. It may also be interesting to study a
tree-shaped river system, where a river at a downstream location is fed by more than
one upstream tributary.
The model used here considered two extreme cases of mobility: either there was no
mobility at all or mobility was perfect by being free and costless. Realistically there is an
intermediate degree of mobility, which could be incorporated into a more complex setting.
In such a setting it would also be interesting to explore variations of non-myopic voting,
which do not assume that voters always correctly anticipate the migration responses.
Under realistic conditions, voters (or decision makers in general) can be expected to
imperfectly anticipate migration responses.
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